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Police officers routinely use their vehicles to pursue individuals 
who flee when signalled to stop.1 Many of these pursuits conclude only 
when drivers, passengers, and pedestrians are injured or killed.2 Indi-
1. The traditional definition of a police pursuit is "an active attempt by a law 
enforcement officer operating a vehicle with emergency equipment to apprehend a sus-
pected law violator in a motor vehicle, when the driver of the vehicle attempts to avoid 
apprehension." R. DUNHAM & G. ALPERT, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPO-
RARY READINGS 217 (1989). Under this definition, an officer's initial signalling of a 
driver to pull over to the side of the road does not become a pursuit until the driver 
exhibits flight behavior and the officer follows. Most law enforcement agencies similarly 
define police pursuits. One agency has exempted from its pursuit definition the act of 
following if it is of a "short duration." See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 
257 joint app. at 90 (1987) (Rule 23, § 8(a) provides: "The guidelines regarding the 
continuous high speed pursuit are not meant to deter the high speed chase situation of 
short duration which is so often necessary in traffic violation enforcement or cases in-
volving misdemeanors"). For purposes of this article, the traditional definition applies 
because pursuits of short duration are as harmful as longer pursuits and the need to 
pursue all traffic offenders is questionable. See e.g., Alpert & Dunham, Policing Hot 
Pursuits: The Discovery of Aleatory Elements, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 
531 (1989) ("no clear relationship between time elapsed and injury"); see infra notes 
262-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unlawfulness of pursuits for non-
serious· traffic offenses. 
2. Barker, Police Pursuit Driving: The Need for Policy, 51 PoLICE CHIEF 70 
(1984) (pursuits "may result in more deaths and injuries than any other law enforce-
ment activity, including the use of firearms"). 
One recent scientific study examined police pursuits in a Florida county. Alpert & 
Dunham, supra note 1, at 527-38. It determined that 34% of all pursuits ended in 
accidents. /d. at 528. Twenty-three percent resulted in bodily injury and 1% resulted 
in death. /d. Of those injured, 63% were either the driver or the passenger, 31% were 
officers, and 6% were bystanders. /d. 
Police officers initiated the "majority of the pursuits ... for relatively minor traffic 
infractions." /d. at 535. 
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viduals harmed as result of a pursuit have generally sought relief under 
state law.8 This relief, however, has often been difficult to obtain be-
cause state law often provides officers with immunity for their discre-
tionary actions.• Recent statistical studies of pursuits11 and decisions by 
the United States Supreme Court,6 however, provide support for the 
position that when police officers use their vehicles to pursue individu-
als, they generally use force that is disproportionate to the need for it. 
Such excessive force may violate an individual's constitutional right to 
personal security,7 a right protected by the fourth amendment's prohi-
Another study examined pursuits that occurred in Minnesota in 1989. 1989 Min-
nesota State Report 124-127. Forty-four percent terminated with an accident. Id. at 
125. Twenty-four percent resulted in bodily injury and less than 1% resulted in fatali-
ties. /d. Of those injured, 54% were the driver, 23% were the driver's passengers, 18% 
were police officers, and 5% were other motorists. /d. Seventy-six percent of the pur-
suits were initiated for traffic offenses. /d. at 124. 
Although examining statistics related to pursuits is helpful in determining whet~er 
the practice of pursuing is too inherently dangerous to justify the risks associated with 
pursuits, one should also recognize that an outcome of a pursuit is not necessarily the 
best measure of whether the force actually used was disproportionate to the need for it. 
See Alpert, Questioning Police Pursuits in Urban Areas, 15 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 
298, 301 (1987) ("The obvious measure, an outcome of a pursuit, may not be a respon-
sible criterion of good or bad police behavior, as many bad pursuits end without an 
accident, and many good pursuits end in an accident."). One should also consider what 
offenses justify police officers engaging in pursuits and under what environmental cir-
cumstances pursuits should be restricted. See infra notes 262-84 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of these issues. 
3. See G. ALPERT & L. FRIDELL, POLICE OFFICERS USE OF DEADLY FORCE: 
GuNs, VEHICLES, AND OTHER WEAPONS (1991) ("Until the Supreme Court acknowl-
edges the severe danger of pursuits ... , the law of pursuits will be that of negli-
gence."). See generally Zevitz, Police Civil Liability and the Law of High Speed Pur-
suit, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 237, 245 (1987) (the typical state statute provides that police 
officers exercise "due regard" during pursuits). 
4. See, e.g., G. ALPERT & L. FRIDELL, supra note 3 ("many states provided lim-
ited sovereign immunity to discretionary rather than ministerial decisions"); Zevitz, 
Police Civil Liability and the Law of High Speed Pursuit, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 237, 254 
(1987) (some states may allow officers immunity if they in "good faith [relied] ... on 
existing departmental pursuit policies"). See generally CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17004.7 
(West 1990) (immunity for public agency if it adopts a pursuit policy that complies 
with statutory requirements); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(b)(l)(a) (Anderson 
1989) (political subdivision has defense to liability unless pursuing officers acted will-
fully or wantonly); id. at § 2744.03(A)(6) (officer is immune unless act was "mani-
festly outside the scope of his employment" or he acted "in bad faith, or in a wanton or 
recklesss manner"). 
5. Alpert & Dunham, supra note l, at 528, 535 (pursuits caused personal inju-
ries in more than one-fifth of all pursuits and the reason compelling the pursuit was a 
traffic offense); 1989 Minnesota Report 1, 125-26 (same). 
6. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's disproportionality standard for excessive force claims. 
7. Although the United States Supreme Court has never detailed the exact scope 
of the right to personal security, the fourteenth amendment prohibits governmental 
officials from imposing "bodily restraint and punishment" unless the government af-
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bition of unreasonable seizures.8 Excessive force may also violate the 
substantive due process component of the fourteenth amendment,9 
fords due process. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (students have an 
interest in personal security); see also Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 
(1990) (mentally ill prisoner has "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs" under the fourteenth amendment); Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (institutionalized persons have a liberty interest in 
personal security). See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (right to 
personal security constitutes a fundamental right). The fourth amendment also protects 
an individual's interest in bodily integrity and autonomy. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Gar-
ner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (individual has a "fundamental interest in his own life"); 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1985) (fourth amendment prohibits unneces· 
sary surgery to remove bullet for evidence during trial); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 
(1968) ("inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the 
streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study"). In describing the scope 
of the right to personal security, some courts have recognized that psychological inju-
ries as well as physical injuries are actionable under the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane) 
(Rubin, J., concurring) (fourth and fourteenth amendment protection "is not limited to 
physical injuries but extends to all damage inflicted"); Wright v. District of Columbia, 
No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 28, 1990) (order granting partial summary judgment) 
(driver pursued by officers in unmarked vehicle stated a fourth amendment claim for 
psychological injury caused by being in fear for her life). This Article focuses on physi-
cal injuries arising from PQlice pursuits, injuries actionable under the fourth or four-
teenth amendments. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides in part that "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures, 
shall not be violated." Id. 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment prohibits state offi-
cials from depriving a person of "life [or] liberty ... without due process of law." /d. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution similarly restricts federal offi-
cials. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Some courts have struggled to understand the substantive 
due process component of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g .• Duckworth v. Franzen, 
780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) (substantive due 
process is an oxymoron). The Supreme Court has stated that conduct that "shocks the 
conscience" violates the substantive due process component of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). One court has stated that apply-
ing the "shocks the conscience" standard is only possible in the context of an excessive 
force claim. Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1990) (uniform 
decisions are possible for fourteenth amendment substantive due process claims that 
implicate physical abuse). 
Recently the Supreme Court clarified that the substantive due process component 
of the fourteenth amendment is one of three types of "due process" claims possible 
under the fourteenth amendment. See Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 983 (1990). 
The Court described the substantive due process component as barring "certain arbi· 
trary, wrongful governmental actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used 
to implement them.'" /d. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). 
The fourteenth amendment also provides protection under section 1983 for violations of 
other substantive rights found in the Bill of Rights, such as the fourth amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Id. at 982-83; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1982). In contrast to these substantive rights, the fourteenth amendment also guaran-
tees the right to procedural due process, the right to a "fair procedure." 110 S. Ct. at 
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which prohibits egregious conduct. Determining the constitutionality of 
police pursuits thus requires consideration of two issues: 1) the stan-
dard of disproportionality under the fourth10 and fourteenth11 amend-
ments and 2) the definition of a "seizure,"12 because the fourth amend-
ment applies only to individuals "seized" within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment.18 
Courts have interpreted both the fourteenth14 and the fourth 111 
'983. 
This Article describes the right of personal security as an interest protected by the 
fourth amendment and the substantive due process component of the fourteenth 
amendment. These are the terms the Supreme Court recently used in discussing exces-
sive force claims brought by pretrial detainees and by individuals seized by police of-
ficers. Connor v. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). The eighth amendment, how-
ever, protects a prisoner's right to personal security. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 
u.s. 312, 318-27 (1986). 
10. See infra notes 214-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stan-
dard of disproportionality under the fourth amendment. 
11. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stan-
dard of disproportionality under the fourteenth amendment. 
12. See infra notes 353-459 and accompanying text for a discussion of what con-
duct constitutes a fourth amendment "seizure." 
13. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) ("all claims that 
law enforcement officers have used excessive force- deadly or not- in the course of 
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed 
under the [f]ourth [a]mendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under 
'substantive due process' approach") (emphasis in original)). 
14. The first test of disproportionality was articulated in Johnson v. Glick, 481 
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 
Since this decision, courts have considered, but interpreted differently, the four 
factors in determining whether force was disproportionate to the need for it. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the first two factors as requiring "grossly 
disproportionate" force. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(citing Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981)). The Seventh Cir-
cuit, in contrast, has recently criticized the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the factors 
and has focused the inquiry on whether the force used was reasonable. Titran v. Ack-
man, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990). Some courts have required the plaintiff to 
have incurred a "severe injury." See, e.g., Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655-56 (lOth 
Cir. 1987). Other courts have required more than a "minimal" injury. See, e.g .. Ben-
nett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (lith Cir. 1990); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 
924 (2d Cir. 1987) ("permanent or severe" injury not necessary). Similar disagreement 
has occurred regarding the fourth factor, the need for malicious conduct. Compare 
Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d at 265 (malice necessary) with Landol-Rivera v. Cruz 
Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990) ("'reckless or callous indifference to an 
individual's right'" sufficient) (quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 
553, 559 (1st Cir. 1989)). The Supreme Court, however, has expressly left open 
whether conduct that is grossly negligent or reckless is actionable under the fourteenth 
amendment. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986). See generally 
Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right to Personal Security 
under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation of the 
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REv. 171, 174-99 (1987) 
(collecting fourteenth amendment excessive force cases). 
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amendment as prohibiting disproportionate force. In 1973, Judge 
Friendly of the Second Circuit first detailed in Johnson v. Glick16 the 
following four factors for determining when force is disproportionate 
under the fourteenth amendment: 1) the need for the force, 2) the rela-
tionship between the need and the amount of force used, 3) the extent 
of the injury, and 4) the officer's motives. 17 Since this decision, all 
courts have applied the first two factors, 18 which directly, relate to the 
question of proportionality, and only a few courts have considered the 
last two factors/ 9 which· do not directly relate to the issue of 
proportionality. 
The fourth amendment standard. of proportionality similarly en-
tails consideration of the first two Glick factors.20 In 1985, the Su-
preme Court in Tennessee v. Garner21 implicitly applied these Glick 
factors to a fourth amendment excessive force claim.22 In Garner, the 
Court held that police officers used disproportionate force when they 
killed a burglary suspect who was attempting to ftee.28 In balancing the 
interests of the parties, the Court noted that the state's need to appre-
hend the individual did not outweigh the suspect's interest in his life 
because the suspect did not present a risk to others if left at large, even 
though he had allegedly committed a felony. 2" Recently, the Supreme 
Court in Graham v. Connorr. applied the Garner proportionality test to 
15. In 1985, the fourth amendment became a basis for evaluating the excessive-
ness of force used during an arrest after the Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Garner, 
471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985), declared that the use of deadly force to stop all fleeing felons 
was objectively unreasonable and that this force violated the fourth amendment. See, 
e.g .• Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986) (examining excessive force claim under both fourth 
and fourteenth amendment); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 
1987) (examining excessive force claim soley under fourth amendment standard of ob-
jective reasonableness). Recently, the Supreme Court declared that only the fourth 
amendment's standard of reasonableness applies to claims that officers used excessive 
force arising from a stop, an arrest, or "other seizure" of an individual. Graham v. 
Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). For a discussion of how the fourth amendment 
standard of reasonableness questions the disproportionality of force, see infra notes 
214-93 and accompanying text. 
16. 481 E2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 
17. /d. at 1033. 
18. See supra note 14 and infra notes 319-22 for a discussion of the federal 
circuit courts' interpretation of the Glick factors. 
19. 481 F.2d at 1033. 
20. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion the fourth 
amendment standard of disproportionality. 
21. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
22. See infra notes 224-47 and accompanying text for a discussion the Garner 
standard of disproportionality. 
23. 471 U.S. at 11-12. 
24. /d. ' 
25. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). 
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the use of nondeadly force. 28 The Court determined that the force ap-
plied should be proportionate to the danger posed by the suspect, with 
the danger being measured by the seriousness of the alleged offense and 
the risk of harm in failing to capture the suspect.27 In addition, the 
Court clarified that the fourth Glick factor -the officials' motives-
was not necessary to establish a fourth amendment excessive force 
claim.28 
When police officers pursue individuals without relating the risk of 
harm inherent in the pursuit to the offense or offenses initiating the 
pursuit, they may breach the duty they owe under the fourth29 and 
fourteenth80 amendments not to use force that unduly infringes upon 
an individual's interest in personal security. The scope of protection 
available under these amendments, however, depends upon the relation-· 
ship between the police officers and the injured individual. The fourth 
amendment specifically applies to the relationship between the police 
officers and individuals "seized" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment.81 In contrast, the fourteenth amendment applies to the re-
lationship between police officers and individuals not "seized" within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment.82 Determining which amend-
ment applies thus depends upon whether police officers "seized" an in-
dividual. The Court's recent decision in Brower v. County of lnyo,88 
however, makes this task difficult because it set forth a new definition 
of a fourth amendment "seizure. " 84 
In Brower, the Court stated that a seizure occurs "only when there 
is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means 
intentionally applied."86 Brower not only leaves unclear whether this 
definition replaces the Court's prior two "seizure" definitions,88 but it 
26. Id. at 1871-72. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 1872-73. 
29. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty 
police officers owe under the fourth amendment. 
30. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty 
police officers owe under the fourteenth amendment. 
31. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989); see also infra notes 
355-457 and accompanying text for a discussion of when individuals are "seized" 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 
32. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.10. 
33. 489 u.s. 593 (1989). 
34. See infra notes 404-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confu-
sion created by the Court's new "seizure" definition. 
35. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-99. 
36. See infra n.otes 368-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
"seizure" definition the Court articulated in Terry v. Ohio,'392 U.S. 1, 20 n.l6 (1968) 
and infra notes 383-400 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "seizure" defini-
tion the Court articulated in INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984). 
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also creates two distinct causation issues for pursuits:37 whether a pur-
suit caused an individual to stop38 and whether the pursuit caused an 
individual's injuries.39 Applying the new "seizure" definition in the con-
text of a pursuit claim thus requires an understanding of how police 
officers may use their cruisers as both physical force40 and psychologi-
cal force41 to apprehend and injure an individual. 
Whether a pursuit violates the fourth or fourteenth amendment 
depends upon how one views the force officials use during a pursuit -
that is, whether it was disproportionate and whether it effected a fourth 
amendment "seizure." Resolving these issues, however, also entails 
choosing between two polar modes of discourse,•• "communalism"43 
and "individualism. "44 According to Professor Balkin, an individualist 
"deemphasize[s] a person's responsibility for the effect of her behavior 
on others" and a communalist emphasizes this responsiblity.45 Each 
37. See infra notes 422-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causa-
tion issues created under the new "seizure" definition. 
38. See infra notes 415-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issue of 
causation to stop under the new "seizure" definition. 
39. See infra note 424 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causation 
issue relating to an individual's injuries. 
40. See infra notes 125, 128-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of how 
police officers use physical force during pursuits. 
41. See infra notes 127, 139-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of how 
police officers use psychological force during pursuits. 
42. Recently Professor Balkin discerned two modes of discourse in his attempt to 
develop "a semiotics of legal discourse - that is, understanding legal discourse as a 
system of interrelated signs, much like a language." Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsi-
bility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 200 (1990). 
43. Professor Balkin has defined "communalism'.' as a perspective that compels 
one to characterize factual issues in a manner that deemphasizes the injured person's 
responsiblity for the harm ~hat occurred and emphasizes the injurer's responsibility for 
the harm. ld. at 207-211. 
44. Professor Balkin has defined "individualism" as a perspective that compels 
one to characterize factual issues in a manner that emphasizes the injured person's 
responsiblity for the harm that occurred and deemphasizes the injurer's responsibility 
for the harm. /d. 
45. /d. at 207. Professor Ba'Ikin has recognized that the question of whether a 
person was an injured party or the injuring party is also a question resolved by rhetoric. 
/d. at 211. He has emphasized that factual characterization is the key to understanding 
legal discourse about responsibility: 
Terms like 'responsibility' or 'injury' require a context in which to be under-
stood and used. To the extent that we can vary the context, or rather our 
description of the context, we can vary the meaning of these terms . . . . 
[W]ithout a grounding in a particular set of social assumptions, legal con-
cepts like 'responsibility,' 'harm,' and 'injury,' threaten to become empty. By 
varying our assumptions we can produce radically different conclusions 
about who is harming whom, what is the relevant injury, and who is ulti-
mately responsible for the injury. 
/d. at 210. 
Determining responsibility for harm is thus a question of how one characterizes 
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perspective influences how one characterizes the underlying issues re-
lating to the general issue of responsibility - actions, "intention, cau-
sation, free will, and available options."46 In the context of a pursuit, 
the injured party, the plaintiff, generally adopts a communalist position 
because this position emphasizes the responsibility of police officers for 
their actions during pursuits and deemphasizes the individual's actions 
during the pursuit.47 In contrast, police officers, the defendants, gener-
ally adopt an individualist position because they emphasize the individ-
ual's responsibility for his actions during a pursuit and deemphasize the 
officers' actions.48 The particular viewpoint accepted by a court ulti-
mately determines whether a pursuit is subject to constitutional 
scrutiny.49 
Any court's determination of the constitutionality of pursuits en-
tails a consideration of policy. This Article advocates that courts adopt 
a communalist position in determining the constitutionality of pursuits 
because a communalist position is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
perspective as expressed in excessive force cases. 5° In evaluating the use 
of force by officials, the Supreme Court has strongly protected an indi-
vidual's interest in personal security.111 Under a communalist perspec-
tive, pursuits would be permissible only when deadly force would be 
authorized and the risk to the public is minimal.112 
facts. Balkin has identified rhetorical devices that courts use in describing the facts 
relating to responsibility. /d. at 212-53. According to Balkin, a communalist perspec-
tive would compel the following factual characterizations: 1) emphasizing facts that 
relate to the defendant's responsibility and deemphasizing facts that relate to the plain-
tiff's responsibility, 2) broadly characterizing inculpating facts about the defendant 
that relate to causal probability and narrowly characterizing exculpating facts about 
the defendant that relate to causal responsibility, 3) abstractly describing the defend-
ant's actions concerning the foreseeability of harm and concretely describing the plain-
tiff's actions concerning the foreseeability of harm, 4) broadly describing the time 
frame relating to the defendant's inculpatory conduct and narrowly describing the time 
frame relating to the plaintiff's conduct, and 5} narrowly describing the options availa-
ble to the plantiff and broadly describing the options available to the defendant. /d. An 
individualist perspective would compel the opposite characterizations. Id. at 207, 212-
53. 
46. Id. at 211. 
47. See infra notes 84-90, 96-97 and accompanying text for an application of the 
communalistic perspective to police pursuits. 
48. See infra notes 78-83, 94-95 and accompanying text for an application of the 
individualistic perpective to police pursuits. 
49. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the individu-
alist and communalist perspectives as applied to police pursuits. 
50. See generally, Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989); Brower v. County 
of lnyo, 490 U.S. 593 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see also infra 
notes 224-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Supreme Court has 
implicitly expressed a communalist perspective in evaluating excessive force claims. 
51. Id. 
52. See infra notes 84-90, 96-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
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Part II discusses the need to adopt a communalist perspective in 
evaluating pursuits.113 It contends that this perspective allows pursuits 
to be subject to constitutional scrutiny.114 Part III describes how police 
officers use either physical or psychological force to cause injuries dur-
ing pursuits.1111 Part IV details the broad protection that the courts have 
afforded to an individual's interest in personal security under the 
fourth116 and fourteenth117 amendments. This section demonstrates that 
most pursuits constitute the use of disproportionate force. Part V ana-
lyzes the three "seizure" definitions that the Supreme Court has articu-
lated.118 The analysis reveals that the fourth amendment generally ap-
plies to the relationship between the police officers and the pursued 
driver and his passengers because police officers "seize" these individu-
als within the meaning of the fourth amendment during a pursuit.119 
Further, the fourteenth amendment applies to the relationship between 
police officers and other drivers, their passengers, and pedestrians be-
cause these individuals are not "seized" during a pursuit.80 Part VI 
indicates that the pursuit policies of many law enforcement agencies 
are unconstitutional. Such policies may expose these agencies to civil 
liability under section 1983.61 This Article concludes with a discussion 
outlining ways to balance a government's need for police pursuits with 
an individual's interest in personal security, as protected by both the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments. 
proper use of police pursuits from a communalistic perspective. 
53. See infra notes 67-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need to 
apply a communalistic perspective to police pursuits. 
54. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the 
communalist perspective, in contrast to the individualist perspective, allows police pur-
suits to be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
55. See infra notes 125-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of how police 
officers use physical or psychological force during a pursuit. 
56. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to 
personal security under the fourth amendment. 
57. See infra notes 294-351 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right 
to personal security under the fourteenth amendment. 
58. See infra notes 357-459 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mean-
ing of a fourth amendment "seizure." 
59. See infra notes 380, 402-403, 432-33, 436-39 and accompanying text for an 
application of the Supreme Court's "seizure" definition as applied to a pursued driver 
and her passengers. 
60. See infra notes 380, 402-03, 434 and accompanying text for an application of 
the Supreme Court's "seizure" definition as applied to other motorists and pedestrians. 
61. See generally City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.lO (1989) 
("need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force ... 
can be said to be 'so obvious,' that the failure to do so could properly be characterized 
as 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional rights"). 
1991] HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS 215 
II. THE NEED TO SUBJECT POLICE PURSUITS TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
SCRUTINY 
Determining whether the practice of police pursuits should be sub-
ject to constitutional scrutiny under the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments is a question linked not only to constitutional doctrines62 associ-
ated with these amendments but also to policy. Policy is implicated in 
every court's examination of the constitutional doctrines associated 
with pursuits, because enmeshed in all pursuit cases are complex social 
issues of who should be responsible for the harm that arises from a 
pursuit.68 Scholars have sometimes referred to the contrasting policies 
62. The constitutional doctrines associated with fourth amendment excessive 
force claims focus upon whether police officers "seized" an individual and whether the 
force used was disproportionate. In analyzing pursuit claims under the fourth amend-
ment, some courts have avoided discussion of either of these constitutional doctrines 
because they have determined that police do not use force during a pursuit. See, e.g., 
Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986) ("police used absolutely no force" 
during pursuit). This narrow perspective fails to see how police officers are implicated 
in the harm that pursuits present. A policy of strongly guarding against physical intru-
sions, however, would discern that police officers are implicated in the harm that occurs 
during pursuits. This perspective is similar to the perspective Professor Balkin has de-
scribed as "communalism." Balkin, supra note 42, at 206-11. 
63. In determining whether police officers or the pursued driver caused the harm 
that occurred as a result of a pursuit, many courts have attributed responsibility to the 
pursued driver for the harm that he incurred. See, e.g .. Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 
89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990) (even though 
police officers allegedly knew that driver and passenger would lose control of their vehi-
cle as they began approaching a dangerous curve, police officers who failed to termi-
nate the pursuit did not cause their deaths); Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 
263 (8th Cir. 1989) (officers who pursued motorcylist and his passenger for failing to 
wear helmets did not "seize" them within the meaning of the fourth amendment even 
though pursuit ended in fatal accident; there was "no evidence that either of the police 
cars collided with the motorcycle or innocent victim); Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 668 F. 
Supp. 1269, 1273 (N.D. Iowa 1987), appeal denied sub nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 
845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 857 F.2d 502 (8th cir. 1988) (pursuit of 
motorcyclist for failing to stop at a stop sign and for failing to have a headlight on was 
constitutional under both fourth and fourteenth amendments because the motorcyclist 
caused his own harm by crashing into another vehicle); Boren v. City of Colorado 
Springs, 624 F. Supp. 474, 477 (D. Colo. 1985) (although the driver was pursued by an 
unmarked police vehicle and even though officers did not have probable cause to believe 
that the driver had violated any offense, driver who was in fear of his life caused his 
own injury by leaving his vehicle); Veach v. Cross, 532 N.E.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1988) (pursued driver, not police officers, caused the injury the passenger 
incurred when the vehicle crashed into the ditch). Some courts have characterized the 
facts in a manner to suggest that the pursuit did not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation. See, e.g., Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987) (officers' 
pursuit at speeds greater than 100 miles per hour of driver who had allegedly been 
driving in an unsafe manner did not "rise to the level of gross negligence and outra-
geous conduct necessary to sustain a section 1983 claim"); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 
947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986) (even though police officer exceeded the speed limit by 15 
miles per hour and failed to use his lights or sirens, his conduct amounted only to 
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influencing decisions as "individualism"64 and "communalism"611 or "al· 
truism."66 An examination of these polar policies reveals that in the 
negligence, not actionable under the fourth or fourteenth amendment); Roach v. City 
of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (pursuit did not "rise to the level 
of gross negligence"); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dept., 721 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. 
Ark. 1989) ("[a]t some point, continued pursuit at high speeds in heavy traffic might 
rise to the level of recklessness, but the brief chase here did not involve such disregard 
of known dangers as to allow the plaintiffs to recover against the officer"). Some courts 
have stated that a pursuit does not involve the use of any force. See, e.g., Brower v. 
County Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1987) (police officers used no force during a 
pursuit; decedent had the option of stopping before crashing into a roadbloek), rev'd, 
489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986) (pur-
sued driver's crash was not a "result of the officer's show of authority," but instead a 
result of his loss of control of the vehicle when he crashed into a tree). Some courts 
have not analyzed whether police officers use force during a pursuit and have instead 
tersely concluded that the pursuit was reasonable. See, e.g., Roach v. City of Freder-
icktown, 882 F.2d at 297 (pursuit of vehicle with license plates registered to another 
vehicle was reasonable, even though driver was killed and two persons in another car 
were seriously injured); Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Minn. 1990) ("mere 
pursuit, without more, [does not] constitute the exercise of unreasonable force"). Some 
courts have also determined that police officers have no duty to refrain from pursuits, 
regardless of the risk to the public. See, e.g., Jackson v. Olson, 712 P.2d 128, 130-31 
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting majority rule that police officers have no duty to refrain 
from pursuing drivers, even for misdemeanor offenses, "even when risk of harm to the 
public arising from the chase is foreseeable"). 
Few courts have subjected pursuits to constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Brower v. 
County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1317 n.l (9th Cir. 1989) (in dicta the court stated that 
police officers may not be able to use the danger present during a pursuit as a reason 
justifying their use of force); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968, 975 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(city failed to properly train police officers about policies on the use of "high speed 
chases"); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (passenger stated claim 
under fourteenth amendment for psychological injury he received during pursuit initi-
ated by police officers in an unmarked vehicle); Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1211 
(5th Cir. 1985) (injured passenger stated claim under the fourth amendment when 
police officer's used roadblock to stop driver who refused to terminate the pursuit); 
Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 920-22 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (even 
though officers did not directly use "physical force," they may be liable for the death of 
a driver who lost control of his vehicle; jury will decide whether high-speed pursuit of a 
speeding driver "amounted to an abuse of their police powers"); Wright v. District of 
Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 21, 1990) (order granting partial summary judg-
ment) (driver pursued by officers in unmarked vehicle stated a fourth amendment 
claim for psychological injury caused by being in fear for her life); Travis v. City of 
Mesquite, No. C-8576 (Tex. Dec. 31, 1990) (WESTLAW, State Library, Tex. file) (pur-
suit of person allegedly involved in prostitution may constitute "deliberate indifference" 
to personal security rights of third parties who were injured and killed in violation of 
fourteenth amendment). · 
64. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 206-211; see also infra notes 78-83, 94-95. 
65. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 206-211; see also infra notes 84-90, 96-97. 
66. Professor Balkin has stated that his theory of individualism and communal-
ism is similar to Professor Duncan Kennedy's theory of individualism and altruism, a 
theory Kennedy applied to contract law. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 202. In applying 
Kennedy's theory to contract law, "denying contractual liability in the absence of con-
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context of police pursuits courts should adhere to a policy of commu-
nalism, because to do otherwise would be to allow the dangerous prac-
tice of pursuits to evade constitutional scrutiny. 
A policy of communalism affords individuals more protection of 
their right to personal security than does a policy of individualism. 
Communalism recognizes that when a person is injured,67 others may 
be implicated in the harm that the person experienced;68 individualism, 
however, emphasizes that each person needs to protect himself from the 
harm associated with the presence of others.69 Because communalism 
sideration was relatively individualist, while permitting recovery in cases of detrimental 
reliance was relatively altruist." /d. at 203. The only difference between Kennedy's 
theory and Balkin's is the manner in which each theory emphasizes or deemphasizes 
excuses or defenses. /d. at 204. Under Kennedy's theory, individualism "deem-
phasize[s] both liability and the recognition of excuses and defenses, [and] altruism 
emphasize[s] both liability and the recognition of excuses and defenses." Id. (emphasis 
in original). Under Balkin's theory, although individualism similarly deemphasizes lia-
bility, it emphasizes, not deemphasizes, excuses or defenses because these are means of 
diminishing liability in tort Jaw. /d. 
67. Although determining that an individual was physically injured during a pur-
suit is not dependent upon how one characterizes the facts, Professor Balkin has noted 
when an individual asserts that she was acting in self-defense, factual characterization 
is central to determining whether the individual was the injured or the· injurer. See 
Balkin, supra note 42, at 235-36 (questioning whether a battered wife who killed her 
husband was the injured or injurer). 
68. /d. at 206-07. Courts can find that other individuals were implicated in the 
harm by using rhetorical devices that make their participation seem obvious. Id. at 210. 
They can also conclude that others were not implicated by using the same rhetorical 
devices, but in the opposite manner. Id. According to Professor Balkin, the following 
rhetorical devices might be present in an opinion that represents a communalist per-
spective, one that would find that a defendant was implicated in the harm that oc-
curred: 1) characterizing the facts to emphasize the defendant's responsibility and to 
deemphasize the plaintiff's responsibility, 2) characterizing broadly inculpatory facts 
relating to the defendant's link to the harm and narrowly characterizing exculpatory 
facts relating to the defendant's distance from the harm, 3) using abstract terms to 
describe the forseeability of harm to the plaintiff, 4) using a broad time frame to find 
inculpatory facts relating to the defendant and a narrow time frame to find exculpatory 
facts relating to the defendant, and 5) narrowly characterizing alternative ways for the 
plaintiff to have acted and broadly characterizing the options available to the defend-
ant. /d. at 202-52; see also id. at 252-53 for a concise chart summarizing the rhetorical 
devices relating to the characterization of responsibility. See generally Note, Police 
Liability for Creating the Need to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, 86 MICH. L. 
REv. 1982, 1985 n.17 (1988) ("social policy considerations have persuaded courts to 
find defendants liable for civil damages even in cases in which the line of causation 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury is so indirect that defendant could not 
have had any meaningful choice in causing the injury"). 
69. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 206-07. Courts can deemphasize the role of 
others in causing harm by using rhetorical devices that make their involvement seem 
remote. /d. at 210. The following rhetorical devices might be present in an opinion that 
represents an individualist perspective, one that would find that a defendant was not 
implicated in the harm that occurred: 1) ·characterizing the facts to deemphasize the 
defendant's responsibility and emphasize the plaintiff's responsibility, 2) characterizing 
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may provide the injured individual with compensation for the harm in-
curred, the availability of compensation may deter others in the future 
from acting in a manner that threatens the safety of others.70 Individu-
alism, on the other hand, forces the harmed individual to incur the loss 
without any compensation and fails to deter others from causing simi-
lar harm. 
Although these simple contrasting perspectives seem removed from 
constitutional analysis, Professor Balkin has cogently detailed how 
these perspectives influence courts in deciding important legal issues.71 
For instance, courts may advance a perspective by using rhetorical de-
vices that are hidden in the deep structures of an opinion.72 Therefore, 
understanding how courts may apply these devices aids in discerning 
the need to adopt a communalist perspective of police pursuits. 
The typical pursuit has different classes of injured persons: the 
pursued driver, passengers· in the pursued vehicle, other drivers and 
their passengers, and pedestrians. The perspective one adopts may de-
pend upon how one perceives the culpability of the particular injured 
person. To group these plaintiffs according to culpability would result 
in two classes: the culpable plaintiff- the pursued driver, who violated 
a law by fleeing - and nonculpable plaintiffs - the pursued's passen-
gers and other persons harmed who have done nothing to engender the 
pursuit. 
When passengers, motorists, ·and pedestrians are injured, the cen-
tral issue is who is responsible,78 the pursued driver or the police of-
narrowly inculpatory facts relating to the defendant's link to the harm and characteriz-
ing broadly the exculpatory facts relating to the defendant's proximity to the harm, 3) 
using concrete terms to describe the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; 4) using 
a narrow time frame to find inculpatory facts relating to the defendant and a broad 
time frame to find exculpatory facts relating to the defendant, and 5) broadly charac-
terizing the alternative ways for the plaintiff to have acted and narrowly characterizing 
the options available to the defendant. /d. at 202-52; see also id. at 252-53 for a con-
cise chart summarizing the rhetorical devices relating to the characterization of 
responsibility. 
70. Jeffries, Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation to Risk in 
Constitutional Torts, 15 VA. L. REV. 1461, 1462-63 (1989). 
71. See Balkin, supra note 42. 
72. /d. at 200. 
73. The term "responsible" implies that ultimate liability may lie with either the 
police officers or the pursued driver. Although Professor Balkin indicates how courts 
use rhetorical devices to determine the ultimate issue of liability, the devices also apply 
to issues related to the ultimate issue, such as causation. /d. at 240-46. This Article 
discusses Professor Balkin's theory, not as a means to impose liability upon police of-
ficers for the harm that arises from pursuits, but instead to subject pursuits to constitu-
tional scrutiny under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Professor Balkin's theory 
is helpful in the pursuit context to aid courts in discerning that police officers use either 
physical or psychological force during a pursuit and that this force can cause injuries to 
the pursued drivers and others. Adopting a communalist perspective would allow pur-
suit claims to be subject to constitutional scrutiny to determine whether the force police 
1991] HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS 219 
fleers who pursued the driver. When police cruisers crash into one of 
these individuals, causation is not in issue because the police officers 
directly caused the harm.74 When the pursued's vehicle inflicts the 
harm, the causation question, however, is complex. The actions of the 
pursued driver cannot be subject to constitutional scrutiny because the 
driver is a private actor, not a state official.76 The actions of police 
officers do, however, signify the presence of state action.76 Thus the 
officers' actions may be subject to constitutional scrutiny, but only if a 
court finds them to be causally implicated in the harm. 
Resolving the issue of causation depends upon how one character-
izes the facts, whether it is from a communalist or individualist per-
spective.77 When police officers are the defendants, the individualist 
officers use is actually disproportionate to the need. Many courts have failed to discern 
that police officer use any force; thus, they never need to determine whether the alleged 
force caused any injuries and whether the force used was disproportionate to the need 
for it. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text for these issues and how courts 
have resolved them. 
74. Causation is not an issue, however, only to the degree that the facts cannot 
be subject to an interpretation that the pursued driver was somehow responsible for the 
officer's cruiser hitting her. According to Professor Balkin, if facts can be subject to 
different interpretations, then courts may resolve the causation issue either under a 
communalist perspective or an individualist perspective. Balkin, supra note 42, at 240-
46. 
75. A remedy under state law may be available, but this remedy can be without 
any force if the pursued driver has no assets. The profile of the typical pursued driver 
indicates that the driver is generally a young male. See, e.g., H. NUGENT, E. CONNORS, 
J. MCEWEN & L. MAYO, RESTRICTIVE POLICIES FOR HIGH-SPEED POLICE PURSUITS 17 
(1989) (almost 60% of pursued drivers were between the ages of 18 and 25; 96% were 
males); Beckman, Identifying Issues in Police Pursuits: The First Research Findings, 
54 POLICE CHIEF 57, 60 (1987) (82% of suspects were between the ages of 11 and 30; 
96% were males). 
The private person's actions can signify state action when the person acts jointly 
with a state official. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) 
(state action may be present if private restaurant owner conspired with police officers). 
A pursued driver, however, acts as an adversary to the police officers and thus she is 
not a state actor. See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-326 (1981) 
(public defender does not act jointly with a state, even though paid by the state for the 
legal services he provided, because the defender acts as an adversary to state). 
76. For the purpose of claims brought under section 1983, whenever a plaintiff 
has established state action he also has established action "under color of [state] law." 
See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982) ("the under-
color-of-state-law requirement does not add anything not already included within the 
state-action requirement of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment"). 
If federal officials abuse the power they have under federal law, their actions con-
stitute federal action and they may be subject to liability for a violation of an individ-
ual's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (federal officials liable for violating an 
individual's fourth amendment right to be free from an an unlawful search and 
seizure). 
77. See generally Balkin, supra note 42, at 240-43 (discussing rhetorical devices 
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perspective shifts the responsibility of the harm to the pursued driver, 
but the communalist perspective allows courts to see how the police 
officers are implicated in the harm. 
From an individualist perspective, a court would characterize the 
facts in a manner that would suggest that responsibility follows natu-
rally from the facts it emphasizes. The court would declare that the 
pursued driver was in control of the pursuit - he could have stopped 
the pursuit at anytime.78 
This perspective also would emphasize that it was the pursued 
driver's vehicle, not the police officers' cruiser, that physically produced 
the harm.79 In addition, it would emphasize the pursued driver's incul-
patory conduct in failing to follow the officers' command to stop.80 To 
that enable courts to resolve the issue of causation in the manner that furthers either 
an individualist or a communalist perspective). 
78. One rhetorical device focuses on the free will of an individual and the options 
available to him. ld. at 233-46. From an individualist perspective, one would character-
ize the plaintiff's options broadly and the defendant's options narrowly. Id.; see, e.g., 
Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 668 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (N.D. Iowa), appeal denied sub 
nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 857 F.2d 
502 (8th Cir. 1988). In Tagstrom, a federal court used an individualist perspective as it 
discussed the issue of free will and causation: 
The Court believes that the proper focus should be upon the nature of the 
[officers') acts, rather than the risk created or the foreseeability of the harm. 
The pursuit, by itself, did not limit the plaintiff's ability to protect himself 
from harm in the same way in which a shot or attempt to run him down 
would limit that ability. At all times the plaintiff retained the ability to 
lower or eliminate the risk of injury by slowing down or stopping. Instead, 
he appears to have preferred the risk of injury over the risk of apprehension 
and suffered the consequences of that choice. Because the Court cannot find 
that the plaintiff was forced to make that choice, it cannot find that the 
[officers] ... used excessive force or any. force. 
Id. Although the court states that the focus is on the police officers' conduct, it actually 
characterized the facts to emphasize the plaintiff's inculpatory act of fleeing. The court 
deemphasized the officers' role in the pursuit by finding that the police officers may not 
have even used "any force" during the pursuit. Similarly, it focused on the plaintiff's 
options, not the officers' option of terminating the risk of harm. 
79. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 263 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(there was "no evidence that either of the police cars collided with the motorcycle or 
the innocent victim"). One rhetorical device relates to emphasis and deemphasis of 
facts relating to responsibility. Balkin, supra note 42, at 202-12. From an individualist 
perspective, one would emphasize facts relating to the plaintiff's responsibility and 
deemphasize facts relating to the defendant's responsiblity. Id. 
80. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1987) (pur-
sued driver had "numerous opportunities to stop" pursuit before he crashed into a 
roadblock), rev'd, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989). One rhetorical device characterizes events 
either broadly or narrowly depending upon whether they are inculpatory or exculpa-
tory. Balkin, supra note 42, at 212-20. Under an individualist perspective, one would 
broadly characterize inculpatory events relating to the plaintiff and exculpatory events 
relating to the defendant; one would also narrowly characterize exculpatory events re-
lating to the plaintiff and inculpatory events relating to the defendant. Id. 
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the same degree that it emphasizes facts associated with the pursued 
driver's blameworthy conduct, it would deemphasize the police officers' 
role in the pursuit.81 By using concrete language, a court adhering to 
an individualist perspective would state that the police officers could 
not have foreseen the specific accident, nor could they have known who 
in particular would be injured.82 In addition, it would deemphasize that 
police officers have the option to decide whether they should pursue an 
individual under the circumstances.88 
A communalist perspective, however, reverses the emphasis and 
adopts the opposite characterization. From a communalistic perspec-
tive, a court would declare that the police officers were in control of the 
pursuit.8" The officers could not only determine whether to initiate a 
pursuit but also when to terminate the pursuit if it became apparent 
that the danger of harm was too great. 811 By using abstract language, 
81. See supra notes 78-80 for a discussion of this rhetorical device; see also Britt 
v. Little Rock Police Dept., 721 F. Supp. 189, 194 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (deemphasizes 
police officer's role in the pursuit). In Britt, a federal court factually characterized the 
police officer's role from an individualist perspective: 
The officer pursued in a chase that lasted about a minute, including a brief 
period of time when the stolen car was stopped and apparently out of gear. 
There was initially not much traffic, and the officer was on the verge of 
breaking off the pursuit when the accident occurred. He did not see the 
actual accident because the stolen car had disappeared through a dust cloud. 
Id. The court deemphasizes the officer's role during the pursuit by highlighting the 
short duration of the pursuit, the officer's assertion that he was just about to terminate 
the pursuit, and the distance between the officer's vehicle and the crash. Studies have 
indicated, however, that accidents are as likely to happen during pursuits of short dura-
tion as they are during pursuits of longer duration. See supra note 1. 
82. See e.g., Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(officer "did not intend for the pursuit to end by means of an accident with another 
vehicle"). One rhetorical device relates to characterization of the foreseeability of 
harm. Balkin, supra note 42, at 221-227. Under an individualist perspective, one would 
use concrete language to describe whether the defendant could have foreseen the spe-
cific harm and abstract language to describe whether the plaintiff could have foreseen 
the general harm. Id. 
83. See, e.g., Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987) (whether the 
officers chose to pursue or not to pursue, they could have been exposed to a lawsuit for 
their actions or for their failure to act); see also supra note 69. 
84. See, e.g., Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Ga. 1986) 
(police officers may be liable for failing to terminate pursuit, even though the pursued 
driver was injured when he lost control of his car and hit a tree). The rhetorical device 
associated with this characterization relates to an individual's free will and options. See 
supra note 72. Under a communalist perspective, one would characterize the plaintiff's 
options narrowly and the defendant's options broadly. Balkin, supra note 42, at 233-46. 
85. See, e.g., Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. at 922 ("officers may 
have been negligent and/or reckless in failing to break-off the chase and arrest [the 
driver] at a later time when it would have been safer for all concerned"). The rhetori-
cal device associated with this characterization is the perspective on foreseeability of 
harm. See supra note 76. Under a communalist perspective, one would use abstract 
language to describe whether the defendant could have foreseen the general harm and 
222 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:205 
the court would find the accident was foreseeable by stressing the in-
herently dangerous nature of pursuits in general.86 The opinion would 
characterize the police officers as using psychological force,87 force that 
compels a pursued driver to continue his flight as his adrenalin in-
creases and his judgment decreases.88 The court would deemphasize the 
concrete language to describe whether the plaintiff could have -foreseen the specific 
harm. Balkin, supra note 42, at 221-27. 
86. Some recent police pursuit policies indicate a communalist perspective when 
discussing the dangerousness of pursuits. See, e.g., Butler County, Emergency Opera-
tion of Sheriff's Office Vehicles (Dec. 13, 1989) ("foremost thought in the officer's 
mind must always be SAFETY"; pursuit is justified only when the necessity of immedi-
ate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the pursuit") (emphasis in 
original). See supra note 68. 
87. See, e.g .. Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (psychological 
injury is actionable for fear arising from pursuit in an unmarked vehicle). In Checki, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the police officers' inculpatory acts in 
determining that psychological force itself is actionable, even if the plaintiff receives no 
physical injury: 
It cannot reasonably be argued that no serious physical danger confronts 
civilians who are forced to travel at speeds over 100 mph in their attempt to 
flee a terrorizing police officer. Furthermore, there is no valid reason for 
insisting on physical injury before a section 1983 claim can be stated in this 
context. A police officer who terrorizes a civilian by brandishing a cocked 
gun in front of that civilian's face may not cause physical injury, but he has 
certainly laid the building blocks for a section 1983 action against him. Sim-
ilarly, where a police officer uses a police vehicle to terrorize a civilian, and 
he has done so with malicious abuse of official power shocking to the con-
science, a court may conclude that the officers have crossed the constitu-
tional line. 
Id. (emphasis in original). The court uses a communalist perspective by comparing the 
use of a speeding vehicle to the use of a cocked gun. It implicitly emphasizes the for-
seeability of psychological harm and explicitly emphasizes the foreseeablity of physical 
harm, even though the plaintiff was never physically injured. The court thus deter-
mined that the officers' use of psychological force was actionable under the fourteenth 
amendment. See also infra notes 139-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
how police officers use psychological force during pursuits. 
88. The rhetorical device associated with this characterization relates to an indi-
vidual's free will and the options available to him. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 233-
46. Under a communalist perspective, one would characterize the plaintiff's options 
narrowly and the defendant's options broadly. Id. 
Pursuits also have a psychological effect upon some police officers. Barker, Police 
Pursuit Driving: The Need for Policy, 51 POLICE CHIEF 70, 72 (1984) (studies reveal 
that "bad judgment shootings occur more often in pursuit situations than in apprehen-
sion without pursuits"). Some officers may experience "pursuit fixation," which has 
been defined as "becoming so engrossed in the apprehension of a fleeing violator that 
the safety of others is forgotten or ignored." Id. at 70. This fixation compels officers to 
have a "'run them until they wreck' mentality." Id. One study has indicated that 
young male officers are more likely to conduct unnecessary and danger pursuits. See 
Alpert & Dunham, supra note 1, at 532, 537 ("aggressiveness of the younger male 
officers is a characteristic not conducive to efficient and safe pursuits"; chases initiated 
by female officers resulting in personal injury are 50% less likely to occur than chases 
initiated by male officers). The adrenalin they experience may explain their combative 
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pursued driver's refusal to stop by narrowing the time frame to focus 
on the harm as arising from the officers' decision to continue the pur-
suit.89 It would also deemphasize the driver's ability to stop once the 
pursuit has begun.90 In short, the communalist perspective focuses at-
tention on the police officers' actions, but the individualist perspective 
focuses attention on the pursued driver's actions. 
The shifting emphasis of the rhetorical device also is apparent 
when the situation involves only two parties, the pursued driver, who is 
injured, and the police officer.91 Although Professor Balkin has identi-
fied five distinct rhetorical devices92 for this situation, the application of 
behavior. See International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference Report, 44 
CRIM. L. REP. 2136 (1988) (a Maryland assistant attorney general stated that "[i]n far 
too many pursuits cases ... the offense that precipitated the chase was 'contempt of 
cop' - that is, the officer's ego says, I won't let him outrun me"). See generally John-
son v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Minn. 1990) (police officers stopped a pursued 
farmer's pickup truck at 2:00 a.m. by surrounding it with police vehicles after having 
collided with it earlier; after farmer exited from truck, an officer unnecessarily shot the 
truck's tires and threatened to kill the farmer); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968, 
971 (1st Cir. 1986) (after the pursuit ended, a police officer handcuffed the driver and 
"repeatedly [beat him] about his head, neck and shoulders with his revolver"). 
89. One police association has crafted .guidelines for terminating pursuits that 
represent a communalist perspective. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF Po-
LICE MODEL POLICY: VEHICULAR PURSUIT (1989). The guidelines generally provide 
that "[a] decision to terminate pursuit may be the most rational means of preserving 
the lives and property of both the public, and the officers and suspects engaged in a 
pursuit." /d. 
One rhetorical device is to characterize the applicable time frame either narrowly 
or broadly, depending upon whether the events are inculpatory or exculpatory. Balkin, 
supra note 42, at 228-33. Under a communalist perspective, one would broadly charac-
terize time to include inculpatory events related to the defendant and exculpatory 
events related to the plaintiff; one would also narrowly characterize time to include 
exculpatory events related to the defendant and inculpatory events related to the plain· 
tiff. !d. 
90. The rhetorical device associated with this characterization relates to an indi-
vidual's free will and options. See supra note 69. 
91. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 202-46. The rhetorical devices discussed above 
apply to any factual characterization, whether the disputed event involves two or three 
individuals. /d. at 246. 
92. The following are some of the rhetorical devices Professor Balkin has identi-
fied: I) factual characterization emphasizing or deemphasizing responsibility, 2) fac-
tual characterization broadly or narrowly describing causal probability, 3) abstract or 
concrete descriptions of foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, 4) narrow or broad time 
frames of fact relating to inculpatory or exculpatory facts, and 5) broad or narrow 
characterization of free will. /d. at 202-46. 
The first device is factual characterization. A court with a communalist perspec-
tive would emphasize the facts that implicate the police officers in the harm arising 
from a pursuit and deemphasize the facts that focus on the pursued driver's responsibil-
ity. See supra notes 84-90, 96-97 and accompanying text. In the context of a pursuit, 
this rhetorical device is important in characterizing who causes a pursuit to occur. 
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these devices is similar to the three-party situation.93 
The individualist perspective would detail how the driver is impli-
cated in the harm he incurred, but the communalistic perspective 
would emphasize the police officers' actions.94 The individualist per-
spective would emphasize the driver's culpable conduct of fleeing from 
the officers, the driver's option911 of stopping either at the time the po-
lice officers signalled or after the pursuit began, and the link between 
the act of fleeing and the harm. It would deemphasize the police of-
ficers' decision to pursue and any control the officers have over the pur-
sued. The communalist perspective, however, would emphasize that po-
lice officers used psychological force during a pursuit, that this force is 
linked to the harm that the pursued driver incurred, and that bodily 
injury is a foreseeable event. The communalist perspective thus deem-
phasizes the driver's culpable conduct in order to view more broadly 
the police officers' role during a pursuit. The need to scrutinize police 
pursuits is apparent when considering three aspects of pursuits: (1) the 
potential harm present during pursuits,96 (2) the reason that police of-
ficers generally pursue, and (3) the availability of other means either to 
apprehend individuals or to stop the need for pursuits.97 
93. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 202-46. 
94. See id. 
95. An individualist perspective broadly characterizes the pursued driver's op- . 
tions and narrowly describes the police officers options. See, e.g .• Jones v. Sherrill, 827 
F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987). In Jones, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals used an 
individualist perspective to describe the alternatives available to the pursued driver and 
officers: 
The officers made a choice to protect the public safety by attempting to 
apprehend an obviously dangerous driver. Although the pursuit ended tragi-
cally, the officers may have averted equal or greater tragedy by halting [the 
driver] when they did rather than allowing him to continue driving. Indeed, 
had the officers not pursued [the driver] and had his unimpeded progress 
resulted in a fatal accident, as it well could have, the officers might be fac-
ing a different section 1983 claim based on their failure to act .... 
/d. The court thus narrowly defined the officers' options by determining that they may 
have a duty to pursue. The Supreme Court, however, has recently held that state offi-
cials have no duty to protect individuals against harm from third parties. DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dept. Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989). See infra notes 
185-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
96. Foreseeability of harm, however, is subject to either a communalist perspec-
tive or an individualist perspective: an individualist perspective questions whether the 
specific harm was foreseeable and a communalist perspective questions whether harm 
was foreseeable. See supra note 69. Because the Supreme Court has broadly protected 
an individual's interest in personal security, a communalist perspective on this aspect of 
pursuits seems appropriate. See infra notes 224-353 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court's protection of the right to personal security. 
97. A discussion of the availability of other means signifies the use of a rhetorical 
device that furthers a communalist perspective. See supra note 68. To focus on the 
options available to police officers is to deemphasize the options available to the pur-
sued driver. The Supreme Court has frequently scrutinized the means that police of-
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All pursuits represent an event in which someone may either be 
seriously injured or killed.98 The injured is not necessarily the individ-
ual who is fleeing from the officers' assertion of authority. The pursued 
driver may have passengers who have not consented to the placing of 
their lives in danger.99 In addition, pursuits also may result in other 
drivers, their passengers, or pedestrians being injured or killed. Under 
an individualist perspective, captive passengers, other drivers, and 
pedestrians need to take actions to protect themselves from the harm 
arising from the pursuits. Crowded roads and sidewalks, however, as 
well as other circumstances, may not permit some of these individuals 
an avenue of escape from the harm. Under a communalist perspective, 
one may see that the police officers' conduct is at least implicated in 
the harm created by the pursuit. To find, as some individualist courts 
have done, that police officers do not use force during a pursuit is to 
allow all pursuits to evade scrutiny.100 
The need for scrutiny is even more obvious when considering the 
typical reason that police officers conduct pursuits. The most common 
reason police officers pursue is to apprehend an individual who has 
committed a traffic offense.101 Even though some traffic offenses, such 
as speeding, may at first appear to warrant police intervention to stop 
the danger presented to others, police intervention can increase rather 
than lessen the danger.102 In addition, police officers have pursued indi-
ficers have used when these means threaten to infringe an individual's interest in per-
sonal security. See infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
98. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of the serious risks 
associated with police pursuits. 
99. Some courts have failed to see how police officers are implicated in the harm 
that a passenger incurs when the pursued driver's car crashes. See, e.g .. Veach v. Cross, 
532 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). In Veach, the state court characterized 
the passenger as a person over whom the police officers had no control; any injury that 
she incurred came as a result of the pursued driver. Id. at 1073. Under state law, the 
court declared, the police officers have no duty to protect individuals from private vio-
lence,, as demonstrated by the pursued driver's act of fleeing. /d. Although the court's 
interpretation of state law is correct, the court fails to characterize the facts in a man-
ner that reveals how police officers are implicated in the harm. Police officers increase 
the risk of harm by using psychological force during pursuits. See infra notes 139-76 
for a discussion of the use of psychological force during pursuits. 
100. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
101. See supra note 2. 
102. See infra notes 139-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of 
psychological force during pursuits. 
Some pursuit policies allow police officers to pursue drivers who appear to be in-
toxicated. See, e.g., Metropolitan Police, Boston, Mass., General Order 4.4.4, §§ 2.10, 
3.0 (July 16, 1990) ("operating under the influence of drugs or alcohol" is a "life-
threatening offense" justifying a pursuit). See generally Metropolitan Police, Boston, 
Mass., Statistical Summary on Pursuits 5 (Aug. 9, 1989) (54% of drivers pursued in 
Boston from April 1, 1989 through June 30, 1989 were charged with operating under 
the influence of alcohol). Although drivers who are intoxicated do present a danger to 
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viduals who have violated a safety law, such as failing to wear a hel-
met108 or failing to turn on headlights.104 By pursuing the individual 
not wearing the required helmet, police officers increase the risk of 
harm present to the driver and thus thwart the purpose of the safety 
law. Similarly, by pursuing the individual driving without headlights, 
police officers increase the risk of harm present to others on the road 
and pedestrians. 
Other means are available to apprehend drivers. Police officers 
may maintain an effective pursuit of a driver by using a helicopter or 
small airplane.1011 These means allow for constant surveillance without 
the risk of harm to the driver, police officers, and others in the driver's 
path. Sometimes spike belts108 may be a means of stopping an individ-
ual. When the pursued driver travels over a spike belt that police of-
ficers have laid in his path, the punctured tires of the pursued vehicle 
gradually lose air and compel the driver to stop.107 In addition, legisla-
tures could create a rebuttable inference that the owner of a pursued 
vehicle was the driver of the vehicle.108 When they know the identity of 
others, pursuing someone believed to have impaired physical skills and judgment in-
creases the danger presented by the impaired driver. See Volusia County, Florida De-
partmental Standards Directive§ 41.2.2 (Feb. 15, 1990) (pursuing an impaired driver 
"compounds the danger to the public"). Better means are available to stop drunk driv-
ers. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2483-84 (1990) 
(sobriety checkpoints for stopping motorists do not violate the fourth amendment); see 
id. at 2496 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (purpose of sobriety checkpoint was not to be an 
effective means of apprehending intoxicated drivers but to deter people from driving 
after drinking). 
103. See Webbs v. Hyans, No. 88-3180 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1989) (WESTLAW, Fed-
eral library, Court of Appeals file). 
104. Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 668 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (N.D. Iowa 1987), appeal 
denied sub nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 
857 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1988). 
105. See, e.g., A. STONE & S. DELUCA, POLICE ADMINISTRATION: AN INTRODU-
CATION 415 (1985). Air surveillance reduces the risk of injury to the driver, police 
officers, other motorists, and pedestrians. Because the pursued driver frequently will not 
know that he· is being pursued, he will "slow down as soon as the pursuing patrol car is 
out of sight." /d. Air surveillance also increases the likelihood of apprehension because 
officers can prepare to intercept the driver. /d. 
106. See Markell, Spike Belts: A Suitable Alternate to High Speed Pursuits? 
389 lNT'L CRIM. PoLICE REv. 161, 162 (1985). A spike belt consists of "two or more 
rows of hollow spikes inserted in a four-ply, woven rubber belting with segmented 
metal backing. The spikes are case hardened, the tips of which are ground to a fifteen 
degree angle and then teflon coated to allow easier penetration." /d. 
107. /d. Police officers successfully used the belts in the Province of Alberta. /d. 
108. This policy has been proposed by civil rights advocate Jerry LaCross, whose 
daughter was a bystander killed as a result of a pursued driver's vehicle crashing into 
her, a death witnessed by the victim's mother. J. LaCross, Remarks at Conference on 
Police Pursuits: New Horizons in Law Enforcement Driver Training (July 17, 1990). 
Some police officers, however, have conducted pursuits even when they know who the 
offender is and that he has not committed a serious offense. See, e.g., Richardson v. 
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the violator, police officers may use other means to arrest the individ-
ual. Similarly, states could adopt programs that educate young drivers, 
· who are frequently the individuals fleeing from police, 109 about the ex-
treme dangers associated with police pursuits. 
One should adopt a communalist perspective in analyzing the con-
stitutional issues arising from pursuits by recognizing the danger that 
all pursuits entail and the needless harm that often occurs as a result of 
pursuits. A communalist perspective allows courts to focus attention on 
the conduct of police officers during pursuits. This communalist per-
spective is particularly appropriate in the pursuit context because the 
Supreme Court has implicitly adopted this viewpoint when analyzing 
the scope of the right to personal security under the fourth110 and four-
teenth amendments. 111 
Ill. THE UsE OF PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCE DURING 
PURSUITS CAN CAUSE INJURIES 
When individuals seek recovery for the harm caused as a result of 
a pursuit, the essense of their claim is that the police officers used dis-
proportionate force in violation of the fourth112 or fourteenth amend-
ment.113 Determining whether force is disproportionate is both similar 
City of Indianapolis, 658 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 
(1982); Reed v. County of Allegan, 688 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 n.4 (W. D. Mich. 1988). 
109. See, e.g., H. NuGENT, E. CoNNORS, J. McEwEN & L. MAYO, supra note 
75, at 17 (almost 60% of pursued drivers were between the ages of 18 and 25; 96% 
were males); Beckman, supra note 75, at 60 (82% of suspects were between the ages 
of 11 and 30; 96% were males). Some pursuit policies, recognizing that young drivers 
are often the ones attempting to flee, have adopted a restrictive pursuit policy. See 
Volusia County, Florida Departmental Standards Directive § 41.2.2 (Feb. 15, 1990) 
("many persons who flee from law enforcement officers while operating motor vehicles 
are youthful and do so because of drivers license violations and other non-violent 
crimes"). 
110. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's broad protection of the right to personal security under the fourth 
amendment. 
111. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's broad protection of the right to personal security under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
112. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989); 
Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 263 (8th Cir. 1989); Galas v. McKee, 801 
F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986); Wright v. District of Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. 
June 21, 1990) (order granting partial summary judgment); Reed v. County of Alle-
gan, 688 F. Supp. 1239, 1241-43 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 
31, 36 (Minn. 1990). 
113. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 
296-97 (8th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1987); 
Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other 
grounds, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dept., 721 F. Supp. 
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to and different from the task of resolving the typical fourth or four-
teenth amendment excessive force claim. The typical fourth amend· 
ment claim includes allegations that officers unnecessarily used their 
weapons114 or physical force1111 in arresting an individual. The typical 
fourteenth amendment claim includes allegations that officers used dis-
proportionate force during pretrial detention.118 A pursuit claim is dif-
ferent from these excessive force claims because some courts have ques-
189, 192-95 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 920-
22 (S.D. Ga. 1986). 
114. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. l, 3-7 (1985) (gun used to kill 
fleeing felon); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (lst Cir. 1990) (officer 
who shot at hostage in escaping vehicle was negligent); Fargo v. City of San Juan 
Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1988) (officer was grossly negligent when 
his gun accidentally discharged); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d l, 8 (2d Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988) (officer was not negligent when his gun 
accidentally discharged); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (lith Cir. 
1985) (en bane) (shooting was unreasonable because officer could not have reasonably 
thought his life was in danger); Leber v. Smith, 773 F.2d 101, 104-05 (6th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986) (officer was not negligent when his gun accidentally 
discharged as he slipped on ice); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232-34 (4th Cir. 
1970) (accidental shooting constituted reckless conduct). 
115. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1867-71 (1989) (physical 
force during an investigatory stop); Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. at 599 (physi-
cal force by establishing a roadblock); Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 478-80 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (physical force during an arrest); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 
714 (7th Cir. 1987) (physical force during arrest). 
116. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 903 F. 2d 400, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1990) (facts 
surrounding struggle between detainee and law enforcement officers in dispute; officers 
claimed that they acted in self-defense); White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th 
Cir. 1990); Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d. 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (force occurred at 
jail after the detainee was booked); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the fourteenth amendment pro-
tects the right to personal security for pretrial detainees; it has not, however, deter-
mined "whether the [f]ourth amendment continues to provide individuals with protec-
tion against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which 
arrest ends and pretrial detention begins." Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.lO. Lower 
courts appear to be extending the reach of the fourth amendment beyond the point of 
actual arrest. See, e.g., Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (fourth 
amendment applies to force used prior to time plaintiff was arraigned or formally 
charged); Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989) (force used in ad-
ministering a blood test at the hospital after the plaintiff was arrested); Spell v. Mc-
Daniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987) (force used in "effecting and main-
taining" arrest), cert. denied sub nom. City of Fayetteville v. Spell, 484 U.S. 1027 
(1988); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (force used while an 
arrestee was "in the custody of the arresting officers"). One writer has proposed the 
following bright-line rule: "In warrantless arrests, the rule would define the end of a 
seizure as the first appearance of the suspect before a judicial officer for a probable 
cause hearing[;] [i]n warrant arrests, the end of a seizure would be the first appearance 
before a judicial officer." Note, Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When 
Does Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 824 (1990). 
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tioned whether police officers use force during a pursuit, 117 and if they 
do, whether the officers, rather than the pursued driver, caused the al-
leged injuries.118 In the typical excessive force case, the parties do not 
dispute that police officers used force119 and only sometimes do they 
dispute whether the force used caused a particular injury.120 Instead, 
the focus of an excessive force claim is whether the circumstances justi-
fied the degree of force used by the officers.121 In this respect, pursuit 
claims and excessive force claims are similar. Both question whether 
officers used disproportionate force. 
Whether pursuits violate the disproportionality standards of the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments thus requires consideration of three 
related issues: whether police officers used force during a pursuit;m if 
so, whether this force caused a particular injury;128 and if so, whether 
the circumstances justified the degree of force applied. 124 An examina-
tion of these specific issues, however, should include an understanding 
of how policy implicitly affects resolution of these issues. An analysis of 
these issues reveals that most pursuits constitute the use of dispropor-
tionate force. 
117. See infra notes 125-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of 
force during pursuits. 
118. See infra notes 171-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cau-
sation issue in police pursuits. 
119. When police officers shoot during an arrest, the use of force is not disputed. 
See supra note 114 (collecting cases in which plaintiff challenged the reasonableness of 
using deadly force during an arrest). When suspect and police officers engage in physi-
cal combat, the plaintiff typically alleges that the force used was unreasonable. See 
supra note 114. Officers often assert that the force used was necessary either to control 
the suspect or to protect themselves from the suspect. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 
S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (1989) (officer claimed that physical force was necessary to control 
the suspect); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989) (officers claimed that 
roadblock was necessary to apprehend fleeing driver); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 
4 (1985) (officer claimed that shooting was necessary to apprehend fleeing burglar sus-
pect); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) 
(officer claimed shooting was in self-defense), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986), cert. 
denied sub nom. Sampson v. Gilmore, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986). 
120. In a case where more than one police officer shoots at the plaintiff, there 
may be a question of which officer's bullet caused the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., Kibbe 
v. Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 802-03 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 257 
(1987) (ten officers involved in three shootings). 
121. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the use of disproportionate force. 
122. See supra notes 112-70 and accompanying text for discussion of the force 
police officers use during pursuits. . 
123. See infra notes 171-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the 
force police officers use during pursuits may cause harm to the pursued driver, his 
passengers, other motorists, and pedestrians. 
124. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dis-
proportionality standards of the fourth and fourteenth amendments as applied to 
pursuits. 
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A. The Act of Pursuing Constitutes the Potential Use of Deadly 
Force 
During a pursuit, police officers may use two different types of 
force, physical force and psychological force. Physical force is apparent 
when police officers use their cruisers to collide with an individual's 
vehicle. In this situation, the use of force is obvious because the colli-
sion produces a visible mark of force, whether it is a dent or a totalled 
car.1211 When the cruisers do not actually touch the individual's vehi-
cle,128 then they may have used psychological force, force that causes 
an individual to continue to flee even though there is a substantial risk 
of harm to himself and others.127 An examination of these two types of 
force indicates that some pursuits involve the use of physical force and 
that all pursuits involve the use of psychological force. 
1. Use of Physical Force 
Officers may use physical force during a pursuit in two ways. First, 
125. See, e.g., Kuhar v. Hanton No. 86-4110 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1988) (table pub-
lished 836 F.2d 1348) (police officers' cruiser collided with motorcylist); Benskin v. 
Addison Township, 635 F. Supp. 1014, 1019 (N.D. IJI. 1986) (police officers acted 
maliciously in causing a direct collision, which resulted in severe injuries). Even when 
the use of physical force is obvious, what caused an injury may nevertheless be dis-
puted. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Harris, 490 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1987) (police officers "rammed the fleeing suspect's car, 
locked fenders with it, and forced it off the road into a bus bench [killing a 
bystander]"). . 
Using a vehicle to stop a fleeing suspect is similar to using a roadblock to stop his 
flight. Recently the United States Supreme Court recognized that police officers use 
physical force when they set up a roadblock to stop a fleeing suspect. Brower v. County 
of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1989). Other courts have similarly recognized that a 
roadblock constitutes the use of force. See, e.g, Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1207 
(5th Cir. 1985) (passenger was severely injured as driver crashed into roadblock); Reed 
v. County of Allegan, 688 F. Supp. 1239, 1240, 1245 (W. D. Mich. 1988) (crash into 
roadblock resulted in suspect becoming a quadriplegic); City of Amarillo v. Langley, 
651 S.W.2d 906, 911 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (suspects were seriously injured when their 
motorcycle crashed into roadblock; second motorcylist who swerved around roadblock 
was seriously injured when he collided with a parked car). 
126. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989) 
(pursued driver and passenger killed when driver hit a bump and flew through the air, 
crashing into a utility pole); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 295 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (pursued driver died and passengers were seriously injured when pursued 
driver lost control of vehicle and crashed into oncoming motorist); Patterson v. City of 
Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 262 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (motorcyclist and passenger 
killed when motorcyclist lost control); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 
1987) (motorist was killed when pursued's vehicle crossed center line and crashed into 
his vehicle); Easterling v. City of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 914 (S.D. Ga. 1986) 
(pursued driver lost control of vehicle and crashed into tree). 
127. See infra notes 139-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of 
psychological force during police pursuits. 
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they may intentionally use their cruiser to crash into the individual's 
vehicle.128 This situation implicates the fourth amendment because the 
officers' conduct does not signify mere negligence. 129 By intentionally 
using a cruiser to stop a fleeing individual, the officers have used force 
that is potentially deadly.130 The use of a cruiser in this manner is like 
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
129. In defining what constitutes a fourth amendment "seizure," the United 
States Supreme Court recently stated that to effectuate a "seizure" police officers must 
have "intentionally applied" the means that caused an individual to stop. Brower v. 
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). The Court explained that the question of 
intent relates to the means that the officers have applied, not a subjective desire to 
cause a particular result. Id. at 598. Under. the fourth amendment, the question of 
"intent" only relates to the question of whether officers "seized" an individual. See 
infra notes 367-459 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes a 
fourth amendment "seizure." Intent is not relevant to determining whether the force 
used was disproportionate under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 
109 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 (1989) ("fourth amendment inquiry is one of 'objective reasona-
bleness' under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like 'malice' and 'sadism' 
have no proper place in that inquiry"); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 
(7th Cir. 1987) ("fourth amendment standard calls for objective analysis without re-
gard to the officer's underlying intent or motivation."). 
Some courts have failed to distinguish negligent conduct from reckless or inten-
tional actions. See, e.g., Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947 (11th Cir. 1986). In Cannon, 
a police officer, traveling 15 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit, killed another 
driver when he crashed at an intersection. /d. at 948. Even though the officer was 
driving an unmarked car and he failed to use his siren, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated that officer was only negligent. /d. at 949. The 6fficer, however, had 
been charged with vehicular homicide. Id. at 951. By characterizing the conduct as 
negligence, the federal court was able to dismiss the action and send the plaintiff to 
state court to seek recovery. The court stated, "Automobile negligence actions are grist 
for the state law mill. But they do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation." 
/d. at 950. Such characterization, however, is another example of how courts have 
narrowed the protection available under section 1983 by restrictively interpreting the 
underlying constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests 
on the Law of Federal Courts, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 499, 502-03 (1989). Professor 
Wells states: "Although the Court invokes the conventional tools of judicial decision 
making, . . . the results reflect a strong tendency to subordinate each . . . of these 
considerations in favor of promoting the substantive interests of one side or the other in 
the litigation on the merits." /d. 
130. See, e.g., Alpert, Questioning Police Pursuits in Urban Areas, 15 J. PoLICE 
Sci. & ADMIN. 298, 299 (1987) (car is a "potentially dangerous weapon"). If police 
officers' use of a vehicle to pursue a suspect constitutes a. potentially deadly force, then 
one must question whether the fleeing suspect similarly uses potentially deadly force 
when he flees. Justice O'Connor, during oral argument in Brower v. County of Inyo, 
489 U.S. 593 (1989), questioned whether the person fleeing was "armed with a deadly 
weapon in the form of a vehicle." 57 U.S.L.W. 3531, 3532 (Feb. 21, 1989). During a 
pursuit, both police officers and a fleeing driver are "armed" with a deadly weapon, the 
speeding vehicle. See, e.g., Kuhar v. Hanton, No. 86-4110 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1989) 
(Wellford, J., concurring) (when motorcyclist traveled at high speed, he was "armed" 
with a deadly weapon). By terminating a pursuit, officer, however, may "disarm" both 
themselves and the driver because neither the pursued nor the pursuer will continue to 
speed. See infra note 147 and accompanying text for a discussion of how termination of 
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a shot fired from a gun: sometimes the individual may die as a result of 
the officers' using deadly force and sometimes he is only injured. Re-
gardless of the injuries, the collision involves the use of potentially 
deadly force. 131 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never detailed 
what constitutes the use of deadly force, it has implied that "the 
[f]ourth [a]mendment constrains the use of any police practice that is 
potentially lethal, no matter how remote the risk. " 132 A pursuit is po-
tentially lethal. Studies document the high risk of physical harm associ-
ated with pursuits.m As one scholar has stated, a pursuit is often as 
"senseless as shooting at a fugitive on a crowded sidewalk."13' Another 
scholar has similarly emphasized that reckless driving which causes a 
person to die should constitute "vehicular murder."1311 Not all pursuits, 
however, result in accidents. 138 Police officers may also use physical 
force when they stop an individual by surrounding him.137 This type of 
physical force is sometimes referred to as a "moving roadblock."138 As 
a pursuit causes the fleeing driver to reduce his speed. 
131. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the risks associated with police pursuits. 
132. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 31, 32 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(under the majority's standard the fourth amendment would require review of "poten-
tially lethal weapons ranging from guns to knives to baseball bats to rope"). 
133. See supra note 2. 
134. A: STONE & S. DELUCA, POLICE ADMINISTRATION: AN INTRODUCTION 416 
(1985). . 
135. Luria, Death on the Highway: Reckless Driving as Murder, 67 OR. L. REv. 
799, 835-36 (1988). 
136. An accident, however, may not be the best means of determining whether a 
pursuit was justified because unjustified pursuits do not always conclude with an acci-
dent. See Alpert, Questioning Police Pursuits in Urban Areas, 15 J. POLICE Sci. & 
ADMIN. 298, 303 (1987). 
137. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Minn. 1990) (officers 
"boxed in" the pursued driver with their cruisers and stopped him). In this situation, 
the force used by the officers would not produce a physical injury but may produce a 
psychological injury. See generally id. at 37 n.10 (psychological injury is actionable if 
officers use an "egregious" amount of force). For example, if cruisers surrounded an 
individual's car without justification and gradually caused him to stop, the individual 
may have suffered a psychological injury. The officers would have restricted the indi-
vidual's freedom of movement and violated his right to personal security. See generally 
Wright v. District of Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 21, 1990) (order granting 
partial summary judgment) (driver incurred actionable psychological harm because po-
lice officers chased her without justification in an unmarked vehicle); Wisniewski v. 
Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1990) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (extensive discus-
sion of psychological injuries), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 301 (1990). 
138. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RESTRICTIVE POLICIES FOR HIGH-SPEED 
PoLICE PuRSUITS, 28 (1989) (pursuit policy of Nassau County, New York, defines 
moving roadblocks as the presence of "two or more department cars in front of [a] 
pursued vehicle[, which] ... gradually slow down by allowing no outlet"). Nassau 
County states that rolling roadblocks are "most effective on limited access highways." 
Id. Police departments disagree as to whether police officers should stop individuals by 
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more and more police officers encompass the individual's vehicle, the 
police officers use the physical presence of their cruisers to stop the 
individual. 
2. Use of Psychological Force 
Officers also use psychological force during pursuits.189 The Su-
boxing them in. Compare id. at 29-30 (policy of Phoenix, Arizona, prohibits boxing-in 
unless the procedure is applied to an "unaware suspect [in order] to avoid pursuit") 
with id. at 31-32 (policy of St. Petersburg, Florida, boxing-in is permissible "only if 
officer reasonably believes there is substantial risk that violator will cause death or 
serious physical injury to others if apprehension is delayed"). 
139. No courts or criminal justice scholars have ever used the term "psychologi-
cal force" in discussing police pursuits. I have used this phrase to describe the psycho-
logical compulsion that police officers exert when they decide to pursue an individual. 
The nature of the interaction between the pursuing police officers and the individ-
ual reveals that most pursued drivers respond to the psychological force officers present 
during pursuits. This force is apparent by examining how pursued drivers respond dur-
ing pursuits and how they respond when police officers terminate pursuits. See infra 
notes 143-46 and accompanying text. When police officers pursue, the pursued driver's 
speed can be in part measured by the speed of the police officers. See infra notes 152-
53 and accompanying text. As police officers increase their speed in order to apprehend 
the driver, the pursued driver increases his speed in order to flee. See id. The pursuit 
also communicates to the pursued driver that the officers will continue the pursuit until 
the driver stops. This message implicitly compels the driver to continue his flight: by 
stopping, the pursued driver will probably be charged with speeding, fleeing from an 
officer, and other offenses; by fleeing, he may escape from being charged with any 
offense. Once the driver initially refuses to stop and begins his flight, he has little in-
centive to stop because that initial act of fleeing is the basis for most of the offenses 
with which the officers will charge him. 
Recently one court implicitly questioned whether psychological force was present 
during a police pursuit. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1318 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 1989). In Brower, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on remand, questioned 
whether police officers should be allowed to use the danger present in a pursuit as a 
reason for justifying a pursuit. ld. By raising this issue, the court may be recognizing 
that police officers implicitly create the danger of a pursuit when they decide to pursue. 
In other areas, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the use of psycho-
logical force by police officers. In determining whether an individual was "seized" 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the Court has considered whether officers 
stopped an individual by a "show of authority." See infra notes 140-70 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the use of psychological force during a "seizure." The 
Court has also recognized that psychological compulsion can invalidate a criminal sus-
pect's confession. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (Court 
designed the Miranda warnings as a means to dispel psychological pressure inherent 
when police officers interrogate an individual in custody); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 
49, 53 (1949) (confession is invalid if the product of "sustained pressure" by police, 
whether that pressure was physical or mental). The Court has also noted that police 
officers can structure a lineup of suspects in a manner that is psychologically sugges-
tive: the structure of the lineup suggests to the observer which individual to select or it 
may compel the individual to confess. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 453 
(Court recognized coercive nature of a " 'reverse line-up,' " in which the suspect is 
placed in a line-up, deliberately charged by "fictitious witnesses" of having committed 
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preme Court recognized this type of force in Terry v. Ohio, 140 in which 
it discerned that police officers' "show of authority" may cause an indi-
vidual to stop.1" 1 The focus of this definition was whether officers used 
psychological force that compelled an individual to stop.142 In the pur-
suit context, however, the same actions not only communicate a com-
mand to stop, but also that the police will continue to pursue until the 
individual stops. Courts, however, have not analyzed the psychological 
effect that police officers have on an individual during a pursuit. An 
examination of the dynamics of a pursuit reveals the presence of psy-
chological force during all pursuits. 
Pursuit experts agree that police officers, when deciding to pursue 
an individual, exert psychological force, a force that often compels an 
individual to continue his flight until he crashes or the police officers 
abandon the pursuit. 148 Expert Van Blaricom states that this psycho-
logical force is similar to the psychological force police officers may 
sometimes mistakenly apply when responding to domestic violence 
problems or hostage crises.14" In all these situations, the use of psycho-
logical force can exacerbate the problem confronting police officers.1411 
The inappropriate use of psychological force can cause an indiyidual to 
endanger his life, the lives of others, and the lives of police officers. 
Although intervention by law enforcement officials is needed, police of-
ficers should anticipate the response that psychological force can 
produce.146 
Van Blaricom maintains that if police officers decide to abandon 
the pursuit, then the individual will either go home or park his car in 
an attempt to evade detection by other police officers.1" 7 In both situa-
tions, the potential harm arising from the pursuit is under the control 
of the police officers. By abandoning the pursuit, the psychological 
offenses for the purpose of making him confess "to the offense under investigation"); 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (reliability is the "linchpin" in deter-
mining whether an indentification procedure violates the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment). 
140. 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
141. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (1968) (a "seizure" occurs when police officers "by 
means of physical force or show of authority ... in some way restrain[] the liberty of a 
citizen"). See infra notes 362-380 and accompanying text for a discussion of this 
"seizure" definition. 
142. See infra notes 372-79, 385-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
psychological force during a "seizure." 
143. Interview with D.P. Van Blaricom, Police Expert (July 1989); telephone 
interview with Professor Geoffrey P. Alpert, Sociologist and Criminal Justice Scholar 
(June I, 1990). 
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force compelling the driver to continue the pursuit ceases.1" 8 
Similarly, criminal justice scholars have recognized that once po-
lice officers decide to pursue an individual, there is no reason for the 
individual to stop. 149 The individual, who initially responded by fleeing 
from officers, probably has committed the offenses of fleeing from an 
officer, speeding, and reckless driving.m To continue the pursuit thus 
poses no increased criminal or traffic penalty for the individual because 
he has already committed the offenses. In those states that have in-
creased the penalty for fleeing from an officer, the pursued driver has 
even less incentive to stop the pursuit after it has begun. 1111 Escape thus 
may appear to afford freedom from these penalties, but at the risk of 
bodily harm to himself and others. . 
Professor Geoffrey Alpert also has affirmed that police officers use 
psychological force during a pursuit. He believes that the individual 
who flees initiates the pursuit, but that police officers decide whether to 
continue the pursuit. 1112 According to Professor Alpert, the speed of the 
officers may control the speed of the individual who is fleeing. 1118 This 
psychological force arises from the police officers' decision to continue 
148. Id. 
149. Id. Telephone interview with Professor Geoffrey P. Alpert, Sociologist and 
Criminal Justice Scholar (June 1, 1990). 
150. See infra notes 262-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
offenses. 
151. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.33l(C) (Anderson 1989). Under 
Ohio law, fleeing from an officer is a misdemeanor; but it is a felony if a jury makes 
one of the following possible factual findings: 
(1) in committing the offense, the offender was fleeing immediately after the commis-
sion of a felony; · 
(2) the operation of the motor vehicle by the offender was a proximate cause of serious 
physical harm to persons or property; 
(3) the operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a substantial risk of harm 
to persons or property. 
Id. Because of the nature of pursuits, under this statute fleeing from an officer would 
generally constitute a felony. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the risks associated with pursuits. Although this statute could generally deter indi-
viduals from engaging in vehicular flight, once a pursuit has begun, the statute in-
creases the pursued driver's motivation for fleeing. The police officers' presence during 
a pursuit could create even more psychological pressure if the pursued driver is aware 
of this statute. 
152. Telephone interview with Professor Geoffrey P. Alpert, Sociologist and 
Criminal Justice Scholar (June 1, 1990). 
153~ /d. Professor Alpert has analogized the use of psychological force during a 
pursuit to the use of psychological compulsion during a dog race. Id. At a dog race, in 
order to make the dogs run faster, a metal frame is placed in front of them with the 
appearance of rabbit on it. The dogs' pace increases as the speed of the frame moves 
faster. According to Professor Alpert, the police officers' vehicle respresents a similar 
kind of compulsion to the pursued driver, except this time the force is behind the 
driver. Id. · 
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the pursuit. 1114 
Some courts have recognized the presence of psychological force 
when police officers in unmarked cars pursue an individual. 11111 These 
courts have recognized that the pursued driver's natural response is in-
creased speed.1118 One court has noted that a pursuing vehicle can "ter-
rorize a civilian."1117 Another court has found that such psychological 
harm arising from an unjustified pursuit is actionable under the fourth 
amendment.1118 
Some courts, however, have failed to recognize that pursuits in-
volve psychological force. 1119 These courts have found that only physical 
force is actionable under the fourth amendment.180 In requiring the use 
of physical force, these courts focus on the individual's decision to flee, 
not the officers' conduct during the pursuit. They have determined that 
a pursuit does not involve the use of force because the individual is not 
restrained during a pursuit. 
This viewpoint, however, is similar to the individualist viewpoint181 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner182 and Brower v. 
County of Inyo. 183 In both Garner184 and Brower/811 the Court adopted 
a communalist viewpoint188 by emphasizing the officers' conduct, not 
154. ld. 
155. See, e.g., Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986); Wright v. 
District of Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 21, 1990) (order granting plaintiff's 
partial summary judgment on issue of fourth amendment violation). 
156. See, e.g., Checki, 785 F.2d at 538. 
157. ld. 
158. Wright v. District of Columbia, No. 87-2157 (D.D.C. June 21, 1990) (order 
granting plaintiff's partial summary judgment on issue of fourth amendment violation). 
159. See supra note 63 and infra note 160 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of how courts have narrowly viewed the force present during police pursuits. 
160. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, (8th Cir. 1989) ("no 
evidence that either of the police cars collided with the motorcycle or the innocent 
victim"); Brower v. County of lnyo, 817 F.2d 540,_ 546 (9th Cir. 1987) (police officers 
did not restrain the plaintiff, even after they set up a roadblock that stopped him), 
rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th 
Cir. 1986) ("police used absolutely no force" during pursuits); Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 
668 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (pursuit involved no restraint), appeal 
denied sub nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 
857 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1988). See generally Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 
294, 296 (8th Cir. 1989) (no fourth amendment claim because individual's crashing 
into another car was not intended by the police officer's pursuit); Easterling v. City of 
Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 921 n.ll (S.D. Ga. 1986) (pursuit may involve the use of 
"indirect" force). 
161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the individual-
ist perspective of responsibility. 
162. 471 u.s. 1, 11 (1985). 
163. 489 u.s. 593, 598 (1989). 
164. 471 U.S. at 11. 
165. 489 U.S. at 598-599. 
166. See supra notes 43-46, 63-68, 77-90 and accompanying text for a discussion 
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the individual's decision to flee when commanded to stop. The Garner 
Court declared, "It is not better that all felony suspects die than that 
they escape."167 Instead of determining that the individual had the 
choice of preventing the shooting, the Court emphasized the unreasona-
bleness of the officer's decision to shoot. The Brower Court similarly 
emphasized· the officers' decision to set up a roadblock that fatally 
stopped a pursued driver, rather than emphasizing the individual's fail-
ure to terminate his flight prior to crashing into it.168 It held that the 
fourth amendment was implicated even though the individual could 
have avoided crashing into the roadblock by simply deciding to stop the 
pursuit.169 The Brower Court rejected the argument that the officers 
used no force in stopping the individual.170 By focusing on the officers' 
conduct during a pursuit, one can thus discern the presence of psycho-
logical force. 
B. The Act of Pursuing Can Cause an Individual's Injuries 
Whether the officers' use of physical force and psychological force 
during a pursuit was the proximate cause of injury to a pursued driver, 
his passengers, other motorists, or pedestrians depends upon the per-
spective one adopts. 171 A communalist perspective of pursuit claims fo-
cuses on the police officers' conduct during ;:t pursuit; it recognizes that 
the officers' use of psychological force may cause harm, even if the pur-
of the communalist perspective of responsibility. 
167. 471U.S.at11. 
168. 489 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1989). The lower court in Brower, with its individu-
alist viewpoint on what conduct constitutes a fourth amendment "seizure," had implic-
itly determined that the officers had not used force in setting up the roadblock. Brower 
v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, Brower 
v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). Although the lower court had erroneously 
determined that the police officers had not "seized" the driver when he crashed into the 
roadblock, the court nevertheless recognized that the police officers' conduct could vio-
late the fourteenth amendment if a jury determined that it was egregious. /d. at 544, 
rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). The lower court emphasized that the 
individual had remained free to stop the pursuit that occurred before the officers had 
established the roadblock. !d. at 546-47. The court characterized the pursued driver's 
options from an individualist perspective by emphasizing his options and by deem-
phasizing the officers' conduct of establishing the roadblock. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, focused on the officers' actions and subjected them to scrutiny under the fourth 
amendment. 
169. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-99. The Court characterized the officers' actions 
from a communalist perspective by emphasizing the officers' culpable conduct and 
deemphasizing the pursued driver's option of stopping. 
170. · !d. The Court determined that the police officers had allegedly caused the 
individual to stop. The second question was whether this force caused the individual's 
injuries. See infra notes 423-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two 
causation issues for pursuit claims. 
171. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the harm associated with police 
pursuits. 
238 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:205 
sued driver's vehicle was the source of injury as it slammed into a tree, 
another driver, or pedestrians. As discussed above, both physical and 
psychological force create predictable responses by the pursued 
driver.m If these responses lead to harm, then under the communalis-
tic perspective, the force causing the harmful response may be the 
source causing the injury. An examination of recent Supreme Court 
decisions discussing causation under the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments indicates that the communalist perspective of causation for pur-
suit claims is appropriate, 178 but that an individualist perspective is ap-
propriate when analyzing officers' failure to pursue a driver.174 The 
difference in perspectives is sound because in acting during a pursuit, 
police officers increase the risk of harm to individuals, but in failing to 
pursue, any harm that occurs is directly a result of the driver's conduct. 
In addition, the communalist perspective of causation in pursuit claims 
is harmonious with the Court's decisions subjecting law enforcement 
practices, which can seriously infringe upon an individual's right to per-
sonal security, to fourth amendment scrutiny.1711 
The Supreme Court has recognized two causation issues for fourth 
amendment excessive force claims: 1) what caused an individual to stop 
172. See supra notes 126, 139-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
use of psychological force. 
173. See infra notes 214-58 and accompanying text. Some lower courts have also 
applied a communalist perspective when police officers' conduct creates or increases the 
danger presented to individuals by third parties. See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 
583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989) (because officers allegedly arrested driver, impounded the car, 
and left the passenger in an unsafe area at 2:30 a.m., the officer acted with deliberate 
indifference to the passenger's need for personal security and may be held liable for 
rape committed by a third party), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990); White v. Roch-
ford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (officer who allegedly arrested driver and left 
children stranded on a highway in a car may be held liable for the harm that occurred 
to the children). 
174. See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text. 
175. In the following cases, the Court found the challenged police practice un-
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment: Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. 
Ct. 1684, 1688-90 (1990) (overnight guest had a reasonable expectation of privacy of 
dwelling; police officers violated privacy by entering dwelling without consent, without 
a warrant, or without probable cause and exigent circumstances); Florida v. Wells, 110 
S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990) (failure to have a policy concerning the opening of closed 
containers during an inventory search violated an individual's expectation of privacy 
under the fourth amendment); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-22 (1985) (the use 
of deadly force to stop a fleeing felon); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 
(1983) (brief detention of luggage at airport); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504-07 
(1983) (plurality opinion) (unjustifiable stop of traveler at airport); Winston v. Lee, 
470 U.S. 753 (1985) (surgery to remove bullet as evidence); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 
U.S. 721 (1969), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 855 (1969) (fingerprinting at station without 
probable cause). The Court has also protected an individual's interest in personal se-
curity by declaring that officials violate the fourth amendment if they use excessive 
force as they seize an individual, even if the force applied was done in subjective good 
faith. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872-73 (1989). 
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and 2) what caused an individual's injuries.178 In resolving the first is-
sue, the Court has adopted a communalistic perspective. The Court has 
refused to focus on the individual's act of failing to stop the pursuit and 
it has emphasized the police officers' decision, whether it was to shoot a 
fleeing suspect177 or to set up a roadblock.178 When the suspect died, 
what caused the individual to stop was the shooting179 or the road-
block, 180 not the individual's act of failing to stop when commanded to 
176. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1989). See infra notes 
422-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of these issues. 
177. Garner, 4 71 U.S. at 9-11. The Court's characterization of alternatives avail-
able to officers strongly reveals its communalist perspective. /d. The Court emphasized 
that the "failure to apprehend at the scene does not necessarily mean that the suspect 
will never be caught." /d. at 9 n.8. The Court could have emphasized the option availa-
ble to the suspect, stopping when so commanded. In addition, the Court also expressed 
a communalist perspective by emphasizing the inculpatory facts related to the police 
officer who shot, not the suspect who fled. /d. at 9-10. The Court characterized the 
harm arising from an officer's shooting as grave. /d. The Court stated that even if other 
alternatives for capture are generally available to officers, shooting under some circum-
stances is always unconstitutional even if "subsequent arrest is not likely." Id. at 9 n.8. 
The Court could have expressed an individualist perspective by emphasizing the sus-
pect's failure to stop when requested. 
178. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. The Court's characterization of the facts reveals 
its communalist perspective: 
[A] roadblock is not just a significant show of authority to induce a volun-
tary stop, but it is designed to produce a stop by physical impact if volun-
tary compliance does not occur. It may well be that [the officers] here pre-
ferred, and indeed earnestly hoped, that [the driver] would stop on his own, 
without striking the barrier, but we do not think it practicable to conduct 
such an inquiry into subjective intent. 
/d. at 598. The Court could have described the facts from an individualist perspective 
by emphasizing the driver's option of stopping during the pursuit and before hitting the 
roadblock. The Court could have stated that it was the driver's responsibility to make 
sure that he was in control of his car at all times. The Court instead focused on the 
police officers' conduct and deemphasized the driver's options. 
This communalistic perspective is even more apparent when the Court states that 
a court should err on the side of protecting an individual from the use of force by police 
officers: 
In determining whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement 
is the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a 
line, or we will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been 
stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with which he was meant only 
to be bl\ldgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg. 
We think it enough for a seizure that a person be stopped by the very instru-
mentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result. 
/d. In focusing on the effect of the police officers' conduct and not the officers' inten-
tions, the Court strongly expressed a communalist perspective. The Court chose not to 
emphasize the individual's part in the confrontation between officers and suspects. In-
stead, it expressed a policy of subjecting the means officers use to inflict personal injury 
to constitutional scrutiny. 
179. Garner, 411 U.S. at 9. 
180. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. 
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do so. 
Interpreting both causation issues from the same perspective 
would be harmonious with the Court's recent decisions in Brower v. 
County of /nyo181 and Tennessee v. Garner.182 By broadly interpreting 
the first causation issue, the Court subjected the practice of using road-
blocks and deadly force to stop 'individuals to scrutiny under the fourth 
amendment.183 To interpret narrowly the causation question, while 
181. In Brower, the Court did not address whether the roadblock caused the in-
dividual's injuries. Jd. at 599 ("the circumstances of this roadblock, including the alle-
gation that headlights were used to blind the oncoming driver, may yet determine the 
outcome of this case"). 
Recently the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed a communalist perspective 
as it discussed in detail an analogous causation issue when examining the use of force 
by prison officials. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1502-07 (9th Cir. 1990). The court 
held that although prison officials had not used excessive force in subduing an unruly 
prisoner, they nevertheless could be held liable for the injuries that this force produced, 
· because the prisoner's attempted escape was a foreseeable response to their act of try-
ing to put him in the cell of a known violent prisoner. The court emphasized that prison 
officials should have foreseen that the prisoner would respond by attempting to flee 
when they brought him to the cell. Although the act of fleeing caused the officials to 
use force, the intervening act of flight did not relieve the officials from liability. The 
court explained, "The courts are quite generally agreed that [foreseeable] intervening 
causes ... will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Id. at 1506 (quoting W. 
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 44, at 303-04 (5th ed. 1984)). "Courts 
look to the original foreseeable risk that the defendant created." Jd. In this context, a 
jury could find that officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's right to per-
sonal security. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit, in analyzing causation, thus focused on the officials' conduct, 
not the individual's rebellious act of fleeing. This decision exemplifies a communalistic 
perspective because it emphasizes the prison officials' original act of taking the prisoner 
to the cell and deemphasizes the prisoner's responsibility for the harm arising from his 
flight. By interpreting the facts of a typical pursuit in this manner, one could hold that 
police officers' use of psychological and physical force foreseeably caused an individual 
to continue her flight. The intervening act of flight, however, does not necessarily re-
lieve the officers from responsibility for their decision to pursue. The injuries resulting 
from a crash, whether the cruiser smashes into the individual's car or the individual 
loses control of his vehicle, could thus be caused by the police officers' decision to pur-
sue. The individual's flight response is thus a foreseeable result from the psychological 
and physical forces used by police officers. This communalistic perspective thus mini-
mizes the individual's responsibility for his act of fleeing but emphasizes the police 
officers' act of pursuing. 
182. 471 u.s. 1, 11 (1985). 
183. As Justice Scalia noted during oral argument, it would be better to draft a 
fourth amendment "seizure" definition that not only would encourage individuals to 
stop, but one that would also allow the stopped individual the opportunity to litigate the 
issue of whether the particular police practice is "reasonable" within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment. 57 U.S.L.W. 3531, 3532 (Feb. 21, 1989). 
The lower court in Brower, however, would have addressed whether the force used 
in establishing the roadblock was disproportionate under the fourteenth amendment. 
Brower v. County of lnyo, 817 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 
489 U.S. 593 (1989). Because the Supreme Court determined that the officers had 
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broadly interpreting the "seizure" issue, would be to ignore the Court's 
preference of subjecting stops to fourth amendment scrutiny.184 
The Court's recent discussion of causation under the fourteenth 
amendment in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services18"' provides support for the proposition that if police officers 
fail to pursue an offender, they cannot be said to have caused the harm 
the unapprehended offender later commits. In DeShaney, the Court de-
termined that state social workers did not cause the harm a child ex-
perienced when his father beat him.186 The officials did not cause the 
harm because the Court characterized the facts in the case from an 
individualist perspective to suggest that the workers had not acted.187 
In its opinion, the DeShaney Court generally described the right to 
seized the driver, the protections available under the fourteenth amendment would no 
longer be available. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (fourteenth 
amendment substantive due process claim not available when the plaintiff alleges that 
the force used during a seizure violated the fourth amendment). 
184. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 
(1990). In Sitz, the Court expressly limited its holding that police officers without rea-
sonable suspicion may stop drivers at a sobriety checkpoint. !d. The Court stated, "De-
tention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require 
satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard." !d. 
185. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
186. 489 U.S. at 194-95. 
187. In characterizing the facts in this manner, the Court implicitly encouraged 
social agencies to continue to attempt to provide services rather than shutting down out 
of fear that their services are inadequate and violative of the fourteenth amendment. A 
commentator has interpreted the DeShaney opinion as encouraging state legislators to 
pass laws that would protect individuals from an official's "reckless omissions." Note, 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County: The Narrowing Scope of Constitutional Torts, 49 
Mo. L. REv. 484, 508 (1990). 
The DeShaney decision does, however, express an individualist perspective. The 
Court, for example, narrowly defined the options available to social services workers 
and broadly defined the options available to the abused child. 489 U.S. at 203. The 
Court stated that if social service workers had taken the child from the father's cus-
tody, they "would likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the 
parent-child relationship." !d. With respect to the child, the Court stated that the 
workers had not limited "his freedom to act on his own behalf." !d. at 200. The Court 
also characterized the facts in a manner that deemphasized the social service workers 
involvement in the difficult family relationship, but emphasized the facts relating to the 
abusive father. /d. at 201. 
Professor Oren has severely criticized the Court for its individualist perspective. 
Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: 
DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C.L. REv. 659, 697 (1990). She equates individualism with 
"classical liberalism and the laissez faire ethic." !d. Professor Oren argues that the 
Court has misapplied these perspectives because "children ... do not fit the model of 
free agents acting in a free market or free society." !d. She also discusses feminist 
jurisprudence to indicate that the Court's adoption of individualism in this context rep-
resents "male thinking," which focuses attention to abstract objectives, in constrast to 
"female thinking," which focuses more attention to relationships in a particular con-
text. !d. at 698. 
242 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:205 
personal security by intertwining issues of causation and duty.188 The 
Court was able to intertwine these issues because it is "possible to state 
every question which arises in connection with 'proximate cause' in the 
form of a single question: was the [official] under a duty to protect the 
[individual] against the event which did in fact occur."189 
The DeShaney Court determined that generally there was no duty 
to protect an individual against "private violence,''190 that is, harm 
caused by third parties, as opposed to harm caused by state officials. 
The Court noted, however, that even when a third party injures an in-
dividual, under some circumstances officials have a duty to protect.191 
A constitutional duty to protect arises only when the state itself de-
prives an individual of the means to protect himself.192 A state deprives 
an individual of this freedom to protect himself when he is imprisoned, 
institutionalized, or subject to "other similar restraint[s] of personal 
liberty."198 
188. 489 U.S. at 201. In the following passage, the Court discusses both the 
state's limited duty and its lack of involvement in the harm: 
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that [the child] faced 
in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything 
to render him any more vulnerable to them. That the State once took tem-
porary custody of [the child] does not alter the analysis, for when it re-
turned him to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse position than 
that in which he would have been had it not acted at all; the State does not 
become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having once 
offered him shelter. Under these circumstances, the State had no constitu-
tional duty to protect [the child]. 
ld. The intertwining of the duty issue with causation was logical in this case because 
the Court characterized the facts of the case in a manner to indicate that the state 
officials had not acted. With this perspective, the focus of the duty issue was whether 
the state was liable for its presumed failure to act. 
189. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS,§ 42, at 274-75 (5th ed. 1984). 
190. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. 
191. ld. at 198. 
192. ld. at 199-200. The Court stated, "The affirmative duty to protect arises not 
from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of 
intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed upon his freedom to 
act on his own behalf." Id. 
193. /d. at 200. Under these circumstances, mere "private violence" has not oc-
curred because state officials are implicated in the harm: they caused the harm to the 
individual by breaching their duty to protect her. In drawing the line between state 
involvement and mere "private violence," the Supreme Court has sometimes described 
the line in terms of a duty and sometimes in terms of causation. In DeShaney, the 
predominate focus was on the scope of the constitutional duty to protect; yet, the Court 
also used causation language. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. In Martinez 
v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Court used causation analysis to describe an 
act as private. 444 U.S. at 284-85 (1980). The Court also used state action analysis to 
distinguish private conduct from official conduct. Id. at 285. To use state action analy-
sis as a means to distinguish the two, however, is to invite uncertainty because the 
doctrine produces unpredicatable results. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITU-
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The Court's narrow duty definition is understandable if one also 
notes that its duty analysis was intertwined with its implicit finding 
that the officials also were not the cause of the harm. The Court em-
phasized that the state officials had not done anything that made the 
child "more vulnerable"194 to the harm caused by his father. It also 
noted that the officials had not "created" the danger caused by his fa-
ther.196 In using these terms, the Court determined that the social ser-
vice workers had not acted. Thus, according to the Court, there was no 
duty to protect because the ·state was not involved in creating the harm 
posed by the father. The harm occurred as a result of mere "private 
violence." Determining that the harm was a result of private violence, 
however, represents the conclusion, not the process of evaluating the 
social service workers' actions or inactions. 
In characterizing the harmful act as a private one, the DeShaney 
Court also relied on Martinez v. California/96 a case in which it explic-
itly used causation analysis in deciding whether state officials were lia-
ble for the harm committed by a third party.197 In Martinez, the Court 
determined that parole officials were not liable for the death caused by 
the prisoner that they had released.198 The Court noted that the death 
was only remotely linked to the state officials' decision to release the 
prisoner and that the officials did not know which individual the pa-
rolee would harm.199 
TIONAL LAw § 18-2, at 1691 (2d ed. 1988) (the only way to understand the .Court's 
analysis of state action cases is to ask "why anarchy prevails" and "to construct an 
'anti-doctrine,' an analytical framework which, in explaining why various cases differ 
from one another, [will] paradoxically provide[] a structure for the solution to state 
action problems") (emphasis in original). Whichever analysis the Court employs, offi-
cials may be liable when their actions or inactions cause a third party to harm an 
individual. 
194. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. 
195. /d. 
196. 444 u.s. 277 (1980). 
197. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 
277, 284-85 (1980)). 
198. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284-85. 
199. The Martinez decision, however, as the Court noted in DeShaney, later be· 
came the basis for analyzing the constitutional duty owed by state officials under the 
substantive due process clause. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4. Lower courts inter-
preted Martinez as imposing a duty upon officials to protect an individual from the 
harm by a third party if there was a "special relationship" between the officials and the 
individual in danger. /d. A "special relationship" existed if officials knew which individ-
ual was in danger and if they had offered to protect the individual. /d. 
The intertwined nature of duty and causation analysis under the fourteenth 
amendment is thus apparent by considering the Court's decision in Martinez and the 
lower courts' adoption of a "special relationship" test for determining whether officials 
had a constitutional duty. The DeShaney Court, however, limited the doctrine of "spe-
cial relationships," which emerged after Martinez, to situations in which the state had 
deprived the individual of the means to protect herself. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-
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In both DeShaney and Martinez, the Court determined that state 
officials had not caused the harm that was committed by a third party. 
The Court adopted an individualist perspective on the ultimate issue of 
liability. The Court's discussion of causation, however, does not man-
date an individualist perspective of the causation issue for a pursuit 
claim because during a pursuit, officials are much more closely tied to 
the resultant harm than the officials were either to the child abuse or 
the murder caused by the parole. In neither DeShaney nor Martinez 
did the officials exert physical or psychological force over the third 
party that inflicted the harm. 
During a pursuit, police officers may use physical force and· psy-
chological force. 200 When police officers intentionally use their cruisers 
to collide with the pursued driver, they have used deadly force to stop 
the driver. When this crash results in injury to other drivers and 
pedestrians, the act of deliberately stopping the pursued driver often 
creates a foreseeable risk that others will be injured. In this sense, po-
lice officers may have caused the injuries to other drivers and 
pedestrians. 
When police officers use only psychological force and the pursued 
driver harms others, resolving liability depends upon whether one 
adopts a communalist perspective or an individualist perspective. 
Courts with an individualist perspective on the issue of psychological 
force would not find that police officers caused the harm. Because they 
do not recognize psychological force, they implicitly determine that the 
pursued driver caused his own injuries or the injuries of others.201 
202. To determine the scope of the right to personal security, however, one must also 
consider the degree of involvement the state played in creating the danger because the 
DeShaney decision also considered whether state actions or inactions had contributed 
to the danger posed by the third party. /d. at 196-202. In short, when a third party 
causes harm to an individual, whether state officials violated a duty owed to an individ-
ual under the fourteenth amendment or caused a violation of the right to personal 
security depends upon how one characterizes the state's actions or inactions. If officials 
were involved, then the harm may not be a result of "private violence," but instead a 
result of the state's breach of its duty to protect. Defining the scope of the fourteenth 
amendment thus is generally a question of characterizing the officials' actions or inac-
tions. As stated previously, resolution of causation questions and factual characteriza-
tions are generally controlled by policy decisions. The scope of protection available 
under the fourteenth amendment thus ultimately is a question of policy. See supra 
notes 50, 62-70 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra notes 125-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the force 
used during a pursuit. 
201. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990); Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 262-63 
(8th Cir. 1989); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986). But see Britt v. 
Little Rock Police Dept., 721 F. Supp. 189, 191, 195 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (police officer 
admitted that when the pursued driver lost control of his vehicle and crashed, the of-
ficer "proximately caused" the death of another motorist; court found that police pur-
suit was reasonable). 
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Courts that adopt a communalist perspective on the issue of psy-
chological force have the opportunity to address whether psychological 
force caused the injuries that occurred. Under the communalist per-
spective, one discerns the presence of psychological force and may de-
termine that this force was the proximate cause of the pursued driver's 
loss of control. Unlike the state officials in DeShaney, police officers in 
pursuing drivers place other drivers and pedestrians in greater danger. 
Their actions make other drivers and pedestrians "more vulnerable"202 
to the harm presented by the driver. For example, to pursue a driver 
allegedly intoxicated is to increase the speed of a driver already out of 
control. A decision not to pursue can lessen the danger presented by an 
intoxicated driver. 
A decision not to pursue, however, does not subject police officers 
to liability because, as the DeShaney Court determined, there is no 
general duty to protect the public from harm caused by third parties.208 
A duty only arises if the person harmed was in the custody of the of-
ficers. When police officers decide not to pursue, they are not liable for 
the harm caused by the unapprehended driver to other motorists and 
pedestrians because the injured individuals were not in the custody of 
officers. Thus, the DeShaney Court's duty analysis is helpful to the ex-
tent that it reveals that police officers would not be liable for a decision 
not to pursue. 
The DeShaney Court's duty analysis, however, should not be used 
202. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200-01. 
203. /d. at 200. See generally Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1392 
(9th Cir. 1990) (police officers were not liable for their inactions during a hostage crisis 
because they "played no part in creating the danger to the victims, nor did they do 
anything to render them more vulnerable to [the danger]"); Comment, The Constitu-
tional Duty to Complete a Rescue: An Examination of Archie v. City of Racine, 23 
CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 487, 490 (1990) (no constitutional right to protective ser-
vices, unless "a state initiates rescue"). 
In Bryson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed an individualist perspec-
tive in not imposing liability upon officers for their waiting one hour and a half before 
entering a building with hostages. Bryson, 905 F.2d at 1392. The court narrowly de-
scribed the options available to the officers in a manner similar to the DeShaney Court: 
"It is obvious ... that believing there was a hostage situtation inside, had the police 
permitted others to rush into the midst of the audible gunfire, there might have been 
some basis for charging recklessness or indifference towards the public and possibly 
toward those inside." /d. Both the DeShaney Court and Bryson court stated that if the 
officials had acted, they may have been sued for their actions. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 
203; Bryson, 905 F.2d at 1392. 
The Bryson court, however, expressed a communalist perspective in discussing lia-
bility if the police officers had acted during the hostage crisis. It recognized that by 
entering the building, the officers' mere presence could have exacerbated the situtation. 
In this sense, the officers' presence would have signified the presence of psychological 
force. See supra notes 126, 139-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of psycho-
logical force. 
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to ignore the police officers' own actions during a pursuit.204 As stated 
above, police officers use psychological force during a pursuit, a force 
that can cause both the pursued driver and the police officer to lose 
control and perspective. By focusing on the actions of the police of-
ficers, one need not address whether the officers had a duty to protect 
other drivers and pedestrians from the harm caused by the pursued 
driver because the officers' actions create or increase the harm 
presented by a driver. 
Even if police officers have caused the injuries incurred by other 
drivers and pedestrians, whether using physical or psychological force, 
liability attaches only if the force used was disproportionate. To deter-
Pline whether the force used was disproportionate requires considera-
tion of the parties' interests.205 This latter inquiry is the one in which 
courts can best reconcile an individual's right to personal security with 
society's interest in law enforcement.206 
IV. THE DISPROPORTIONALITY STANDARDS OF THE fOURTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
When police officers cause individuals to be injured during pur-
suits, whether by using physical or psychological force, liability at-
taches only if the force the officers used was disproportionate to the 
need for it.207 Both the fourth208 and fourteenth209 amendments balance 
the interests of the parties to determine whether the force was dispro-
portionate. The fourth amendment, however, only applies to individuals 
"seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment,210 and the four-
204. See supra notes 171-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of apply-
ing a communalist perspective to the actions of police officers and an individualist per-
spective for their inactions. Although rhetorical devices are implicated when a court 
characterizes the facts to determine whether officials acted or failed to act, the differ-
ence between action and inaction in the context of police pursuits is not as susceptible 
to manipulation. Other issues, such as the presence of force and causation, however, are 
subject to opposing characterizations. 
205. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stan-
dard of disproportionality under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 
206. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of balanc-
ing under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 
207. See infra notes 214-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dis-
proportionality standards of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 
208. See infra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bal-
ancing of interests for fourth amendment excessive force claims. 
209. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bal-
ancing of interests for fourteenth amendment excessive force claims. 
210. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (fourth amend-
ment applies to excessive force used "in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or 
other 'seizure' of a free citizen"); see also infra notes 357-459 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of when individuals are "seized" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. 
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teenth amendment applies only when an excessive force claim is not 
actionable under the fourth amendment.211 Because the pursued driver 
and her passenger may be "seized" during a pursuit,212 the fourth 
amendment is applicable to them. The fourteenth amendment is appli-
cable to pursuit claims brought by other motorists and pedestrians in-
jured as a result of a pursuit; these individuals are not "seized" within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment during a police pursuit.213 An 
examination of the standards under each of these amendments reveals 
that most pursuits constitute the use of disproportionate force. 
A. The Fourth Amendment Standard of Disproportiona/ity · 
The fourth amendment protects the right to personal security. It 
safeguards "[t]he right of the people to be secure.in their persons ... 
against unreasonable ... seizures."214 Most pursuits are "unreasona-
ble" within the meaning of the fourth amendment because they mini-
mally further society's interest in law enforcement while significantly 
infringing upon an individual's right to personal security.216 The unrea-
sonableness or disproportionality of force is apparent by balancing an 
individual's interest in personal security against society's interest in law 
enforcement.216 Although the balancing of interests often produces un-
predictable results,217 in the context of pursuits the balance tips in 
211. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871. In Graham, the Court recognized 
that three constitutional amendments protect an individual's interest in personal secur-
ity: the fourth amendment applies to individuals "seized" during an investigatory stop, 
an arrest, or "other 'seizure' of a free citizen," id.; the eighth amendment applies to 
prisoners, id. at 1870; and the fourteenth amendment protects pretrial detainees, id. at 
1871 n.lO. The Court stated that either the fourth or eighth amendment will apply in 
"most instances" to excessive force claims. Id. at 1870. Many courts have extended the 
reach of the fourth amendment to apply to claims that officials used excessive force 
after an arrest but before pretrial detention. See supra note 116. 
212. See infra notes 380, 402-03, 432-33, 436-39 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of how officers may seize the pursued driver and his passengers during a 
pursuit. 
213. See infra notes 380, 402-03, 434 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
.why other motorists and pedestrians are not "seized" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. 
214. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
215. See infra notes 259-293 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bal-
ancing process under the fourth amendment as applied to pursuits. 
216. See infra notes 217-58, 294-349 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the balancing of interests inherent in excessive force claims. 
217. See, e.g., Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth 
Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1141 n.73 (1984) ("(f]ourth [a]mendment balancing 
test operates in almost every new case: Once decided, a particular case need not be 
reconsidered, but most cases have distinctive variables calling for a new balance"). See 
generally Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 n.18 (7th Cir.) (although balancing 
interests generally does not lead to "clearly established" law, officials may be liable 
when their "actions are so egregious that the result of the balancing test will be a 
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favor of protecting an individual's right to personal security.218 An ex-
amination of the risks and benefits of pursuits indicates that when the 
pursued driver or his passengers are injured, the force used may violate 
these individuals' fourth amendment right to personal security. 
Although the Supreme Court has never determined whether pur-
suits are unreasonable, in two cases it has articulated the standard for 
determining when force is unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 
In Tennessee v. Garner,219 the Court established the standard for deter-
mining when deadly force is unreasonable,220 and in Graham v. Con-
nor,221 it determined that the Garner standard also applies to the use of 
nondeadly force. 222 An application of the Garner/Graham standard in-
dicates that most pursuits are unreasonable.223 
1. Tennessee v. Garner Standard 
In 1985 the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner24 articulated a 
per se rule for determining when police officers may use deadly force to 
apprehend a fleeing suspect.2211 The rule provided that police officers 
may use deadly force only when they have "probable cause to believe 
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the 
officer or to others .... " 226 Under the Court's rule, force was thus 
automatically disproportionate227 if the officers did not reasonably be-
lieve that the suspect presented a significant danger to the commu-
foregone conclusion"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986). 
218. See infra notes 259-93, 342-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
balancing the interests of the parties in police pursuits. 
219. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
220. /d. at 11-12; see also infra notes 224-47, 258 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Garner case. 
221. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). 
222. /d. at 1871-72; see also infra notes 249-58 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Graham case. 
223. See infra notes 259-85 and accompanying text for an application of the 
Garner/Graham standard applied to police pursuits. 
224. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
225. 471 U.S. at 11. 
226. /d. 
227. One commentator has characterized the Garner Court as declaring that 
force that is disproportionate is unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. Com-
ment, Deadly Force Justifications and the Tennessee v. Garner Proportionality Re-
quirement, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 191, 196 (1986). The author has noted that when police 
officers assert that their use of force was "reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment, they are asserting common "defensive force justifications." /d. He states 
that these justifications "follow that same three-pronged theoretical structure": an 
event in which the suspect signifies the possibility of harm towards others, a "necessary 
response" by police officers, and a response that was "proportional." /d. In Garner, the 
Court specified when an event represents harm toward others, when police officers may 
respond, and when the use of deadly force is proportionate to the need for it. Garner, 
471 U.S. at 11-12. 
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nity.228 The Court created this rule by balancing the interests of the 
parties229 and by rejecting the common law rule, which broadly permit-
ted the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect. 230 
The Court determined that the suspect's "fundamental"231 interest 
in personal security outweighed the state's asserted interests.232 The 
state had claimed that the practice of killing all fleeing felons furthered 
its interest in effective law enforcement and its interest in reducing 
"overall violence."233 Its interest in law enforcement related to the two 
offenses allegedly committed by the fleeing suspect: fleeing from an of-
ficer after being commanded to stop and burglary, the original offense 
prompting the flight. Although the Court determined that the state's 
interests were "important,"234 it closely scrutinized the means the state 
had adopted to further these interests.2811 It found that the· use of 
228. Id. The Court's per se rule is a form of "rule utilitarianism." See Note, The 
Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 
1141 n.73 (1984). One scholar has defined "rule utilitarianism" as a form of moral 
philosophy that "measures the consequences of different types of actions and lays out 
beforehand a set of rules designed to maximize collective pleasure or happiness." !d. In 
Garner, the Court established a rule that informs police officers under what circum-
stances they may shoot a fleeing suspect. 471 U.S. at 11. The Garner decision can be 
understood as establishing a rule that courts are to apply before they balance the inter-
ests of the parties to determine whether the force used was disproportionate to the need 
for it. If officers did not reasonably believe that the suspect presented a danger to the 
community, then the shooting signifies the use of disproportionate force under the per 
se rule and balancing would not be necessary. One scholar has advocated this approach 
to fourth amendment issues because balancing alone, without any per se rules, fails to 
protect an individual's interest in personal security. See Note, supra note 228, at 1127. 
In contrast to rule utilitarianism is "act utilitarianism," which "determines the moral-
ity of an act by weighing all of its consequences" and considers "the best actions [to 
be] those that increase the aggregate pleasure or happiness of an entire society." /d. at 
1141 n.72. When the Garner Court first balanced the interests of the parties, it ap-
peared to express the moral philosophy of "act utilitarianism" to create its per se rule. 
The Court explained that " 'the balancing of interests' " is the "'key principle of the 
Fourth Amendment.'" Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692, 700 n.l2 ( 1981) ). 
229. /d. at 9-12. 
230. /d. at 13-15. 
231. /d. at 9. 
232. Id. at 9-10. 
233. Id. at 9. 
234. Id. at 10. 
235. Id. at 10. The Court stated, "we are not convinced that the use of deadly 
force is a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing them to jusitify the killing of 
nonviolent suspects." /d. 
Recently the Court expressed some reluctance in evaluating the effectiveness of 
the means chosen by law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State 
Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990). In Sitz, the Court allowed officials to 
establish sobriety roadblocks as a means designed to protect the public from experienc-
ing physical harm caused by an intoxicated driver and noted the following: 
Experts in police science might disagree over which of several methods of 
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deadly force to stop all fleeing felons, and in this case, the burglary 
suspect, was not sufficiently tailored to the state's interests in law en-
forcement.1186 In short, the use of force was disproportionate to the need 
for it, even if the suspect would not have been arrested later.1187 
Although the state had an interest in arresting suspects for the act 
of fleeing, the degree of force permitted under the statute1188 did not 
relate to the seriousness of the offense committed.:0189 Because some 
states did not outlaw fleeing from an arrest, some made flight only a 
misdemeanor, and some imposed only a fine for the act of fleeing,1140 the 
offense of fleeing itself was not a serious offense that justified the use of 
deadly force.1141 Presumably the state's interest in apprehension is di-
rectly related to the seriousness of the offense allegedly committed. The 
state's interest in apprehension for the act of flight was thus not sub-
stantial. Furthermore, its interest in apprehending a burglary suspect 
was similarly outweighed by the suspect's fundamental interest in per-
sonal security because, as the Court determined, the suspect had not 
committed a serious offense. 
Deadly force, however, would properly further the state's interest 
in law enforcement if the attempt to capture related to a serious of-
fense. The Court defined a serious offense as one in which the suspect 
apprehending drunken drivers is preferrable as an ideal. But for purposes of 
Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives 
remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, 
and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number 
of police officers. 
ld. When the use of force is in issue, the Supreme Court has not expressed this defer-
ence. In Garner, the Court did not defer to legislatures the task of determining how 
best to balance the interests of the parties. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Law - The 
Right to Run: Deadly Force and the Fleeing Felon: Tennessee v. Garner, 11 S. ILL. 
U.L.J. 171, 183 (1986) (Garner Court failed to discern that "legislatures are best able 
to evaluate all the information and public opinion and come to a proper balancing of 
public and private interests"); see also Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a Gen-
eral Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
119, 148 (1989) (even though the "Rehnquist Court, like the Burger Court before it, 
has generally been inhospitable toward ... substantive fourth amendment claims," it 
nevertheless has evaluated closely fourth amendment claims raising the issue of the 
reasonableness of force). The Court has frequently subjected police practices to fourth 
amendment scrutiny. See supra note 175. 
236. Garner, 471 U.S. at 10. 
237. I d. at 9 n.8. ("we proceed on the assumption that subsequent arrest is not 
likely"). 
238. TENN. CooE ANN. § 40-7-108 ( 1982) ("If, after notice of intention to arrest 
the defendant, he either fiee[s] or forcibly resist[s), the officer may use all the neces-
sary means to effect the arrest."). 
239. Garner, 471 U.S. at 1 L 
240. Id. at 10 n.9. The Court aptly noted that the decedent in Garner could have 
received a fine of fifty dollars for his act of fleeing if the officer had not killed him. Id. 
241. Id. at 11. 
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"poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to 
others .... "242 Under this definition, not all felonies would constitute 
serious offenses. Instead, seriousness is directly related to the harm the , 
individual presents to the community if he is not apprehended. Thus, if 
the offense prompting the flight was one that involved "the infliction or 
threatened infliction of serious physical harm,"243 then using deadly 
force to apprehend the suspect would be reasonable. Using deadly force 
under these circumstances would further the state's interest in appre-
hending a dangerous suspect. 
This per se rule for the use of deadly force strikes the appropriate 
balance between the state's interest in law enforcement and the individ-
ual's interest in personal security. The Court recognized that an indi-
vidual has a fundamental interest in life.244 When an individual com-
mits a serious offense, however, the state's interest in law enforcement 
outweighs the individual's fundamental interest. The use of deadly 
force under these circumstances is reasonable because it allows police 
officers to protect others whose lives are threatened by the suspect's 
freedom. 
· By balancing the interests in this manner, the Court created a per 
se rule that conflicted with the common law rule, which allowed officers 
to shoot all fleeing felons. In rejecting the historical context of the 
fourth amendment, the Court explained that changes in law and in 
technology indicated that the practice of shooting all fleeing felons was 
unreasonable. 2411 
In its analysis of what constitutes the use of disproportionate force, 
242. /d. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that all felonies are serious 
and all misdeameanors are not serious. /d. at 14. The Court thought the actual danger 
posed by the suspect was a better measure of the seriousness of the crime. /d. at 20. 
In the context of determining what constitutes exigent circumstances under the 
fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has measured the gravity of the offense by 
considering the penalty that a state imposes for a particular offense. See, e.g., Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). The Court determined that the offense of driving 
while intoxicated was not serious because the state "has chosen to classify the ... 
offense ... as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possi-
ble." /d. at 754. The dissent, however, appropriately criticized the Court for failing to 
recognize that the civil classification of this offense was meant to aid the state in secur-
ing convictions for the traffic offense. /d. at 763 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent 
thus maintained that the offense was a serious one, rather than a minor offense. /d. at 
762-63 (White, J., dissenting). 
243. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
244. !d. at 9. 
245. /d. at 13. The Court interpreted the standard of disproportionality under 
the fourth amendment in' light of technological changes, not the common law rule. In 
doing so, the Court implicitly recognized that reliance on the common law rule would 
have failed to consider societal values. See Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Derner 
cratic Practice of Judicial Review, 14 REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 700 (1986) ("his-
tory was uninstructive; at worst, its application would have led to a quite arbitrary 
rule"). 
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the Garner Court thus appeared to express a communalist perspective 
because it emphasized the police officer's role in the shooting and 
deemphasized the suspect's culpable act of fleeing and committing bur-
glary. The Court also emphasized the options available to police officers 
and deemphasized the suspect's options. It stressed "that failure to ap~ 
prebend at the scene does not necessarily mean that the suspect will 
never be caught."2" 6 On the other hand, the Court deemphasized the 
notion that the suspect could have prevented the need for force by com-
plying with the officer's command. Using strong communalist tones, the 
Court stated, "It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they 
escape."247 
The Court thus strongly protected a suspect's right to personal se-
curity under the fourth amendment by closely evaluating the means 
officers use to apprehend suspects. The fourth amendment safeguards a 
suspect's right to personal security as long as that right does not in-
fringe upon another individual's right to personal security. Only when 
the suspect poses a danger to others is the suspect's right to personal 
security less weighty. The Court similarly expressed the importance of 
the right to personal security in the recent decision of Graham v. 
Connor.2" 8 
2. Graham v. Connor Standard 
Four years after the Garner decision, the Supreme Court clarified 
in Graham v. Connor"9 that the Garner standard was also applicable 
to claims involving the use of nondeadly force. Again, the Court fo-
cused on the seriousness of the offense that the individual had commit-
ted and considered the risk that an individual who evades arrest poses 
to others.211° For force to be reasonable under the fourth amendment, it 
must be related to the need to apprehend or control an individual.2111 
In applying the Garner standard to a claim alleging the use of 
nondeadly force, the Court made explicit what was implicit in Garner. 
It articulated three factors to consider in determining the reasonable-
ness of force: "[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the 
246. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9 n.8. 
247. /d. at 11. Professor Geoffrey Alpert interprets Garner as establishing a 
"moral precedent." G. ALPERT, THE POLICE UsE OF DEADLY FORCE: GuNs, VEHICLES 
AND OTHER WEAPONS (1991) (forthcoming). He criticizes the Garner Court as provid-
ing "no more than rhetoric and ambiguity ... [to] serve as guideposts for a post-hoc 
analysis." /d.; see also Winter, supra note 245 at 692 (Garner decision "is essentially a 
moral pronouncement"). 
248. 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871-72 (1989); see infra notes 249-58 and accompanying 
text. 
249. /d. at 1871-72. 
250. /d. 
251. /d. 
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suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, 
and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest by fiight."2112 All three factors compel police officers to measure 
the need for force in light of the danger posed by the suspect, with the 
danger being measured by the seriousness of the alleged offense and the 
risk of harm in not capturing the suspect. 
The first factor is similar to the Court's focus in Garner on the 
offense allegedly committed by a suspect. If the offense is a serious 
offense, then more force would be permissible in apprehending or con-
trolling a suspect than if the offense were minor. The second factor is 
also present in the Garner decision. Both question the danger that the 
suspect poses to others. In Graham, however, the Court questioned 
whether the suspect posed an "immediate" threat to others.2118 If the 
individual would not endanger others, then less force is permissible 
than if the suspect presented imminent harm. Similarly, the last factor 
questions whether the suspect is attempting to escape. When this factor 
is read in light of the other two factors in the Garner decision, the 
degree of force reasonable under the fourth amendment relates to the 
offense that the individual committed and the harm that he presents to 
others if he remains at large. The last factor thus does not authorize 
police officers to use an unlimited amount of nondeadly force to appre-
hend a suspect. Force must be proportionate to the offense, the danger 
the suspect poses to others, and the suspect's resistance to arrest.2114 
Force is thus reasonable if it is proportionate to the need for it. 
Reasonableness of force, according to the Court, is to be measured ob-
jectively, not subjectively.21111 Even if police officers in good faith applied 
force in arresting an individual, the force used may not be reasona-
ble.2116 Reasonableness is to be determined by considering whether a 
reasonable officer would have similarly thought the degree of force ac-
tually used was reasonable under the circumstances known to the act-
ing police officer. 2117 
The Graham standard, like the Garner standard, represents a com-
munalist perspective regarding the use of nondeadly force. The Gra-
ham Court deemphasized a suspect's culpable conduct in failing to 
comply with the officers' attempt to subdue him, while it emphasized 
the police officers' role during the altercation. By determining that a 
252. ld. at 1872. 
253. ld. 
254. ld. 
255. ld. at 1872-73. The Court properly noted, however, that although a plaintiff 
need not establish that officers maliciously used force to establish a fourth amendment 
claim, the plaintiff may nevertheless inject into the case the officers' subjective bad 
faith when he seeks to attack their credibility. ld. at 1873 n.12. 
256. ld. at 1872. 
257. ld. 
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suspect need not prove that officers acted maliciously in subduing him, 
the Graham Court subjected the force officers use to greater scrutiny 
than if it had adopted a good faith standard. As it related the use of 
force to the seriousness of the offense and the "immediate" risk the 
suspect presents to others, the Graham Court implicitly determined 
that it is not better that all suspects be subjected to force "than that 
they escape."2&8 
The Garner/Graham standard broadly protects an individual's 
right to personal security. Although the Court has never applied this 
standard to pursuits, an application of the Garner/Graham standard 
indicates the unreasonableness of most pursuits. 
3. Applying the Garner/Graham Standard to Pursuits 
The Garner/Graham standard applies to the use of force by police 
officers, whether deadly or nondeadly. 2118 In the context of pursuits, po-
lice officers often use either physical force280 to stop an individual, 
which constitutes the use of deadly force, or psychological force,281 
which constitutes the use of potentially deadly force. To determine the 
reasonableness of pursuits, one must consider the factors specified in 
the Garner/Graham standard. These factors are helpful in balancing 
the interests of the parties and provide a means of evaluating whether 
the force applied during a pursuit is disproportionate to the need for it. 
The first factor, the seriousness of the offense, compels police of-
ficers to evaluate the offenses allegedly committed by a suspect who 
flees. The typical pursuit often involves a violation of three laws: the 
original offense prompting the officers to attempt a stop, flight from an 
officer, and speeding. In most situations, the original offense is a traffic 
violation.282 For example, police officers have chased individuals for not 
.258. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; see also supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
259. See infra notes 260-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Gar-
ner/Graham standard. 
260. See supra notes 125, 128-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of how 
police officers use physical force during pursuits. 
261. See supra notes 127, 139-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of how 
police officers use psychological force during pursuits. 
262. One state attorney has stated that although the purported reason for pursu-
ing an individual is a violation of a traffic law, the "offense that precipitated the chase 
was 'contempt of cop' - that is, the officer's ego says, 'I won't let him outrun me.'" 
Emory Plitt, an assistant Maryland Attorney General, made the comment during a 
conference for chiefs of police, International Association of Chiefs of Police Confer-
ence Report, 44 CRIM. L. REP. 2136 (1988). Studies, however, indicate that young male 
police officers are more likely to display this attitude than young female officers or 
more experienced officers. See supra note 88. Similarly, even when pursuits do not end 
because of a collision, officers often use excessive force even after the individual's vehi-
cle has stopped. /d. The affront to police authority during a pursuit is real, yet the 
Court in both Garner and Graham admonished officers to use force only in relation to 
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wearing a helmet,268 for squealing tires,264 for having the wrong license 
plates on the vehicle,26G for having no licenses plates,266 for failing to 
have headlights on, and for not stopping at a stop sign267 or a red 
light.268 Whether these offenses are serious is to be ascertained by con-
sidering the second factor, the risk that these offenses pose to other 
individuals, because the Garner/Graham standard explicitly rejected 
classifying seriousness on a basis of whether the suspect had committed 
a felony or a misdemeanor. 269 
The first and second factors both require consideration of the harm 
inherent in violating a law. The second factor, however, focuses on the 
immediacy of harm that the suspect presents to others. An application 
of these factors indicates that the degree of harm presented by traffic 
offenses varies depending upon the offense. For example, the failure to 
wear a helmet may present a risk of harm to the driver, but not to 
others near him. The failure to stop at a stop sign or a red light may 
present an immediate risk to others if one assumes ~hat the driver gen-
erally fails to stop when he should, rather than assuming that this was 
an isolated incident.270 Similarly, failing to use headlights can poten-
the seriousness of the crime. Graham, 109 S. Ct at 1872; Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
263. Webbs v. Hyans, No. 88-3180 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1989) (WESTLAW, Federal 
library, Court of Appeals file). Under a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, police officers might be able to pursue individuals for failing to wear a 
seatbelt. The court held that police officers have the authority to stop drivers who do 
not appear to be wearing a seatbelt. Guerrero v. United States, 58 U.S.L.W. 3646 
(lOth Cir. April, 10, 1990) (court approves stop of vehicle because the driver, who was 
wearing a lap belt, did not appear to be wearing a seatbelt). 
264. Reed v. County of Allegan, 688 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 n.4 (W.O. Mich. 
1988). 
265. Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 295 (8th Cir. 1989). 
266. Webbs v. Hyans, No. 88-3180 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1989) (WESTLAW, Federal 
library, Court of Appeals file). 
267. Tagstrom v. Pottebaum, 668 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (N.D. Iowa 1987), appeal 
denied sub nom. Tagstrom v. Enockson, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 857 F.2d 
502 (8th Cir. 1988). 
268. City of Amarillo v. Langley, 651 S.W.2d 906, 911 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
269. Professor Salken has noted that "[t]raffic offenses, even the most serious, 
are almost always enforced by fines." Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth 
Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic 
Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 221, 268 (1989). She questioned whether the penalty is 
inconsistent with the broad arrest powers that states have given police officers during 
stops for traffic violations. /d. at 262. The power to arrest for traffic offenses is "rela-
tively recent ... it is not justified nor foreshadowed by common law practice." Id. at 
259. Professor 'Salken argued that the only traffic offense warranting the arrest power 
is driving while intoxicated. /d. at 271. 
270. See generally id. at 270 (some states limit a police officer's power to arrest 
for a traffic violation to situations in which " 'there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
offense would continue or resume or that persons or property would be endangered by 
the arrested person.") (quoting TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-7-118(c)(2) (Supp. 1988)). 
One commentator has criticized the Garner Court for allowing police officers to 
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tially place others at risk, but the failure to have the proper license 
plate does not place other lives in danger; instead, the focus of the stop 
is probably to apprehend someone who has committed a property 
crime.271 Police officers, however, have pursued individuals for traffic 
offenses that endanger others in a more obvious manner. For example, 
police officers have pursued individuals for speeding,272 for drag rac-
ing,278 and for generally driving in an "unsafe manner."274 Because 
these latter traffic offenses may endanger the lives of others, they are 
serious offenses. 
The second and third offenses common to pursuits, flight and 
speeding, can also endanger the lives of others. The harm presented by 
these offenses is "immediate." Studies well document the risk of harm 
that pursuits engender, not only to the individual, but also to police 
officers, other drivers, and pedestrians.2711 These too are serious offenses. 
The threat posed by the second and third offenses, however, arises 
from the police officers' decision to pursue, rather than from the indi-
vidual's initial flight. 276 By terminating the pursuit, police officers may 
cause the individual to stop his flight and speeding.277 In this situation, 
the suspect does not pose an "immediate threat" to others; instead, the 
use deadly force to apprehend a suspect who has allegedly committed a serious offense, 
without considering whether "the suspect might not pose any threat of harm to the 
officer or others." Comment, Criminal Procedure- Search and Seizure - Law Of-
ficer's Use of Deadly Force Against Nondangerous Fleeing Felon Held Violative of 
Fourth Amendment, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 758, 779 (1987). Implicit in the Garner 
decision, however, is the assumption that someone who has allegedly committed an 
offense "involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm" is a 
dangerous person, one that continues to present a significant risk of harm to police 
officers and others until he is apprehended. Garner, 471 U.S. at II. 
271. See, e.g .. Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (stealing a 
car); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't., 721 F. Supp. 189, 190 (E.D. Ark. 1989) 
(same); City of Miami v. Harris, 490 Sc. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
(burglary). 
Some police policies allow pursuits to apprehend someone who has allegedly vio-
lated another person's interest in property. See, e.g., City of Overland Park, Kan., High 
Speed Motor Vehicle Pursuit (April 13, 1989) ("primary goal of the department is the 
protection of life and property"); Macon, Ga., Police Department General Order: Po-
lice Vehicle Operations (Jan. 1, 1988) (same). 
272. Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 262 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); 
Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 201 (6th Cir. 1986); Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 
1207 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 776 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1985); Easterling v. City 
of Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911, 913 (S.D. Ga. 1986). 
273. Allen v. Cook, 668 F. Supp. 1460, 1461 (W.O. Okla. 1987). 
274. Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1107 (6th Cir. 1987). 
275. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the risks associ-
ated with police pursuits. 
276. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of how of-
ficers' use of psychological force during pursuits can cause the pursued driver to con-
tinue to flee and to increase his speed. 
277. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
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police pose such a threat by continuing the pursuit. Similarly, police 
officers, by continuing to pursue, may increase the danger presented by 
the initial offense. The psychological force used during a pursuit may 
increase the danger presented by an unsafe driver.278 Pursuing an indi-
vidual is like shooting at an individual's vehicle279- both raise his ad-
renalin and increase his speed. 
The final factor, whether the individual resists arrest, is applicable 
to all pursuits. This factor focuses on the force the suspect used in at-
tempting to flee. When combined with the other two factors, it does not 
permit the use of all force to apprehend an individual. The police of-
ficers' use of force must still be proportionate to the need for it. 
Applying these factors to the typical pursuit reveals that even 
when the original traffic offense presents a risk of harm to others, pur-
suit is unjustified because the use of psychological force increases the 
risk of harm. The common second and third offenses, flight and speed-
ing, also do not justify a pursuit. Although there is a risk of harm to 
others that arises from the act of fleeing and speeding, police officers 
can terminate the danger to others by terminating the pursuit. Only a 
quick termination will lessen the danger to others because injuries oc-
cur as frequently in pursuits lasting a minute as they do in pursuits 
lasting longer than a minute.280 By not pursuing individuals for traffic 
offenses, police officers thus do not increase the risk of harm nor do 
they create an unnecessary risk. 
Application of the Garner/Graham standard indicates that pursuit 
is generally a means that unduly infringes upon an individual's interest 
in personal security. Striking the balance in this manner, however, does 
not ignore the state's important interest in law enforcement. It only 
signifies that the state may adopt other means that are "reasonable," 
which is to be ascertained by considering the degree of infringement 
upon an individual's right to personal security. As the Garner Court 
stated, technological advances are important in determining whether a 
particular law enforcement practice is reasonable. 281 The use of heli-
copters, small airplanes, or spike belts would allow officers to continue 
pursuit without unduly infringing upon the right to personal security.282 
The Supreme Court recently stated that it would not subject a law en-
278. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dan-
gers associated with psychological force. 
279. See generally, Veach v. Cross, 532 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) 
("the only significance of the alleged shooting was that it may have spurred the fleeing 
driver to drive even faster"). 
280. See supra note 1. 
281. Garner, 411 U.S. at 13. 
282. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of alterna-
tives to vehicular pursuits. 
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forcement practice to close scrutiny283 nor tell agencies how to allocate 
resources.284 However, the particular program at issue, the use of road-
blocks to determine whether a driver is intoxicated, significantly fur-
thered the right to personal security by attempting to reduce the num-
ber of intoxicated drivers on the road. 2811 This program used a stop to 
prevent harm to the driver and others on the road; it did not exacerbate 
the risk of harm as pursuits do. 
Many pursuit policies used by law enforcement agencies, however, 
violate the fourth amendment because they fail to recognize the risk of 
harm present in all pursuits.288 These unconstitutional policies expose 
these agencies to costly law suits under section 1983287 brought by indi-
283. Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990). Al-
though the Court rejected the lower court's "searching examination of 'effectiveness,'" 
it nevertheless did scrutinize the means by considering whether the law enforcment 
practice reasonably advanced the state's interest. Id. at 2487-88. The Court's statement 
in Sitz should not be read to state that the Court will apply only a rational level of 
review in evaluating the soundness of a law enforcement practice. The Court has fre-
quently subjected means to close scrutiny. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 
1684, 1688 (1990) (officers may not enter dwelling to search for "overnight guest" 
unless they have either a warrant or consent); Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1099 
(1990) (protective sweep of dwelling "may extend only to a cursory inspection of those 
spaces where a person may be found" and must last no longer than "necessary to dispel 
the reasonable suspicion of danger"); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (use 
of deadly force to stop all fleeing felons is unreasonable); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 
753, 767 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (surgery to remove a bullet would be 
unreasonable). 
284. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487 ("governmental officials ... have a unique under-
standing of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number 
of police officers"). 
285. /d. at 2488. 
286. Some pursuit policies fail to stress the importance of considering the seri-
ousness of the offense allegedly committed by the driver. See, e.g., City of Overland 
Park, Kan., High Speed Motor Vehicle Pursuit (April 13, 1990) ("Pursuits for per-
son(s) suspected of involvement in serious crime are viewed as more justifiable than 
those for persons suspected of only traffic or other misdemeanor violations"); City of 
West Palm Beach, Vehicle Pursuits (Apr. 7, 1989) (although policy expresses concern 
about the danger pursuits represent, it states "that it is not in the best interests of 
public safety to advocate a policy that would encourage the ... car thief, or fleeing 
criminal to proceed without imminent possibility of police intervention"). Some pursuit 
policies also allow unmarked police vehicles to pursue individuals, a policy that places 
unwarned motorists in danger. See, e.g., Macon Police Department, Georgia, Police 
Vehicle Operations (Apr. 1, 1988) ("Unmarked police vehicles may engage in hot pur-
suit only when the fleeing vehicle presents an immediate and direct threat to life or 
property"); see also City of Jackson, Tennessee, General Order: Pursuit Procedures 
(Mar. 22, 1989). Some policies allow officers to pursue intoxicated drivers, even though 
pursuit increases the risk of harm to the public. See, e.g., Montana Highway Patrol, 
Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy (Mar. 1990) (the need to apprehend a driver "under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs" outweighs the risk of harm presented by a pursuit). 
287. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). In Harris, 
the Supreme Court recognized that a local government may be liable for the harm 
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viduals "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the pur-
sued driver and any passengers in the pursued vehicle who were 
injured.288 
A pursuit may also violate the substantive due process component 
of the fourteenth amendment.289 Individuals not "seized" within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment may assert claims under the four-
teenth amendment.290 Such individuals include other drivers, passen-
gers, and pedestrians injured as a result of a pursuit.291 Similarly, the 
pursued driver and her passengers may assert a fourteenth amendment 
claim in the alternative as a means of preserving scrutiny of the pursuit 
if a court rejects their argument that they were "seized" within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment.292 In the context of a pursuit, pro-
tection available under the fourteenth amendment is similar to the pro-
tection under the fourth amendment. Both amendments balance the in-
terests of the parties to determine whether force was disproportionate 
to the need for it.293 
inflicted by officials if the harm was caused by deliberate indifference in training offi-
cials. ld. at 388. See generally Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official 
Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 625, 630 (1989) (author criticizes 
the Court's decision in Harris and suggests that local government liability should de-
pend upon "whether the [municipal] agent was at fault and whether the agent was 
'caused' by the city to commit the violation") (emphasis in original). The Court ex-
pressly stated that if a local government fails to train its officers regarding the proper 
use of deadly force, the "failure to do so could properly be characterized as 'deliberate 
indifference' to constitutional rights." Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. The Court stated 
that the need to train officers in deadly force is "obvious." Id. 
The Harris standard applies, however, not only to training but also to supervision. 
See, e.g., Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989); S. STEIN-
GLASS, SECTION 1983 STATE COURT LITIGATION, §15.2(a), at 15-4 n.l7 (1988). But 
see Brown, Accountability in Government and Section 1983 (forthcoming) (courts 
should impose liability upon supervisors when they are negligent in their duties). 
288. See infra notes 380, 403, 432-33, 436-39 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of how police officers may "seize" the pursued driver and his passengers during 
a pursuit. 
289. See infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of excessive 
force claims under the fourteenth amendment. 
290. See, e.g., Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't., 721 F. Supp. 189, 190-93 (E.D. 
Ark. 1989) (other motorist killed when police officers pursued car thief). 
291. See infra notes 380, 403, 434 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
why these individuals are generally not "seized" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment during police pursuits. 
292. See, e.g., Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203-05 (6th Cir. 1986) (pursued 
driver was not "seized"; court also considered whether the pursuit violated the four-
teenth amendment). See generally Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(injured passenger in pursued vehicle stated a violation of substantive due process). 
293. See supra notes 214-292 and infra notes 294-353 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the balancing interests under the fourth and fourteenth 
amendments. 
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B. The Disproportionality Standard of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life [or] liberty .. 
. without due process of law."294 The substantive due process compo-
nent of this amendment protects a person's right to personal security.2911 
This amendment safeguards an individual's right to personal security 
only when the right is not protected either by the fourth amendment,296 
which protects against unreasonable seizures, or the eighth amendment, 
which protects against "wanton and unnecessary" force.297 Because 
neither the fourth amendment298 nor the eighth amendment299 apply to 
claims asserted by other drivers, their passengers, or pedestrians who 
are injured during a pursuit,800 the fourteenth amendment is applicable 
to these claims. The scope of the right to security under the fourteenth 
amendment, however, is similar to the scope of the right to personal 
security under the fourth amendment.801 
In contrast to personal security claims brought under the fourth 
amendment802 and the eighth amendment,808 the Supreme Court has 
294. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
295. See supra note 7. 
296. See, e.g .• Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989). 
297. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. (prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments"); see 
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("'unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment'") (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 
430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977), which quoted Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 
298. The fourth amendment is not applicable because these individuals are not 
"seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See infra notes 380, 403, 434 
and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. 
299. The eighth amendment is not applicable because these individuals are not 
prisoners. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40. 
300. If a court determines that a pursued driver and passsengers were not seized 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, then it may need to address the alterna-
tive ground of substantive due process. See, e.g .. Galas 801 F.2d at 202-05; Tagstrom, 
668 F. Supp. at 1271-73. 
301. See supra note 214-300 and infra notes 302-353 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of the disproportionality standards under the fourth and fourteenth 
amendments. 
302. See supra notes 224-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fac-
tors applicable to fourth amendment excessive force claims. 
303. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. In Whitley, the Supreme Court stated 
that during a prison riot, only the malicious use of force violates the eighth amend-
ment. Id. In deciding whether force was malicious, the Court applied three factors that 
courts have considered in determining whether force violated the fourteenth amend-
ment: the need for the force, the relationship between the need and the amount of 
force, and the extent of the injury inflicted. Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 
1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). 
When the exigency of a prison riot is not present, some courts have applied the same 
factors to determine whether the force used signified "deliberate indifference" to a pris-
oner's right to personal security. See, e.g .. Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343, 1350 (8th 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 542 (1989) (deliberate indifference is actionable 
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not articulated factors for determining when force violates the substan-
tive due process component of 'the fourteenth amendment. It has, how-
ever, generally described the right to substantive due process,304 and 
lower courts have specified factors to aid them in determining whether 
force violated the fourteenth amendment. 3011 An examination of these 
cases indicates that officials are liable when they use an egregious 
amount of force, force that is disproportionate to the need for it. 
1. The Rochin/Glick Standard 
When the Supreme Court in 1952 held in Rochin v. Ca/ifornia806 
that conduct which "shocks the conscience" violates the substantive 
due process component of the fourteenth amendment, the Court gener-
ally described the right to personal security.307 In Rochin, police of-
because force "occurred after any threat to institutional security had been quelled"); 
Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 135-36 (1st Cir. 1988) (summary judgment not 
possible because factual dispute as to whether there was a prison disturbance where 
institutional safety was at stake; if no such disturbance exists, deliberate indifference is 
the standard). 
304. See infra notes 306-09 and acCompanying text for a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of excessive force claims under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
305. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fac-
tors courts have applied to excessive force claims under the fourteenth amendment. 
306. 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 
307. Id. at 172. In determining that the conduct under consideration "shock[ed] 
the conscience," the Court used its own institutional conscience to determine the law-
fulness of the conduct. The Court appeared, however, to rely on social norms to deter-
mine what constituted egregious conduct. It stated that the due process clause protects 
those interests that are " 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental.'" /d. at 169 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934)). This process was similar to the procedure the Court frequently used to 
determine whether a right contained in the Bill of Rights was fundamental and was 
incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., id. 
(whether the conduct "'offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express 
the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the 
most heinous offenses'") (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 
(1945)). A right protected by the substantive due process component of the fourteenth 
amendment is thus a right in essence created by the judiciary. 
The right to personal security is an aspect of the right protected by the substantive 
due process component. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.lO (substantive due 
process component protects pretrial detainees from the use of excessive force). See gen-
erally Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common Law Torts: A Critque and a 
Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REv. 515, 517 (1989) (author 
distinguishes between incorporated substantive due process, "fundamental rights" sub-
stantive due process (e.g., the right to privacy), and "shocks the conscience" substan· 
tive due process). One court has stated that "shocks the conscience" substantive due 
process is workable only in the context of excessive force claims. See Braley v. City of 
Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1990) (excessive force claims represent the only 
"area in which the consciences of judges are shocked with some degree of uniformity"). 
262 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:205 
fleers used force in compelling an individual to swallow an emetic in 
order to make the individual regurgitate incriminating evidence.808 The 
Court determined that this conduct violated the individual's right to 
personal security; the government's need for incriminating evidence did 
not outweigh the individual's interest in bodily integrity.809 
This decision, however, provided little guidance in determining 
when an official's use of force was sufficiently egregious so as to consti-
tute a constitutional violation. Two decades later, Judge Friendly of the 
Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick810 articulated factors to aid courts 
in determining when force violated an individual's constitutional right 
to personal security.311 He stated that courts should consider the fol-
lowing four factors: 
[ 1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship be-
tween the need and the amount of force that was used, [3] the ex-
tent of injury inflicted, and [4] whether force was applied in a good 
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadis-
tically for the very purpose of causing harm.m 
These factors require courts to balance an individual's interest in bodily 
integrity against the government's need for force. 
In discussing these interests, the Supreme Court in 1986 recog-
nized in Daniels v. Williams318 and Davidson v. Cannon814 that negli-
gent conduct does not implicate the substantive due process component 
of the fourteenth amendment.8111 It stated that the fourteenth amend-
ment protects only against the "affirmative abuse of power"818 and that 
"[h]istorically, [the] guarantee of due process has been applied to de-
308. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. 
309. /d. at 171-74 (Court considered society's interests, which "push[] in oppo-
site directions"). 
310. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 
u.s. 1033 (1973). 
311. /d. at 1033. 
312. /d. The lower courts, however, have not uniformly interpreted the factors; 
not all courts have required malicious conduct nor a serious injury in order to find a 
violation of substantive due process. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text. 
313. 474 u.s. 327 (1986). 
314. 474 u.s. 344 (1986). 
315. Daniels, 414 U.S. at 332-33; Davidson, 414 U.S. at 347. 
316. Daniels, 414 U.S. at 331 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49 
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring)). In the context of excessive force claims, the Court's 
requirement of an affirmative act is not problematic because the use of force constitutes 
an act. Characterizing officials' responses to a situation as either action or inaction, 
however, is problematic for other substantive due process claims. Compare DeShaney 
v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989) (majority opin-
ion held that because there was no duty to act officials were not liable for their inac-
tion) with id. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion characterized actions 
of officials as creating a duty to protect child from abusive father). See supra notes 
185-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
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liberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life [or] 
liberty."317 In light of the Court's egregious standard in Rochin and the 
lower courts' application of the Glick factors to excessive force claims, 
the Court's rejection of negligence as a basis was not surprising. Of 
much greater interest was the Court's statement that it left for another 
day whether gross negligence or recklessness violates the fourteenth 
amendment. 818 
Since the Court left this question open, the lower courts have dis-
agreed as to whether gross negligence or recklessness is actionable 
under the fourteenth amendment.819 Some have stated that gross negli-
gence is sufficient,320 some have stated that recklessness is necessary,821 
and some have stated that only intentional conduct is actionable.322 Re-
gardless of the particular state of mind selected, determining the scope 
of the right to personal security under the fourteenth amendment. has 
required courts to balance the interests of the parties. 828 This balancing 
317. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (emphasis in original). 
318. Id. at 334 n.3. The Court properly recognized that the distinctions between 
negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and intention may not be clear. Id. at 335. It 
refused, however, to "trivialize the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause in an effort to simplify 
constitutional litigation." Id. The question of whether gross negligence or recklessness 
is actionable not only depends on how a court interprets the state-of-mind requirement 
for substantive due process claims, but also on how a court describes the particular 
standard that it adopts and how it characterizes facts in a case. See, e.g., Germany v. 
Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 n.10 (1st Cir. 1989) (court declared that recklessness is actiona-
ble under the fourteenth amendment, but its definition of reckless conduct is similar to 
the deqnition for intentional conduct: "official believes [or reasonably should believe] 
that his conduct is very likely but not certain to result in a violation"). In the context of 
police shootings, courts characterize facts in different manners. Compare Landol-Ri-
vera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1990) (officer who shot at hostage 
·in escaping vehicle maybe negligent) with Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 
F.2d 638, 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1988) (officer was grossly negligent when his gun acciden-
tally discharged) and Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1987) (officer 
was not negligent when his gun accidentally discharged). 
319. See infra notes 320-22 and accompanying text for courts' contrasting state-
of-mind requirements for substantive due process claims. 
320. See, e.g., Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 
1989); Taylor ex rei. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir. 1987) (en 
bane); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987). 
321. See, e.g., Germany, 868 F.2d at 18. 
322. See, e.g., Hannula v. City 'of Lakewootl, 907 F.2d 129, 132 (lOth Cir. 
1990); Rasmussen v. Larson, 863 F.2d 603, 605 (8th Cir. '1988). See generally Free-
man v. Elgin Sweeper Co., 885 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1989) (no liability for killing of 
bicyclist because conduct was not intentional). 
323. Balancing is proper because most courts do not require malice in order to 
find a violation. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(malice not necessary to establish a constitutional tort); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 
783 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1986) (liability attaches if force was unreasonable, unnec-
essary, or violent); see also supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the lesser culpability standards actionable under the fourteenth amendment. 
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process is similar to the balancing of interests that the Court recog-
nized under the fourth amendment in Tennessee v. Garneru and Gra-
ham v. Connor.32"' 
Like the Garner/Graham standard, the Glick factors require a 
similar balancing of interests. The first factor questions the need for 
force, and the second factor questions whether the force used was dis-
proportionate to the need for it. This is similar to the analysis the 
Court adopted when it stated that under the fourth amendment the 
need for deadly force in Garner or nondeadly force in Graham is to be 
measured in light of the risks the suspect poses to others. 326 The third 
factor, the extent of the injury, is a disputed factor. Some courts have 
used this factor to distinguish between injuries that are of sufficient 
magnitude to constitute a constitutional violation and those that re-
present only a state tort.327 Other courts, however, have appropriately 
refused to apply this factor because it is irrelevant to the central issue 
of disproportionalit/328 The last factor, malice, is not necessarily a re-
quirement for subs
1
tantive due process claims, particularly since the Su-
preme Court has not decided whether gross negligence and recklessness 
are actionable under the fourteenth amendment and since not all courts 
324. See supra notes 224-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Court's interest in balancing under the fourth amendment. 
. 325. See supra notes 249-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of balancing 
of interests in this case. 
326. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871-72; Garner, 411 U.S at 11. 
327. See, e.g., Hannula, 907 F.2d at 132 (pain from tight handcuffing did not 
establish a constitutional violation because plaintiff failed to present evidence that she 
incurred "contusions, lacerations or damage to the bones or nerves"). The third factor, 
the extent of the injury, may also represent institutional balancing because some courts 
use this factor to state that unless there was a "serious" or "significant" injury, then 
the conduct does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., White v. 
Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990) (sufficient showing to establish excessive 
force claim would be that pretrial detainee "lost consciousness" or suffered a "perma-
nent injury"). 
328. Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (court eliminated its 
previous "severe injury" requirement, "observing that a 'state is not free to inflict ... 
pains without cause just so long as it is careful to leave no marks'") (quoting Williams 
v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988)); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (injuries need not be permanent or severe under the Glick standard). See 
generally Note, Graham v. Connor: A Reasonable Approach to Excessive Force 
Claims Against Police Officers, 22 PAC. L.J. 157, 180 (1990) (although extent of injury 
factor is relevant "to the damages issue in a section 1983 action, the fourth amendment 
standard properly does not require a minimum threshold of injury to establish liabil-
ity"); Note, Excessive Force Claims: Is Significant Bodily Injury the Sine Qua Non 
To Proving a Fourth Amendment Violation, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 741 (1990) 
("'significant or meaningful' injury requirement does not comport with the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Graham and Tennessee v. Garner and thwarts the broad remedial 
purposes of section 1983"); Corselli v Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988) (for 
eighth amendment claim injuries need not be permanent or severe). 
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require malice.329 
When courts do not require plaintiffs to establish that officers ac-
ted maliciously, balancing interests under the fourteenth amendment is 
similar to balancing interests under the fourth amendment.330 Although 
courts interpret the balancing process under the fourth amendment in 
light of its standard of reasonableness,331 they balance interests under 
the fourteenth amendment in light of its egregious standard.332 When, 
329. Balancing of interests under these amendments is similar only if a court 
interprets the fourteenth amendment as not requiring malicious conduct. A court com-
mits reversible error if it instructs a jury on a fourth amendment claim to consider 
whether officers acted maliciously. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1873 ("concepts 
like 'malice' and 'sadism' have no proper place in [the objective reasonableness] in-
quiry); Hay v. City of Irving, 893 F.2d 796, 798-99 (5th Cir. 1990); Calamia v. City of 
New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989). The similarity in balancing the inter-
ests of the parties is apparent by considering the history of excessive force claims. Prior 
to the Court's decisions in Garner and Graham, individuals subjected to excessive force 
generally alleged a violation of substantive due process, not the fourth amendment. 
Plaintiffs began bringing claims under the fourth amendment when lower courts and 
later the Supreme Court made it clear that the fourth amendment's standard of objec-
tive reasonableness does not consider whether police officers acted maliciously in using 
force. Such individuals no longer need the protection of the fourteenth amendment. 
330. See, e.g., Titran, 893 F.2d at 147. In Titran, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals recognized that when an individual is injured while in jail, the substantive due 
process standard, even with the mental element of malice, is like the fourth amendment 
standard. Id. The court stated, "Most of the time the propriety of using force on a 
person in custody pending trial will track the [f]ourth [a]mendment: the court must 
ask whether the officials behaved in a reasonable way in light of the facts and circum-
stances confronting them." Id. The court also rejected having "multiple standards" to 
evaluate the constitutionality of force because they would "undermine the force of the 
law" and would "complicate litigation.~· Id. See also Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 699 
F. Supp. 1552, 1557 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("there is substantial congruity between what 
violates substantive due process with what is unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment"); Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEo. L.J. 1441, 1491 
( 1989) (courts should "end their overreliance on disembodied state-of-mind require-
ments and begin to identify the more precise constitutional duties to which the mental 
elements attach"). 
Courts have also applied the fourth amendment standard to individuals arrested 
and subjected to compelled blood tests. See, e.g., Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200, 
1204 (9th Cir. 1989) (blood test of arrestee taken at hospital); State v. Lanier, 452 
N.W.2d 144, 145 (S.D. 1990) (blood test of arrestee taken at jail). Courts have also 
applied the fourth amendment standard to the force used by prison officials to stop a 
prisoner from escaping. See, e.g., Henry v. Perry, 866 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(court relies in part on Garner's fourth amendment standard to resolve prisoner's 
eighth amendment excessive force claim); Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 880-81 (lith 
Cir. 1988) (same). 
331. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1873 ("[f]ourth [a]mendment inquiry is 
one of 'objective reasonableness'"); Garner, 471 U.S. at 7 .("apprehension by the use of 
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the [f]ourth 
[a]mendment"). 
332. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1990) (questioned 
whether conduct was shocking). 
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however, the interests of both parties under the fourteenth amendment 
mirror the interests under the fourth amendment, as they do in the 
unique context of a police pursuit, conduct that is unreasonable under 
the fourth amendment is, however, also egregious under the fourteenth 
amendment. Thus, whether force is lawful generally depends upon the 
interests of the parties, not upon the particular standard applied. 
This general focus on the parties' interests arises because balanc-
ing is a process of weighing opposing interests. The standard of care, 
however, does aid courts in evaluating the state's conduct; it focuses 
attention on how to weigh the state's interest, but not the individual's 
interest in personal security. For example, the Court has recognized 
that the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution,333 which 
applies only to prisoners,334 has two different standards of care that 
protect a prisoner's right to personal security. During a prison riot, offi-
cials violate the right only if they act maliciously,3311 but in failing to 
provide proper medical care, officials violate the right if they act with 
"deliberate indifference."338 In light of these different eighth amend-
ment standards, lower courts have recognized that a prisoner's interest 
in personal security is constant, but that the level of culpable conduct 
actionable under the eighth amendment depends upon the circum-
stances facing officials.337 When no riot is present, the use of force may 
violate the eighth amendment .if it signifies "deliberate indifference" to 
a prisoner's right to personal security.338 These two contrasting stan-
333. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments"). 
334. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). 
335. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). In Whitley, the 
Supreme Court stated that prisoners injured must prove malice to establish a violation 
of their eighth amendment right to personal security when officials use force during a 
riot. Id. To determine whether the force was used maliciously, the Court, however, 
declared that the other Glick factors were "relevant to that ultimate determination." 
/d. at 321. By using the other Glick factors, the Court was implicitly questioning 
whether the force used was disproportionate to the need for it. 
336. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). · 
337. See, e.g., Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343, 1350 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 
S. Ct. 542 (1989) (deliberate indifference actionable because force "occurred after any 
threat to institutional security had been quelled"); Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 
135-36 (1st Cir. 1988) (summary judgment not possible because factual dispute exists 
as to whether there was a prison disturbance); Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52, 54-55 
(5th Cir. 1987) (applies "unnecessary and wanton" standard because "[t]here was no 
imminent danger"). 
338. See supra note 335. Some courts, however, have erroneously applied the 
malice standard when a riot is not present because they have extended the Whitley 
standard to any type of prison disturbance. See, e.g., Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 
26 (2d Cir. 1988); James v. Alfred, 835 F.2d 605, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 1036 (1988); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188-90 (11th Cir. 1987), 
reh'g denied, 818 F.2d 871 (lith Cir. 1987). These courts may perhaps assume that if 
officials fail to establish authority with a single prisoner, this failure may lead to a · 
general lack of control over prisoners. 
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dards both describe conduct that is "cruel and unusual" within the 
meaning of the eighth amendment.339 
Thus, to recognize "two" standards of care under the fourteenth 
amendment, that is, to discern that unreasonable conduct during a pur-
suit constitutes "egregious" conduct within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment, is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's in-
tepretations of the "cruel and unusual punishments" language of the 
eighth amendment. Whether one evaluates fourteenth amendment pur-
suit claims under a standard of reasonableness or egregiousness, resolu-
tion of an excessive force claim generally requires a balancing of inter-
ests. Balancing the interests of the parties under the fourteenth 
amendment in the context of police pursuits indicates that many pur-
suits constitute the use of egregious force.3"0 
2. Applying the Substantive Due Process Standard to Pursuit 
Claims 
When police officers pursue a driver, they may cause individuals in 
other vehiclesm and pedestrians3u to be injured as a result of the pur-
suit.m Whether these individuals may properly assert claims under the 
substantive due process component of the fourteenth amendment de-
pends upon whether .the officers used egregious force under the circum-
stances.3"" The issue requires courts to balance the interests of the par-
339. See, e.g., Whitley, 415 U.S. at 320-21 (discussing claims for inadequate 
medical care and the use of force during a riot). 
340. See infra notes 341-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four-
teenth amendment pursuit claims. 
341. See, e.g., Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 295-96 (8th Cir. 
1989) (pursued driver crashed into other motorists, who were seriously injured); Jones 
v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1987) (pursued driver crashed into other 
motorist, who died); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't., 721 F. Supp. 189, 190 (E.D. 
Ark. 1989) (motorist killed when police pursuit terminated); Timko v. City of Hazle-
ton, 665 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (pursued driver crashed into other mo-
torist, who died). 
342. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Harris, 490 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (police officer's cruiser hooked fenders with 
pursued driver's bumper, causing the vehicle to go off the road and kill a pedestrian 
sitting on a bus bench). See generally Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 n.2 (6th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 144 (1990) (court stated in dicta that third party 
injured by officers' actions may have a valid substantive due process claim). 
343. These individuals have standing to bring fourteenth amendment pursuit 
claims because they are not "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
during pursuits. See infra notes 378, 400-01, 432 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of when the fourteenth amendment is applicable to excessive force claims. 
344. See, e.g., Jones, 827 F.2d at 1106; Tagstrom, 668 F. Supp. at 1273. See 
generally Checki, 785 F.2d at 538 (driver pursued by unmarked car alleged a violation 
of substantive due process because pursuit may signify egregious conduct). 
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ties to determine whether the force used was egregious.3411 An 
examination of this issue reveals that many pursuits violate the sub-
stantive due process clause. 
Determining whether the force used by police officers during a 
pursuit violates the fourteenth amendment requires weighing the inter-
ests of the injured drivers and pedestrians against the state's interests. 
The individuals' interest is in bodily integrity and the state's interest is 
in law enforcement. In Johnson v. Glick, 346 Judge Friendly first articu-
lated the factors used in the process of weighing these interests: the 
need for the force, the relationship of the need for force and the 
amount of force used, the extent of the injury, and the state of mind of 
the officials.347 The first two factors aid in determining whether the use 
of force during 'a pursuit constituted the use of egregious force. 3" 8 Ap-
plying these factors to pursuits indicates that many pursuits constitute 
the use of disproportionate force. 
The first three Glick factors compel scrutiny of the means chosen 
by police officers in furthering their interest in law enforcement. These 
factors question whether the force used by officers furthered the state's 
interest in law enforcement but unnecessarily infringed an individual's 
interest in bodily integrity. 
When police officers decide to pursue an individual, regardless of 
the offense he has alledgedly committed, the pursuit places other driv-
ers and pedestrians in greater danger. Pursuit of the alleged violator 
logically furthers the state's interest in law enforcement. If the public 
knows that a police department has adopted a policy of not pursuing 
individuals, then many drivers may feel they have little to lose by at-
tempting to flee. Such actions would clearly diminish the state's inter-
est in law enforcement. 
To recognize the need to promote the state's interest in law en-
forcement is not, however, to approve of pursuits as a means of encour-
aging people to stop. The need for pursuits is measured in relationship 
to the harm that pursuits can engender and the availability of other 
means that can further the state's interest in law enforcement. Al-
though the factors appear to invite courts to second guess the law en-
forcement decisions of agencies, a practice expressly disfavored by the 
Supreme Court,349 in the context of excessive force claims such scru-
345. See supra notes 310-340 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bal-
ancing of interests for fourteenth amendment excessive force claims. 
346. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 
u.s. 1033 (1973). 
347. Id. at 1033. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of these factors. 
348. See supra notes 327-329 for a discussion of why courts have refused to 
apply to other two factors to excessive force claims. 
349. See supra note 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's 
1991) HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS 269 
tiny is the rule, not the exception.3110 The right to personal security is of 
such importance that such scrutiny has occurred under both the four-
teenth amendment and the fourth amendment. 
Pursuits can cause injuries to other drivers and pedestrians, indi-
viduals who have not committed any offense. Their lives may be in dan-
ger when police officers pursue a driver and when the driver himself 
represents a threat to others. The prudence of pursuing a driver, how-
ever, depends upon the circumstances confronting an officer. Determin-
ing the weight of the state's interests and the individual's interests is 
similar to weighing the interests of the parties under the fourth amend-
ment. Under both amendments, the interests are similar. The only dif-
ference is that the individual's interest in personal security is not di-
minished because the individual has not allegedly committed any 
offense. In contrast, the interest of the pursued driver may in some 
sense be considered diminished. 
Applying the Garner/Graham standard3~1 to substantive due pro-
cess pursuit claims would indicate that police officers violate the stan-
dard of care under the fourteenth amendment if their conduct also vio-
lates the fourth amendment.352 Although the fourteenth amendment 
measures the state's conduct by a standard of egregiousness and the 
fourth amendment measures the conduct under a standard of reasona~ 
bleness, conduct unreasonable under the fourth amendment would be 
egregious under the fourteenth amendment because of the similar bal-
ancing process. 
The focus of the Garner/Graham standard is on the harm that a 
suspect presents to others if no.t apprehended immediately. One mea-
sure of the danger requires an evaluation of the offense that the indi-
vidual has allegedly committed. If the pursued driver has committed a 
nonserious offense, then pursuit increases the likelihood of harm to 
other drivers and pedestrians. The standard also implicitly considers 
whether police officers can use other means to apprehend the driver or 
deter flight. As stated previously, other means are available to protect a 
state's interest in law enforcement.3~3 
Both the fourteenth and fourth amendment thus protect an indi-
vidual's interest in personal security. When police officers use force that 
recent deference to a police department's decision to establish roadblocks to apprehend 
intoxicated drivers. 
350. See supra note 175 and accompanying text for the heightened scrutiny that 
the Court has applied to personal security claims involving excessive force. 
351. See supra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of this 
fourth amendment standard. 
352. See, e.g., Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) (in reviewing 
an officer's use of force, the analysis should examine whether the force they applied is 
unreasonable, not egregious, even if the fourteenth amendment is applicable). 
353. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
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is disproportionate to the need for it, they have infringed the individ-
ual's interest in personal security. Whether a claim is viable under the 
fourth or the fourteenth amendment also depends upon whether the 
injured individual was "seized" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. 8114 The class of injured individuals seized during a pursuit 
may allege a violation of the fourth amendment.m Other individuals 
may allege a violation of the fourteenth amendment. 8116 
V. DEFINING A FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEIZURE" 
The Supreme Court has articulated the following three definitions 
for determining whether police officers have seized an individual: 
(1) whether "the officer, by means of physical force or show of au-
thority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen";m (2) 
whether "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free 
to leave";m and (3) whether there was "a governmental termination 
of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. "389 
The third definition, which the Court recently set forth, is dramatically 
different from the Court's earlier definitions. The Court's most recent 
definition engrafts upon the fourth amendment a requirement that of-
ficers intentionally apply the means of force that cause an individual to 
stop;860 it requires courts to consider complex causation issues,861 and it 
drastically narrows the protections under the fourth amendment.862 
Analysis of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amend-
354. See infra notes 357-459 and accompanying text for a discussion of what 
constitutes a fourth amendment '.'seizure." 
355. See, e.g., Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 ("all claims that law enforcement 
officers have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investi-
gatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the [f]ourth 
[a]mendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under 'substantive due pro-
cess' approach") (emphasis in original)). 
356. See, e.g., id. at 1871 n.IO (pretrial detainees may assert substantive due 
process as a basis for an excessive force claim). 
357. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n.l6 (1968). See infra notes 366-77 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of this definition. 
358. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion for Jus-
tices Stewart and Rehnquist); see a/so INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,215 (1984). See 
infra notes 384-402 and accompanying text for a discussion of this definition. 
359. Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original). 
See infra notes 404-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of this definition. 
360. See infra notes 426-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inten-
tionality requirement under the third definition. 
361. See infra notes 422-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causa-
tion issue under the third definition. 
362. See infra notes 423-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the 
third definition narrows the protection of the right to personal security under the fourth 
amendment. 
1991) HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS 271 
ment indicates that when police pursue, the pursued driver and any 
passengers are always "seized" when applying the first two defini-
tions383 but not always "seized" when applying the third definition.384 
Other drivers and pedestri~ns, however, are not seized within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment.3811 They may, however, seek to pro-
tect their right to personal security under the substantive due process 
component of the fourteenth amendment. 388 
A. The First "Seizure" Definition 
The first definition of the word "seizure" occurred when the Court 
questioned whether the fourth amendment is implicated when police 
officers do not arrest individuals, but instead demand that they stop and 
answer questions.367 No one ever questioned whether an arrest was a 
"seizure" because the infringement of the right to personal security is 
obvious. In Terry v. Ohio,868 the Court determined that when police 
officers compel an individual to stop, they have seized the person within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment.369 Although the Court recog-
nized the need for police officers to stop individuals, it held that such 
stops must be subject to fourth amendment scrutiny because the "ines-
timable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the 
streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study."370 By 
holding that compelled stops constitute seizures, the Court thus re-
quired stops to also be "reasonable" within the meaning of fourth 
amendment. 371 
The Terry Court, however, crafted a definition of a seizure that 
indicated that not all stops are fourth amendment "seizures." When 
police officers compel a person to stop, the individual is seized, but 
when police officers merely ask a person to stop and answer questions, 
the individual is not seized, even if he stops.372 The latter is only a 
363. See infra notes 379-80, 403 and accompanying text for an application of the 
first and second definitions to individuals involved in a police pursuit. 
364. See infra notes 432-57 and accompanying text for an application of the 
third definition to police pursuits. 
365. See infra notes 380, 403, 434 and accompanying text for an application of 
the definitions to these individuals. 
366. See generally Graham, l 09 S. Ct at 1871 n.l 0 (individuals not seized may 
assert substantive due process as a basis for an excessive force claim). But see Roach, 
882 F.2d at 297 (applied fourth amendment to oncoming motorist's claim); Britt, 721 
F. Supp. at 190 (applied fourth amendment to bystander's claim). 
367. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.l6. 
368. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
369. !d. at 16. 
370. /d. at 8-9. 
371. !d. at 20 (although a warrant is not necessary to stop an individual, the 
officer's conduct must still be reasonable). 
372. See, e.g., id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (police officers may ask individu-
272 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:205 
consensual encounter.878 The Court explained, "Only when the officer, 
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way re-
strained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has 
occurred."874 The first definition thus contains one bright-line marker, 
the use of physical force, and one more flexible aspect, the "show of 
authority,"8711 which constitutes psychological force. 
The "show of authority" aspect of a "seizure" is more difficult to 
determine because it requires courts to distinguish encounters from 
stops. An encounter occurs if police officers ask casual questions, ques-
tions that are not psychologically coercive. A stop occurs, however, if 
police officers demonstrate a "show of authority," psychological force 
that constitutes a restraint of a citizen's liberty.876 Drawing the line 
between these two types of contact is difficult because resolution of the 
issue depends upon the degree of psychological force that police officers 
use. Every individual, unless police officers have reasonable suspicion to 
believe that an individual has committed an offense, "may refuse to 
cooperate and go on his way."m Under the Terry definition, a request 
to stop thus is not a seizure,878 but a command to do so is one because 
it constitutes a "show of authority."879 
Applying this first definition to the context of police pursuits indi-
cates that police officers "seize" the pursued driver and her passengers 
because the pursuit itself constitutes a "show of authority" directed at 
als questions without implicating the fourth amendment); see also Florida v. Royer, 
460 u.s. 491, 497-98 (1983). 
373. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (a person has a 
right "to ignore his interrogator and walk away"); see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
555 (person could have reasonably believed that she was "free to end the conversation . 
. . and proceed on her way"). 
374. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.l6. 
375. /d. 
376. /d. 
377. /d. at 34 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
378. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 219-21 (1984) (factory survey of 
workers did not constitute a seizure, but was an example of consensual encounters); · 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 503 n.9 (coercive conduct indicated a seizure); Terry, 392 U.S. at 
34 (White, J., concurring); see also W. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE 
ON FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2(h), at 408 (2d ed. 1987) (Supreme Court distinguishes 
stops from encounters by relying "upon the amorphous concept of consent": a person 
may indicate a lack of consent "by ignoring the officer's summfiming or by leaving his 
presense," ... and officer would "seize" the person by attempting to "renew the en-
counter"); Note, Michigan v. Chesternut and the Investigative Pursuits: Is There No 
End to the War Between the Constitution and Common Sense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 203, 
208 ( 1988) (an encounter occurs when "a police officer accosts an individual and asks 
questions"). 
379. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (fourth amendment is applicable to 
" 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and 
prosecution for crime - 'arrests' in traditional terminology"). 
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these individuals. 380 Other drivers and their passengers and pedestrians, 
however, are not "seized" because the police officers' show of authority 
does not communicate to these individuals a command to stop as it does 
to the pursued driver and his passengers. The command implicit in a 
pursuit can be discerned by comparing it to the officers' first act of 
signalling the driver to pull over to the side of the road. The signalling 
is a request that the driver comply with the officer's suggestion. A pur-
suit, however, uses psychological force to compel a stop. This force is 
apparent by the aggressive manner in which officers use their cruisers 
to stop individuals. This interpretation of the Terry "show of author-
ity" definition is supported by the Court's second "seizure" definition, 
which in essence elaborated on what the Court meant by "show of 
authority." 
B. The Second "Seizure" Definition 
Applying the Court's Terry definition, however, proved to be diffi-
cult for the Court. The Court often decided cases by less than a major-
ity.381 In 1984, sixteen years after Terry, a majority of the Court382 
adopted the second "seizure" definition first articulated by Justice 
Stewart four years earlier.383 Under this second definition, the focus 
was on how a reasonable suspect would interpret the police officers' 
conduct.384 If "'a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave,' " 3811 then a seizure had occurred. The second 
"seizure" definition thus appeared to be an elaboration of the Terry 
Court's first "show of authority" standard: if a reasonable person would 
feel compelled to stop because of the police officers' conduct, the stop 
was a result of the officers' use of psychological force. 
In first articulating this definition, Justice Stewart specified some 
factors that would be relevant in determining that officers' used their 
authority to compel a stop: " [ 1] the threatening presence of several 
officers, [2] the display of a weapon by an officer, [3] some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or [ 4] the use of language or tone 
of voice indicating that compliance with the officers' request might be 
380. Professor Lafave has maintained that when police officers engage "in con-
duct significl\ntly beyond that accepted in social intercourse" they are using coercive 
conduct that signifies a fourth amendment seizure. W. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 
A TREATISE ON fOURTH AMENDMENT§ 9.2(h), at 412 (2d ed. 1987). The use of sirens 
and lights suggests that officers use their authority in compelling an individual to stop, 
conduct "beyond that accepted in social intercourse." 
381. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S 544 (1980). 
382. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 211. 
383. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
384. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215. 
385. /d. (quoting Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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compelled."886 Although these factors provide guidance in determining 
whether a person has been "seized," this definition, like the first defini-
tion, requires consideration of all the circumstances to assess the degree 
of psychological compulsion.887 
The two similar definitions of "seizure" articulated by the Court 
occurred in cases in which the suspect actually stopped in response to 
the police officers' conduct. Not until 1988 in Michigan v. Ches-
ternut888 did the Court address whether a person could be "seized" if 
he had not in fact stopped. In Chesternut, an individual standing at an 
intersection saw a patrol car and began to run.889 When the patrol car 
followed "him for a short distance,"890 the individual threw away some 
packets that had been in his jacket.891 The Court determined that 
under these circumstances no seizure had occurred either before or 
upon the individual's discarding of the packets.892 
In Chesternut, the Court quoted the first Terry definition898 but 
applied the second definition of a seizure.894 In applying the second def-
inition, the Court focused on the circumstances as they appeared to the 
individual. The issue was whether the police officers' conduct in the 
particular setting would have "communicated to the reasonable person 
an attempt to capture."896 In this case, the police officers merely "fol-
lowed" the individual, a common investigative practice.896 An attempt 
to capture, however, constitutes a fourth amendment seizure. To distin-
guish the act of mere following from an act that communicates an at-
tempt to capture, the Court implied that the following factors indicate 
an attempt to capture: (1) the use of sirens or flashers, (2) the com-
manding of an individual to halt, and (3) driving a "car in an aggres-
sive manner" in order to block or to control "the direction or speed of 
386. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55. 
387. Professor LaFave has aptly noted that the Court could not have meant to 
create a "seizure" definition that would have made all encounters fourth amendment 
"seizures." W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 9.2(h), at 411 (2d ed. 1987). He surmised that few individuals feel free to ignore a 
police officer's request to stop and answer questions. /d. at 410. Although psychological 
pressure is inherent in every confrontation between a citizen and a police officer, a 
"seizure" occurs, according to Professor LaFave, only if "the officer adds to those in-
herent pressures by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that accepted in social 
intercourse." /d. at 412. 
388. 486 u.s. 567 (1988). 
389. /d. at 569. 
390. /d. 
391. /d. 
392. Id. at 574. 
393. /d. at 573. 
394. Id. at 573-76. 
395. Id. at 575. 
396. Id. at 569. 
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[an individual's] movement."397 Because these factors were not impli-
cated in Chesternut, no seizure occurred. 
In articulating the factors, the Court reaffirmed the totality of cir-
cumstances approach first articulated in the "show of authority" aspect 
of Terry and the second "seizure" definition. The Court explicitly re-
fused to adopt the two contrasting, bright-line "seizure" definitions ad-
vocated by the parties.398 It rejected the individual's argument that all 
"chases" constitute seizures and the state's argument that all seizures 
require the individual to stop.399 The Court explained that bright-line 
rules are inappropriate because the focus of the seizure issue is whether 
the police officers' conduct was "coercive."400 To determine whether 
conduct was coercive requires consideration of all the facts. The Court 
thus adhered to its two definitions for "seizures" because they are 
"fiexible"401 in application, even if they are "necessarily imprecise. "402 
Applying the Chesternut decision to police pursuits indicates that 
the pursued driver and her passengers are "seized" during a pursuit 
because the pursuit communicates an attempt to capture. Other motor-
ists and pedestrians, however, are not "seized" during a pursuit because 
the officers' conduct does not signify an attempt to capture these other 
individuals. 
The factors the Court articulated in Chesternut are present during 
pursuits. Police officers use sirens and flashers during pursuits. They 
also use their car aggressively. By using multiple vehicles, police of-
ficers may control the pursued's direction of travel. They also control 
the pursued's speed. Pursuit experts agree that if police officers were to 
stop the pursuit, the individual would either soon stop and park the car 
or return home.403 The typical pursuit thus clearly communicates an 
attempt to capture the pursued driver and her passengers. It does not, 
however, communicate an attempt to capture any other motorists or 
397. /d. at 575. 
398. Id. at 572-73. 
399. Id. 
400. /d. at 573 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). 
401. Id. 
402. /d. The United States Supreme Court recently decided to review a case that 
may help to define the psychological force aspect of fourth amendment "seizures." Bos-
tick v. Florida, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 241 (1990). The 
Court has agreed to address the following question: "May the police, without violating 
the fourth amendment, board an interstate bus and ask for, and receive, consent to 
search a passenger's luggage where they advise the passenger that he has the right to 
refuse?" 59 U.S.L.W. (1990). The Florida Supreme Court had determined that police 
officers had used intimidation to seize the passenger. 554 So. 2d at 1157. An officer had 
partially blocked the bus exit, had appeared to carry a gun, and had requested to 
search the passenger's luggage during a brief layover, thus prohibiting the passenger 
from leaving the bus. /d. 
403. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of how po-
lice officers may control a pursued driver's speed. 
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pedestrians. 
C. The Third "Seizure" Definition 
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Brower v. County of 
Inyo,"04 however, makes it less clear that pursuits generally constitute 
"seizures" of the pursued driver and her passengers."05 In Brower, the 
Court offered a third definition of a seizure: a seizure occurs "only 
when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement 
through means intentionally applied.""08 In articulating this new defini-
tion for a "seizure," the Court never explained whether the third defini-
tion replaces or supplements the prior definitions.407 In extensive dicta 
404. 489 u.s. 593 (1989). 
405. /d. at 596. In dicta the Brower Court discussed whether a pursued driver 
who stops as a result of losing control of her vehicle is "seized" within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment. /d. It determined that under those circumstances, police officers 
have not intentionally stopped the individual and therefore have not effectuated a 
fourth amendment seizure. /d. (citing with approval Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 
202-03 (6th Cir. 1986)). The Court, however, characterized these circumstances as 
involving an "unexpected" loss of control. /d. How one characterizes the likelihood of a 
crash is a question of perspective. See infra notes 422-31 and accompanying text dis-
cussing the characterization of the causation issue. The Court, however, later stated 
that the question of what caused an individual to stop should not be narrowly charac-
terized. /d. at 1382. It declared that if a person is "stopped by the very instrumentality 
set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result," the individual was seized. 
/d. The Court's broad characterization of causation thus appears inconsistent with its 
narrow characterization of causation regarding a stop by a pursued driver who loses 
control of her vehicle. 
406. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (emphasis omitted). 
407. Since its decision in Brower, the Court has applied both the first and third 
"seizure" definitions. See Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485 (applies and quotes third definition); 
Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.lO (quotes first definition and cites Brower). In neither 
of these cases, however, did the parties dispute whether the individual had been seized. 
Many lower courts have not applied the third definition in determining whether an 
individual has been seized. See, e.g., Flowers, 912 F.2d. at 170-12 (applies second defi-
nition; person on departing bus was not seized by police officers although the departure 
may have psychologically constrained the individual); Jones v. State, 572 A.2d 169, 
172 (Md. 1990) (cites Brower but applies the second definition; police officers seized 
the suspect by commanding him to halt because the statement communicated an at-
tempt to capture). 
Some courts, however, have applied the third definition. See, e.g., Landol-Rivera v. 
Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 794-96 (1st Cir. 1990) (even though police officers knew 
the passenger of a pursued driver was a hostage, the passenger was not seized when an 
officer shot at the driver and hit the passenger); Sutherland v. Holcombe, No. 89-1708 
(4th Cir. Nov. 17, 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1949 (1990) (court applied Brower 
and determined that a pursued driver was not seized when he hit a bump in the road 
that caused him to lose control of his car). 
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case that may explain how to 
interpret the third definition. California v. Hodari, 59 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 2, 
1990) (No. 89-1632). The Court agreed to address two issues: "(l) Is physical restraint 
required for seizure of person under the Fourth Amendment? (2) May citizen who is 
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the Court limited when pursuits can constitute seizures.'08 
In Brower, police officers seized the decedent when he crashed into 
a roadblock, which they had intentionally set up to stop him.'09 Thus, 
in this case, like all the other "seizure" cases previously examined'10 
except Michigan v. Chesternut,m the individual had actually stopped. 
The new definition, although easily applied in this case, in some re-
spects conflicts with prior "seizure" definitions.'12 The new definition of 
"seizure" has two elements: termination of movement413 and causa-
tion.41' Under this definition an individual must always stop in order to 
be "seized," and the stop must occur as a result of means intentionally 
applied by police officers. 
1. The Stop Requirement 
The first element requires the individual to stop. 4111 This require-
ment, however, was explicitly rejected by the Chesternut majority opin-
pursued by police officer on public street immunize himself from prosecution by dis-
carding incriminating evidence and asserting that he did so out of fear of unlawful 
search?" Id. In Hodari, police officers had chased the defendant on foot and "ran in 
such a fashion to cut him off and confront him head on." California v. Hodari, 265 
Cal. Rptr. 79, 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). When the officers were eleven feet from the 
defendant, the defendant discarded some drugs. /d. The court found that Chesternut, 
which involved officers following a suspect, was applicable, rather than Brower, which 
involved officers setting up a roadblock to stop the suspect. See supra notes 388-402, 
404 and accompanying text and infra notes 408-57 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of these cases. The California Court of Appeals mentioned all three "seizure" 
definitions. See Hodari, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 82-84. The court explictly rejected using the 
third definition in favor of applying the second definition. /d. at 84. It did not find the 
third definition applicable to the facts of the case. /d. 
If the Court were to require actual "physical restraint," a standard requested by 
the state government, the Court would have to overrule its landmark case of Terry v. 
Ohio, which first established that a "show of authority" constituted a "seizure." Al-
though actual physical restraint would be a bright-line for law enforcement officials, it 
would drastically curtail the personal liberty of citizens. 
408. /d. at 1381. See infra notes 436-58 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the Court's dicta regarding police pursuits. 
409. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. 
410. See supra notes 368-403 and accompanying text for a discussion of fourth 
amendment "seizures." 
411. 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988). See supra notes 388-403 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of this case and fourth amendment "seizures." 
412. See infra notes 415-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the con-
trasting "seizure" definitions. 
413. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-599. See infra notes 415-21 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the stop requiremept. 
414. /d. See infra notes 422-431 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
causation requirement. 
415. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. The Court stated that a person is seized when 
there is a "governmental termination of freedom of movement." /d. 
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ion, which had applied the second "seizure" definition.•18 In Brower, 
the Court never cited the cases in which it had established the two 
prior "seizure" definitions, nor cases that elaborated on these well rec-
ognized definitions. To explain the new "seizure" definition, the Court 
quoted from Tennessee v. Garner,•17 which stated, "Whenever an of-
ficer restrains the freedom of movement of a person to walk away, he 
has seized that person."u8 In Garner, however, no one ever disputed or 
would dispute that officers had seized the decedent by intentionally kill-
ing him as he fled. The reference to Garner, however, supported the 
two elements of the new definition: in Garner, a "seizure" occurred be-
cause the bullet stopped the decedent, and a police officer, a govern-
mental actor, intentionally caused the stop. 
Aspects of the two prior "seizure" definitions, however, still have 
applicability to fourth amendment claims, even under the third defini-
tion, but only if a stop occurred. For example, in Graham v. Connor,ue 
the Supreme Court quoted the first definition to explain when the 
fourth amendment applies, but also cited the Brower decision, in which 
it articulated the third definition. •:ao In Graham, officers used both 
physical and psychological force in stopping an individual.m The 
"show of authority" definition may thus aid courts in determining 
"seizures" under the third definition if the individual has actually 
stopped. The requirement of an actual stop, however, is clearly incon-
sistent with the second definition elaborated upon in Chesternut. 
2. ·The Causation Requirement 
The second element of the third "seizure" definition, causation, is 
difficult to understand .• 22 The Brower opinion appears to specify two 
causation questions for fourth amendment claims. Under the third deft-
416. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 572-73. Only Justice Scalia, who authored the major-
ity opinion in Brower, and Justice Kennedy advocated an actual restraint test. /d. at 
577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Chesternut concurrence emphatically rejected the 
prior two "seizure" definitions because under the actual restraint test no seizure occurs, 
even if there was "an unmistakable show of authority" (the first "seizure" definition), 
and even if "the officers' conduct communicates to a person a reasonable belief that 
they intend to apprehend him" (the second "seizure" definition). /d. 
417. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
418. Brower, 489 U.S. at 595 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)). The Gar-
ner Court used two sentences to explain that a police officer seized a suspect by killing 
him. 471 U.S. at 7. 
419. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). 
420. /d. at 1871 n.10. 
421. /d. at 1868. The officers used physical force by handcuffing and beating the 
suspect. /d. They used psychological force by making an "investigative stop." 
422. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. The individual must stop as a result of "means 
intentionally applied." /d. (emphasis in original). 
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nition, the officers' conduct must have caused the individual to stop.428 
This causation question, according to the Court, is different from the 
question of whether the officers' conduct caused the stopped individ-
ual's injuries.424 The question of what caused an injury, as opposed to 
what caused a stop, is a familiar issue in constitutional litigation. For 
years the Court has borrowed tort concepts to define the scope of pro-
tection available under various amendments.4211 To be liable for a per-
son's injuries, officials must have caused them. 
The question of what caused a stop, however, is both a familiar 
and an unfamiliar issue. It is a familiar inquiry in cases in which the 
individual actually stopped. Prior "seizure" definitions in essence ques-
tioned whether the stop was compelled or voluntary; that is, did the 
police officers' "show of authority" cause the individual to stop or did 
the individual voluntarily stop.428 The question is also unfamiliar be-
cause it appears to suggest that all seizures must be the result of inten-
tional conduct. 
What the Court means by intentional conduct is unclear. The 
Court seems to emphasize the means intentionally used by police of-
ficers to stop an individual and deemphasize the individual's culpable 
behavior in fleeing. 427 The Court stated that if police officers "side-
swipe[]" a vehicle and the touching causes the individual to lose control 
and crash, a seizure has occurred, even if the officers did not subjec-
tively intend to cause an "accident."428 "Intent" in this example ap-
423. /d. 
424. The facts and dicta in Brower suggest a method to distinguish these causa-
tion issues. /d. at 594-598. In Brower, police officers chased the decedent for about 20 
miles. /d. at 594. The officers decided to stop him by setting up a roadblock. /d. When 
the decedent crashed into the roadblock, the police officers caused him to stop. Id. at 
599. The issue of whether the police officers caused his injuries, according to the Court, 
may depend upon whether the officers had caused the decedent to crash into the road-
block by blinding him with their headlights. /d. The Brower opinion thus states that 
the roadblock allegedly caused the decedent to stop, but that it may not necessarily 
have caused the decedent's injuries. /d. 
425. See, e.g., Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEo. L.J. 
1441, 1445-1459 (1989); Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitu-
tion to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1729-30 (1989). 
426. See supra notes 367-403 and accompanying text for a discusssion of these 
prior definitions. 
427. The significance of this focus is apparent by considering the lower court's 
holding in Brower, which emphasized the culpability of the decedent during the chase, 
not the means the police officers used. Brower, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (1987), rev'd, 489 
U.S. 593, 599 (1989). Even though the decedent crashed into the roadblock, the lower 
court surprisingly determined that no seizure had occurred. /d. at 546-47. The Court 
drew this erroneous conclusion by stressing that the decedent could have avoided crash-
ing into the roadblock by stopping the chase. /d. at 546. Under this interpretation, the 
reasonableness of the roadblock would thus evade scrutiny because there would have 
been no "seizure" implicating the fourth amendment. 
428. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
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pears to be similar to the traditional tort standard of intent, which 
states that conduct is nevertheless intentional if the harm that occurred 
was "substantially certain" to follow from a person's act.429 The of-
ficers' subjective state of mind is not controlling. Instead, the focus is 
on the means the officers' used in effecting a stop.•ao 
Thus, under the third "seizure" definition, the causation question 
is whether the stop was substantially certain to occur in light of the 
means used by the officers. "Intent" in this context is an objective ques-
tion, which focuses on the means the officers used, not the officers' sub-
jective beliefs about how they intended to stop an individual.m 
3. Applying the Third "Seizure" Definition to Pursuits 
The third "seizure" definition articulated in Brower is more re-
strictive than prior definitions because it imposes the requirement that 
an individual stop. Fleeing from the officers' "show of authority" is in-
sufficient under the third definition, but sufficient under the first two 
definitions. The third definition is also more restrictive because police 
officers must intentionally, not recklessly, cause the stop. Under this 
narrow definition, most pursuits nevertheless implicate the fourth 
amendment. An application of this definition to four easily identifiable 
pursuit situations indicates that most pursued drivers and their passen-
gers are seized when they stop, whether voluntarily or as a result of a 
crash, but that injured pedestrians and other drivers and their passen-
gers are not seized. 
First, an individual and any passengers are seized if they stop after 
abandoning their flight. In this situation, the officers' "show of author-
ity" caused the stop; it communicated an attempt to capture them. One 
could hardly call the stop a consensual encounter. Flashing lights, si-
rens, and aggressive driving indicate the officers' use of psychological 
force, means intentionally applied to cause the individual to stop. 
The remaining examples are more complex because they involve 
crashes: police officers crashing into the pursued driver, police officers 
crashing into pedestrians and other drivers, and the pursued driver 
crashing into other drivers or an object. According to the Brower 
429. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS § 8, at 35 (5th ed. 1984). . 
430. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597-598. See generally Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1872-73 
(officers' subjective state of mind is not relevant to determining whether force was 
reasonable). 
431. Thus, according to the Court under the third definition, even the "acciden-
tal firing" of a gun can constitute intentional conduct only because the emphasis is on 
the means used by the officers to stop the individual. Some courts, however, have deter-
mined that an accidental shooting does not constitute a seizure. See. e.g .. Landol-Ri-
vera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795-96 (1990); see also supra note 114 (collecting 
cases). 
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Court, if police officers intentionally crash into the individual's vehicle, 
then a seizure of the driver and any passengers occurs. 482 Although the 
officers may be unaware that the vehicle has passengers, the intentional 
act of crashing into the vehicle to stop the driver is an act that is sub-
stantially certain to cause any passenger to stop.488 In this example, 
both the pursued driver and passengers are "seized." 
If police officers accidentally crash into other cars or pedestrians 
during their pursuit of another individual, then neither pedestrians nor 
the other drivers and their passengers have been seized.484 The stopping 
of these other individuals is not substantially certain to occur. In that 
case, the fourteenth amendment, not the fourth amendment, may pro-
tect their right to personal security.4811 
If the pursued driver stops because he accidentally crashes into 
another driver or an object, police officers under some circumstances 
may have seized the driver and his passengers. This seizure issue is 
difficult because of the Brower Court's discussion in dicta of this exam-
ple.488 The Court stated that if an individual stops during a pursuit 
because he "unexpectedly" loses control of his vehicle and crashes, then 
432. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
433. The First Circuit has used an individualist perspective in interpreting the 
intentionality requirement of the third definition. Lando/-Rivera, 906 F.2d at 795. The 
court determined that even if police officers shoot a passenger in a vehicle, only the 
individual they intend to apprehend can be "seized" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. !d. The court stated, "A police officer's deliberate decision to shoot at a 
car containing a robber and a hostage for the purpose of stopping the robber's flight 
does not result in the sort of willful detention of the hostage that the [f]ourth 
[a]mendment was designed to govern." /d. (emphasis in original). This narrow inter-
pretation of the third definition is absurd. It implicitly focuses on an officer's subjective 
intent in determining whether a person was seized, a focus explicitly rejected by the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g .• Graham. 109 S. Ct. at 1873. It also implicitly condones 
reckless conduct on the part of police officers by shielding this fourth amendment issue 
from scrutiny. The court should have determined that the passenger was seized and 
then determined whether the shooting was reasonable under the fourth amendment. 
434. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. The Brower Court explained that "if a parked and 
unoccupied police car slips its brakes and pins a passerby against a wall, it is likely that 
a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth Amendment." !d. 
435. See supra notes 294-356 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ap-
plicability of the fourteenth amendment. 
436. Brower, 489 U.S. at 595-96. The Court explicitly approved of a Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision, in which the circuit court had determined that no 
seizure had occurred when police officers chased an individual using flashing lights. !d. 
(citing Galas, 801 F.2d at 202-203). The Sixth Circuit, however, was unsure of its 
ruling because it stated that even if the individual had been seized, the police officer's 
conduct was nevertheless reasonable. See Galas, 801 F.2d at 203-204. The Sixth Cir-
cuit decision also occurred before the Supreme Court's decision in Chesternut, which 
determined that police officers who chased an individual using flashing lights had not 
seized him. See supra notes 388-403 and accompanying text for a discussion of this 
case. 
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no seizure has occurred.487 In this situation, according to the Court, the 
means of stopping the individual - the "unexpected" accident - was 
not intentionally used by the officers:ua Crashes, however, during pur-
suits are frequent. Police officers are often trained to "stay with the 
individual" because the individual will eventually crash. To continue 
chasing an individual is to employ means intentionally designed to pro-
duce a stop because crashes are generally "expected" stops when police 
officers pursue. Crashes under these circumstances should thus consti-
tute "seizures." 
The above examples indicate the nature of fourth amendment 
seizures. Because these examples assume that a crash was or was not 
intentional, they do not reveal that the issue of what caused a stop is 
subject to both broad and narrow interpretations. Resolution of any 
causation issue depends not only upon how one characterizes the facts, 
but also upon the policies underlying the scope of liability. Because the 
Brower Court adopted a communalist perspective439 in discussing cau- . 
sation to stop, courts should similarly broadly interpret the causation 
issue. 
The Court was able to broadly interpret the causation issue in 
Brower by using five rhetorical devices to express the communalistic 
viewpoint: ( 1) general factual characterization to emphasize the re-
sponsibility of the police officers and to deemphasize the responsibility 
of the decedent, (2) narrow characterization of the decedent's free will, 
(3) broad time frame for inculpatory facts relating to the police and 
narrow time frame for inculpatory facts relating to the decedent, (4) 
abstract description of the foreseeability of the stop, and (5) .broad 
linking of the police officers' setting up of the roadblock to the stop.440 
The Court's adherence to a communalistic perspective is apparent by 
contrasting its decision with the lower court's decision, which expressed 
an individualistic perspective. 
437. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
438. Under the third definition, the conduct must be "intentional." Professor 
Keeton, however, has stated that "the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk-
something short of substantial certainty - is not intent." W. KEETON, D. DoBBS, R. 
KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 8, at 36 (5th ed. 1984). 
Distinguishing intentional conduct from less culpable conduct is difficult. See. e.g .• 
Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1494-96 (lOth Cir. 1990) (courts have 
often struggled to distinguish intentional conduct from conduct that represents reck-
lessness, gross negligence, and deliberate indifference). 
· 439. The Brower Court used rhetorical devices to further a "communalistic" per-
spective, one that requires a broad interpretation of the causation issue. See infra notes 
440-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Court expressed this com-
munalist perspective. See supra notes 65-68, 84-90 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the communalist perspective. 
440. See supra notes 65-7 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of Professor 
Balkin's theory of communalism and individualism. 
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In Brower, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, 
which had determined that no seizure occurred. 441 The Supreme Court 
described the facts to emphasize the responsibility of the police officers 
in setting up the roadblock and to deemphasize the decedent's responsi-
bility for his act of fleeing.442 The lower court, however, emphasized the 
decedent's culpable act of fleeing and deemphasized the police officers' 
act of setting up the roadblock.443 
Naturally linked to factual characterization in this context is the 
issue of free will. The Supreme Court narrowly described the options 
available to the decedent after the officers established the roadblock.444 
It never focused on whether the decedent could have stopped in deter-
mining whether the officers had seized him. Thus, the Court narrowly 
viewed the decedent's free will and broadly defined the police officers' 
choices, which included the option of discontinuing the pursuit. In con-
trast, the lower court broadly defined the decedent's options. It empha-
sized that even after the officers had established the roadblock, the de-
cedent could have stopped voluntarily.4411 
The courts' characterizations are also related to the time frame 
they use to describe the events. The Supreme Court limited the time 
frame to exclude the decedent's inculpatory act of fleeing. It focused on 
the decedent's act of approaching the roadblock at a high speed.448 The 
lower court, however, expanded the time frame to include the pursuit 
that preceded the roadblock. It emphasized that any time prior to the 
roadblock, the decedent remained fr:ee to stop.447 
Whether the stop was foreseeable depends on whether abstract or 
concrete terms are used to describe the likelihood of the stop. The Su-
preme Court used abstract terms to describe the likelihood that the 
roadblock would stop the decedent.448 A seizure occurs if a person is 
"stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in 
order to achieve that result."449 The Court did not focus on whether the 
decedent could have actually stopped to determine the seizure issue.4110 
The Court warned that the issue of what caused a stop should not be 
441. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599. 
442. Id. 
443. Brower, 817 F.2d at 546. 
444. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. 
445. 817 F.2d at 546-47. 
446. 489 U.S. at 598. 
447. 817 F.2d at 546. 
448. 489 U.S. at 598. 
449. !d. at 599. 
450. The Court, however, in dicta appeared to have a much more concrete ap-
proach to determining whether the police officer caused the decendent's injuries. It 
questioned whether the lights shining into the decedent's eyes caused him not to stop in 
time. /d. at 599. The Court could have similarly decided that no seizure had occurred 
if the decedent could have seen the roadblock. 
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determined too narrowly.4111 The issue of foreseeability for a seizure 
thus does not require officers to perceive exactly how the means used 
will cause the individual to stop; rather, the abstract setting in motion 
of these means is sufficient. The Court explained that even if the means 
employed stops an "unintended person,"4112 a seizure has occurred. In 
contrast, the lower court never discussed the foreseeability of the stop 
but instead stressed the decedent's free will to stop.4118 It stated that the 
police officers never "arrested or restrained" his movement.4114 
The final rhetorical device, characterizing the causal connection 
between the roadblock and the stop, is similar to the other devices. The 
Supreme Court broadly characterized the police officers' behavior in 
setting up the roadblock. It found a causal link between the roadblock 
and the stop.41111 The lower court, in contrast, found no link whatsoever. 
It linked the stop only to the decedent's decision not to stop, not to the 
officers' establishing of a roadblock.4116 
To resolve the issue of .whether an individual has been seized dur-
ing a pursuit, one should thus emphasize the police officers' conduct 
during a pursuit and deemphasize the individual's act of fleeing. This 
emphasis is vital because the causation question presented in the third 
definition is always subject to two contrasting viewpoints. The Brower 
Court expressed an interest in subjecting police officers' conduct to 
fourth amendment scrutiny by broadly defining causation. 
To broadly view the causation requirement of the third "seizure" 
definition would thus be to determine that police officers during a pur-
suit seized the pursued driver and his passengers who crashed when the 
driver lost control. To find that these individuals were "seized" does not. 
necessarily mean that the challenged conduct violated the fourth 
amendment. The other issue central to fourth amendment claims is the 
disproportionally of the force effectuating the seizure.4117 This latter in-
quiry is the appropriate place to weigh an individual's interest in per-
sonal security against the state's interests, which include an interest in 
law enforcement. 
/d. 
451. ld. at 598-599. The Court explained: 
In determining whether the means that terminate the freedom of movement 
is the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a 
line, or we will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been 
stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with which he was meant only 
to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg. 
452. !d. at 596. 
453. 817 F.2d at 546. 
454. ld. 
455. 489 U.S. at 599. 
456. 817 F.2d at 546. 
457. See supra notes 214-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
.fourth amendment standard of disproportionality. 
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Even if one narrowly interprets the causation requirement of the 
third seizure definition and determines that the dicta in Brower is con-
trolling, individuals not seized within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment are still protected by the fourteenth amendment standard of dis-
proportionality.4118 This standard, like the fourth amendment standard 
of disproportionality, requires that police officers use force that is justi-
fied by the circumstances.4119 Whether one asserts a fourth amendment 
claim or a fourteenth amendment claii~1, the individual's interest in per-
sonal security receives constitutional protection. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Police pursuits violate the fourth and fourteenth amendments 
when they represent the use of excessive force. During every police pur-
suit, police officers use psychological force, force that causes the pur-
sued driver to increase his speed and the danger to the public. Whether 
officers use psychological force or direct physical force, such as ram-
ming the pursued driver's vehicle, the constitutionality of their actions 
depends upon the circumstances of each pursuit. Force is permissible 
only if it is not disproportionate to the need for it. Disproportionality is 
measured by balancing the harm presented by the pursuit itself against 
the officers' need to apprehend the fleeing driver. The need to appre-
hend is directly related to the seriousness of the offense prompting the 
pursuit, not to the suspicious act of fleeing.460 An examination of some 
current police pursuit policies reveals that police departments have dif-
ferently assessed the need for pursuits. 
In examining fourth amendment excessive force claims, the United 
States Supreme Court articulated a standard that is similar to the dis-
proportionality standard for fourteenth amendment pursuit claims. In 
Tennessee v. Garner,461 the Court explained that officers may use 
deadly force to apprehend a suspect if he "poses a threat of serious 
physical harm, either to the officer or to others."462 Similarly, in Gra-
ham v. Connor,468 the Court stated that the degree of nondeadly force 
458. See supra notes 294-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
fourteenth amendment standard of disproportionality. 
459. /d. 
460. Some law enforcement officials contend that limiting pursuits of minor traf-
fic offenders would prevent them from effectively protecting the public from criminals. 
See, e.g., The Police Yearbook, 1990 International Ass'n Chiefs of Police 75 (October 
14-19, 1989). They believe that officers should be able to pursue minor traffic offenders 
because police officers may serendipitously apprehend a driver who has committed a 
serious, yet unknown, offense. /d. This erroneous view ignores the clear commands of 
Tennessee v. ·Garner and Graham v. Connor, in which the Supreme Court held that the 
use of force must be related to the seriousness of a known crime. 
461. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
462. /d. at II. 
463. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). 
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permissible depends upon "the severity of the crime at issue, [and] 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the of-
ficers or others.""6" By focusing on the danger that a suspect presents · 
to others, the Court broadly protected a suspect's right to personal se-
curity and limited the degree of force officers may use to apprehend a 
suspect. 
Most pursuit policies recognize that pursuits are inherently dan-
gerous."611 Some policies explicity declare that a pursuit represents the 
use of deadly force."66 Because they directly link deadly force with a 
pursuit, they authorize pursuits only when officers would be just\fied in 
using deadly force to stop the driver."67 Similarly, some policies ques-
tion whether the driver has allegedly committed a "hazardous" offense 
or a "violent" offense.'68 These policies properly recognize that the law-
fulness of a pursuit is not related to whether an individual has commit-
ted a felony or misdemea:nor."69 The focus is on the offense the suspect 
464. /d. at 1872. 
465. See, e.g., Clark County, Ga., Pursuit Policy, Bl.22 (Nov. 1, 1986) ("vehicle 
pursuit is justified only when the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the 
level of danger created by the pursuit"); Little Rock, Ark., Pursuit Policy, G.O. 17 
(Nov. 9, 1989) (pursuits are to be terminated "when the danger created by the pursuit 
outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension"); City of Oakdale, Minn., Pursuit 
Policy, AD-009 (Dec. 15, 1989) (officers are to question whether "the dangers created 
by the pursuit incident exceed the danger posed by allowing the perpetrator to escape" 
and whether "a reasonable person [would] understand why the pursuit occurred or was 
necessary"); Ohio, Pursuit Policy § 12.045-1 (Apr.l2, 1990) (pursuit justified "only 
when the necessity of apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the 
pursuit"). 
466. See, e.g., Volusia County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 41.2 (Feb. 15, 1990) (pur-
suits are prohibited "unless it is for the apprehension of a supsect under the circum-
stances which would, at the time the decision is made to pursue, justify the use of 
deadly force") (emphasis in original); County of Charleston, S.C., Pursuit Policy, G.O. 
81-923(a) (Mar. 23, 1982) ("same judgement must apply to both [pursuits and the use 
of firearms]"). 
467. See, e.g., Volusia County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 41.2 (Feb. 15, 1990). This 
pursuit policy complies with the fourth amendment standard for using force. See supra 
notes 214-293 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fourth amendment stan-
dard. This policy limits pursuits to two circumstances: 
1. The apprehension of a person reasonably suspected of committing a fel-
ony and the deputy reasonably believes that the fleeing person poses a threat 
of death or serious injury to others beyond the circumstances directly in-
volved in the pursuit; OR 
2. The deputy believes the fleeing person has committed a crime involving 
the infliction of serious physical harm or death to another person. 
Volusia County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 41.2 (Feb. 15, 1990). 
468. See, e.g., Palm Beach County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 87-5 (Jan. 1, 1977) 
(pursuit may be initiated only when the driver has allegedly committed a "violent or 
hazardous" crime or violation); Metropolitan Police, Boston, Mass., 4.4.1 (July, 16, 
1990) ("justification for the initiation or continuation of a pursuit shall be judged on 
the basis of the hazard it poses to the safety of the public"). 
469. See, e.g., Metropolitan Police, Boston, Mass., 4.4.1 (July, 16, 1990) (hazard 
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first committed and its dangerousness. 
Some policies, however, fail to explain which offenses justify the 
danger of a pursuit.470 Many policies simply state that police officers 
should consider the "nature of the offense" committed by a suspect as a 
factor in determining whether to pursue.471 One policy leaves the deci-
sion to the "sound judgment" of the officer.472 Other policies authorize 
officers to pursue individuals who violate traffic laws, without caution-
ing that the traffic offense must have represented a danger to others:m 
In addition to these general policies, some policies explicity declare that 
a policy of limited pursuit is not in the public's best interest.474 These 
policies declare that officers may pursue a car thief, an individual who 
has committed a property offense, even if a pursuit is inherently 
dangerous. 4711 
Even when policies create a distinction between dangerous and 
nondangerous offenses, they sometimes disagree as to which offenses 
signify danger. Some policies classify the offense of intoxicated driving 
as an offense justifying a pursuit.476 One state model policy, however, 
explicitly forbids pursujt under these circumstances.477 Although an in-
of a particular offense justifies a pursuit, not whether it is a misdemeanor or felony). 
470. See, e.g., Vernon, Conn., Pursuit Policy, Dl (Dec. 1987) (officer is to 
"weigh the seriousness of the offense committed against the danger to himself and 
others who may be affected by the pursuit"); Cape Coral, Fla., Pursuit Policy, C-2 
(Aug. 11, 1989) (officer is to consider the "seriousness of the crime"); City of Over-
land, Kan., Pursuit Policy, 100-13 (Apr. 13, 1989) ("Pursuits for person(s) suspected 
of involvement in serious crime are viewed as more justifiable than those for persons 
suspected of only traffic or other misdemeanor violations."); City of Jackson, Tenn., 
Pursuit Policy, 26-89 (Mar. 22, 1989) (officer must consider the "seriousness of the 
crime"). 
471. City of New York, N.Y., Pursuit Policy, 85-11 (Nov. 15, 1985) (officer is to 
consider the "nature of the offense"); Broward County, Fla., Pursuit Policy, G.O. 90-
50 (Aug. 20, 1990) (same). 
472. See, e.g., Richmond County, Ga., Pursuit Policy, 87-4.8. 
473. See, e.g., Macon, Ga., Pursuit Policy, 4.45 (Jan. 1, 1988) (officer may pur-
sue when the "violator has committed or is attempting to commit a serious felony, or 
when the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by 
the hot pursuit"). 
474. See, e.g., West Palm Beach, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 1-9 (Apr. 7, 1989) ("it is 
not in the best interests of public safety to advocate a policy that would encourage the 
dangerous driver, car thief, or fleeing criminal to proceed without the imminent possi-
bility of police intervention"); Clarksville, Tenn., Pursuit Policy, 10-003(b) (same). 
475. See supra note 474. 
476. See, e.g., Boynton Beach, Fla., Pursuit Policy, 517.001 (May 11, 1990) 
(driving under the influence is a "serious traffic violation" justifying a pursuit); Mon-
tana Highway Patrol, Mont., Pursuit Policy, S-41.2.8 (Mar. 1990) (same; reckless 
driving also justifies pursuit); United States Capitol Police, D.C., Pursuit Policy, III-1 
(October 1, 1989) (intoxicated driving justifies pursuit). 
477. Florida Police Chiefs Ass'n, Model Pursuit Policy (1989-90) (offenses of 
"burglary, reckless driving, D.U.I., leaving the scene of an accident with injuries ... 
are considered less serious and should only be conducted when such a pursuit is in the 
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toxicated driver does represent a danger to the public, focus on the 
police officers' role during a pursuit indicates that pursuit of such a 
driver increases the risk of harm presented by the driver. 
Whether a police pursuit is constitutional under the fourth and 
fourteenth amendments thus depends upon the danger that the pursued 
driver represents and the risk of harm associated with the pursuits. One 
should evaluate the danger that a pursued driver represents, however, 
before, not after, a pursuit begins because a pursuit itself constitutes 
the use of force, force that is to be proportionate to the need for it. 
Such force is permissible only if the offense or offenses allegedly com-
mitted by the suspect are dangerous offenses. 
The typical police pursuit, however, has occurred because an indi-
vidual allegedly committed a traffic offense. Even though some traffic 
offenses may signify serious offenses, pursuits are inherently dangerous. 
The lawfulness of the force represented by a pursuit, however, is to be 
evaluated in terms of the disproportionality standards of the fourth and 
fourteenth amendments. These standards have permitted the use of 
force when proportionate to the need- a need that not only considers 
the personal security interest of the pursued individual but also of 
others. Because pursuits themselves may endanger individuals other 
than the pursued driver, police officers must also ascertain the need to 
apprehend in light of the personal security interests of others. 
When one considers the risks associated with pursuits and the of-
fenses that justify those risks, one can discern that most police pursuits 
constitute the use of disproportionate force. Pursuing a serial killer may 
justify the risks inherent in a high-speed pursuit. Yet, under some cir-
cumstances, such as a pursuit in a congested area, one must neverthe-
less consider whether apprehension of this dangerous person might 
cause further death, this time to innocent motorists and pedestrians. To 
avoid further loss to liberty and life, police officers need to use other 
means to arrest individuals. As the Supreme Court has stated, a police 
practice may be unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment if it fails to consider modern technology and the need to protect 
the right to personal security.•78 The practice of pursuing all individu-
als, regardless of the offense they have allegedly committed, must now 
yield, as did the earlier the practice of shooting and killing all fleeing 
felons. 
best interests of public safety). 
478. See, e.g., Garner, 471 U.S. at 13. 
